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Six experiments examined the effects of diffuse distrust on cognition, in order to elucidate the 
link between the immediate cognitive changes associated with the state and responses to persuasive 
messages. Five of the present studies addressed two specific mechanisms that appear to account for 
established non-routine effects – increased contrast sensitivity and cognitive flexibility. Experiment 1 
used an imposter detection task (IDT) to induce distrust. It presented participants with 30 statements, to 
rate the likelihood of each on a 100-point scale. The second half consisted of statements that agreed with, 
contradicted, or were unrelated to those in the first half. Impostor detection did not have the predicted 
contrast-sensitizing effect on these plausibility judgments, but values-based medical mistrust was 
associated with higher judged plausibility of factually-false statements that did not contradict previously-
presented statements. Experiment 2 induced distrust via economic deception game (EDG). Four 
characters, including a medical doctor and a quack, were presented either together or alone. The predicted 
effect, that doctor and charlatan would be rated less stereotypically by distrusting participants when 
presented alone, and more when presented together, was not found. Experiment 3 did not find the 
predicted result that the EDG would make participants agree less with strong arguments for senior 
comprehensive exams, and more with an anti-exam argument. In Experiment 4, the IDT did not increase 
completed word stems. In Experiment 5, after the EDG, participants rated the compatibility of statement 
pairs, and provided explanations of how to make them more compatible. Participants in the distrust 
condition who believed their partner was real used more words to reconcile the statements, as predicted. 
Experiment 6 used the EDG and presented participants with a pro-tire-rotation essay, and an anti-tire-
rotation essay designed to imitate the rhetorical style of anti-vaccination websites. Participants in the 
distrust condition were generally more skeptical of the anti-rotation essay, but if they scored highly on 
medical mistrust, they found it more convincing. The relevance of basic cognitive processes to explicit 
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attitudes is discussed, and it is concluded that existing beliefs may have important implications for how 
people respond to deception. 
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Chapter 1 
 
What Is Distrust? 
 In order for any human society to function effectively, interpersonal and institutional trust 
must be present to some healthy degree. A thriving economic system relies on the ability of 
people to be confident that they will get what they were promised. Public safety and peace 
entirely depend on whether the law and those who enforce it act with integrity and fairness. 
Adequately dependable news and educational institutions are necessary for keeping people 
cognizant of what is going on in the world, and how to make the right decisions for their lives. 
Health messages in particular, if they are to be of any use at all in fighting disease, must be 
trustworthy. With public trust in institutions eroding, all of these public goods are increasingly at 
risk (Twenge, Campbell, & Carter, 2014; Wood & Berg, 2011). We should therefore try to 
understand the psychology of distrust, to understand why it occurs, how it changes the way our 
mental processes work, and in what ways it can influence a person’s decisions. This investigation 
purports to advance our understanding of how the cognitive effects of distrust influence attitudes. 
Put in very simple terms, distrust is what we experience when we feel deceived or 
vulnerable to deception. Uncertainty is a necessary element of distrust, but some element of 
human intention seems to also be necessary to activate the characteristic cognitive processes that 
researchers have identified in laboratory studies of distrust (Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011; Posten 
& Mussweiler, 2013; Schul, Mayo, & Burnstein, 2004, 2008). So, in order to understand distrust, 
we first need to understand how people respond to the unpleasant predicament of experiencing a 
loss of control and certainty about their surroundings. 
 
 
2 
 
Distrust and Uncertainty/Control Motivation 
 Uncertainty and loss of control shake us out of our default ways of operating and force us 
to engage more critically with our surroundings. Participants who experience a loss of control 
exhibit a tendency to evaluate information more carefully, to actively seek diagnostic 
information, and ultimately to respond with more accuracy in laboratory tests. They also display 
a more negative mood (Pittman & D’Agostino, 1985, 1989; Pittman & Pittman, 1980).  
 Pittman and Pittman (1980) found that giving participants arbitrary, essentially random 
feedback on the correctness or incorrectness of their choices in a guessing game left participants 
with a more negative mood, yet improved their performance on an anagram task in comparison 
to participants who received no feedback at all on their choices. Using the same paradigm, 
Pittman and D’Agostino (1989) found that participants receiving random feedback inferred traits 
based on behaviors more quickly, spent more time studying textual information, and responded 
more accurately in a recall test based on said textual information.  
 Studies of this kind involve an experimenter providing the participant with unreliable 
information, thus being rather unreliable, though not necessarily malicious – that is, they cannot 
be trusted, but this does not mean they are distrusted. What they do not address, however, is how 
people deal with uncertainty that is understood to be purely chance-based, such as that generated 
by a machine or by the emergent behavior of many people (e.g. fluctuations in stock prices), 
versus when that uncertainty is believed to come from the intentional actions of another person.  
 In order to parse this difference between chance-based and deception-based uncertainty, 
Schul, Mayo, Burnstein, and Yahalom (2007) presented participants with a task in which they 
had the opportunity to win additional money by correctly guessing the content of a matchbox. 
All participants were told that the outside of the box would match the inside in ⅔ of cases. 
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Participants in the chance condition pulled the matchbox out of a bag, and participants in the 
deception condition had the box handed to them by a partner who stood to profit from their 
incorrect guesses. The researchers found that participants whose uncertainty was based on 
random chance tended to adopt a statistical approach - they based their guess on the sticker on 
the outside of the matchbox, accepting that they would be incorrect about ⅓ of the time. On the 
other hand, participants experiencing deception-based uncertainty adopted a clinical approach - 
they tried to construct a narrative around their partner’s actions and predict the contents of each 
box according to their hypothesis about his or her deception plan. These participants performed 
considerably worse.  
 Based on these findings, it appears that when uncertainty is believed to be chance-based, 
people will adopt a strategy aimed at maximizing successful outcomes, accepting that some error 
will be inevitable. However, when the uncertainty is attributed to a distrusted other, people will 
try to eliminate the uncertainty - either by avoiding the distrusted entity altogether, trying to read 
their mind, as Schul et al.’s participants did, or by relying on socially-constructed incentive 
structures to restrict (and therefore make more predictable) the other’s choices. Uncertainty, 
therefore, is a necessary but insufficient element of distrust. In order for distrust to be 
experienced, uncertainty must be accompanied by a degree of vulnerability to the intentional 
actions of another. 
 This helps to explain why some recent studies have found that dispositional measures of 
trust and distrust are addressing different constructs. Conchie, Taylor, and Charlton (2011) found 
that trust and distrust in leaders were both influenced by the perceived integrity of a given leader, 
but that the perceived ability of the leader only enhanced trust, having no effect on a person’s 
distrust of the leader. They also found that the perceived benevolence of a leader had very little 
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influence over how much the leader was trusted, but that perceived malevolence strongly 
predicted distrust. Ou and Sia (2010) have also demonstrated that trust and distrust have distinct 
cognitions, antecedents, and consequences, behaving more like separate constructs than locations 
on a continuum. Similarly, major questionnaire measures of trust (e.g., Shea et al., 2008; 
Yamagishi et al., 2015; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994) are often split into two factors – one that 
addresses the need for caution or the perceived competence of others, concepts that deal with 
basic human tendencies toward error, and one that addresses the goodness or values of others, 
indicators that they will intentionally behave in ways that are detrimental to oneself. 
Focused and Diffuse Distrust 
 Schul and Peri (2015) have suggested that there is another way that distrust can be 
conceptually split. They contend that there are two strategic necessities that come into play when 
our distrust is focused on a particular entity – “unmasking the other” and “masking the self.”  
Focused distrust. In our attempts to unmask the other, we engage in more broad 
interpretations of their statements and actions, and try to detect inconsistencies, which could 
reveal deception attempts. We engage in non-routine cognitions in response to a situation in 
which things may not be what they seem – where it is possible that some messages are decoys, 
falsehoods, or other means to manipulate us into being taken advantage of. With this strategy, we 
are trying to answer the question, “what is this really about?” Does this salesperson mean that 
this car is reliable in the way that I understand the term, or is it just a reliably-selling product for 
her? Perhaps she is only emphasizing its reliability in order to draw my attention away from its 
flaws. Perhaps she is lying about the car’s reliability outright – is there any available information 
to contradict her claim? We entertain a wider range of interpretations of the information 
available, and we look for ways to test these interpretations.   
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Masking the self is also necessary during such an encounter, because when we are wary 
that someone may try to deceive or otherwise manipulate us, we feel the need to conceal our own 
thoughts and motives, in order to make ourselves less vulnerable to manipulation. With this 
strategy, we tend to become more rigid, reluctant to show signs of weakness to the distrusted 
other, and relying more on our own “gut” feelings to make decisions, resisting making the 
decisions we believe they want us to make. If we distrust the car salesperson, this may take the 
form of maintaining a “poker face” while she pitches the car, or looking for problems to point 
out with the car when we are actually enamored with it. If we reveal any weakness in our mental 
armor to the distrusted other, we run the risk of losing our autonomy altogether, so even when 
we find her persuasive, we try to conceal it. In this way, distrusting others makes us behave in 
less trustworthy ways, ourselves. 
Diffuse distrust. When the encounter that prompted a distrust response has ended, and 
we are no longer directly interacting with the distrusted other, we are left dealing with the 
residual activation of these distrust-oriented cognitive processes for a time. Strategically, the 
need to “mask the self” is no longer present, but we continue to “unmask the other,” internally. 
The creative, critical, way of thinking remains at work until we settle back into our normal 
cognitive habits.  
Studies that observe the effects of distrust in this diffuse form have found an increase in 
what is often referred to as “non-routine” cognition – the influence of inadmissible information is 
weakened for participants in mock juries (Fein, McCloskey, & Tomlinson, 1997), the halo effect 
is reduced (Schul, Burnstein, & Bardi, 1996), counterintuitive puzzles are solved more easily, 
whereas straightforward ones become more difficult (Schul et al., 2008), creativity of responses 
increases (Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011), and stereotyping is reduced (Posten & Mussweiler, 
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2013). This shift away from our personal biases in judgment tends to make us more likely to take 
another person’s advice, which is the opposite of what happens if that person is subject to 
focused distrust (Schul & Peri, 2015).  
This shift is not necessarily advantageous. Despite the fact that over-reliance on personal 
biases can often lead us astray, if a bias is, say, in favor of legitimate scientific or professional 
authorities, it can be a helpful shortcut or heuristic. If the psychology of diffuse distrust is used to 
undermine the legitimacy of critical institutions and make half-baked alternatives sound more 
promising, for instance, the potential for harm is great. 
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Chapter 2 
Why Do People Distrust? 
 If distrust is a departure from routine modes of cognition, then it must also be a response 
to some sort of environmental cue. Some of these cues have been documented in the 
psychological literature.  
Characteristics of the message or messenger.  
Message characteristics. Sometimes information of shaky validity can promote a state 
of diffuse distrust. One obvious way this can happen is when a message or messenger provides 
information the recipient knows to be false. In laboratory experiments, distrust toward a 
particular set of individuals has been provoked by consistently attributing false statements to 
those individuals (Schul, Mayo, & Burnstein, 2004).  
 It also may be possible to induce a state of distrust in a less direct way--without explicit 
experience with false information. For example, the semantic content of a message can cue 
associations the recipient has previously associated with distrust, putting its recipient into a more 
distrusting state of mind. Various experiments have used semantic primes (distrust-related 
words) embedded in scrambled sentence tasks (Friesen & Sinclair, 2011; Mayer & Mussweiler, 
2011; Posten & Mussweiler, 2013), and lexical decision tasks (Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011; 
Posten, Ockenfels, & Mussweiler, 2014; Posten & Mussweiler, 2013) to promote distrust. This 
suggests that even the words of a message may subtly induce a state of distrust in their recipient. 
 Communicator characteristics. Aside from the message itself, the messenger’s features 
might also act as cues to distrust. They may convey a certain facial expression, for example. 
Schul, Mayo, and Burnstein (2008) promoted distrust in laboratory participants simply by having 
them fixate on and form an impression of an illustrated human face that was designed to look 
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particularly untrustworthy – a thin face with a goatee and narrowed eyes (based on empirical 
findings about perceived suspiciousness and facial expressions, see Akehurst, Köhnken, Vrij, & 
Bull, 1996). So specific facial features and expressions may make a person appear to be less 
trustworthy, and as a consequence, also promote a distrusting state in perceivers who were 
exposed to an image of such a person. This effect may require a certain minimum amount of time 
and attention to work. A previous study had used similarly-designed faces that were presented 
for much shorter periods of time, and did not find evidence that the facial expressions promoted 
distrust (Schul et al., 2004).  
Social Context 
Surveilling and being surveilled by others. Research on the nature of trust and distrust 
within organizations seems to suggest that surveillance promotes a state of distrust in both the 
watcher and the watched.  
Cialdini notes in his Triple Tumor model of organizational dishonesty that surveillance 
can have a poisonous effect on the climate of an organization (Cialdini, 1996).  Through basic 
cognitive dissonance processes, supervisors who are surveilling their subordinates will come to 
attribute honest employee behavior to their surveillance practices rather than to the 
trustworthiness of the employees. This leads to a situation in which surveillance justifies itself, 
creating a feedback loop in which investment in surveillance equipment and services promotes 
further investment in the same, leaching resources that organizations could use in more 
productive ways.  
Additionally, placing people under evaluative scrutiny tends to promote feelings of 
personal persecution and paranoid cognition in general – when we feel we are being watched by 
others, we tend to overestimate how much attention is being directed at ourselves, leading us in 
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turn to overestimate how much of our supervisors’ behaviors are directed at ourselves, creating a 
pattern of heightening suspicion of the motives of others (Kramer, 1994). This pattern of 
increased cognitive elaboration is conceptually quite similar to that observed in studies of the 
diffuse state of distrust (Schul et al., 2003;2008; Posten & Mussweiler 2013; Mayer & 
Mussweiler, 2011).  
If we are already treating someone as if they are going to behave in an untrustworthy 
way, and they then behave in a way that is entirely trustworthy, we are still likely to continue to 
distrust them. This is true not only because of the dissonance-based mechanisms described in the 
triple tumor model, but also, distrust drives us to discount information from the distrusted source, 
and to avoid contact – both of which make it unlikely that we will encounter credible information 
to effectively challenge our distrust of that entity (Kramer, 1999).  
 Awareness of interests in conflict with one’s own. Any two people who have mutually 
conflicting interests will have difficulty trusting one another, so even the awareness of the fact 
that another person has an incentive to deceive us may lead us to distrust them. One way that 
many cultures have dealt with this problem is by providing social assurance – the collective 
enforcement of honest dealings that promises to punish dishonest conduct in greater magnitude 
than the reward such conduct would provide. Social assurance is the Hobbesian leviathan that 
brings all individuals’ interests into alignment, at least in regard to certain crucial exchanges. In 
this way, even when trust is lacking, people can behave as if they trust each other, because of the 
overarching incentive structure provided by laws or other customs. 
  Social assurance. Any modern economy depends on a high level of certainty between 
participants that they will make exchanges honestly, but different cultures can differ in the 
relative importance of trust versus assurance. In a study of Japanese and American participants, 
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Japanese respondents reported lower levels of interpersonal trust, and assigned less importance 
to reputation and honesty than American respondents did, but there was no difference in the 
amount of caution the two populations believed was necessary in dealing with other people. The 
researchers concluded that this was due to the greater reliance on networks of committed 
relations in Japanese culture, which provides a strong incentive for people to behave in what 
amounts to a trustworthy manner in their exchanges with others (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 
1994).  
There is also reason to believe that much of the prejudice and distrust that people have 
towards atheists (Edgell, Gereis, & Hartmann, 2006; Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011) is 
due to their relative lack of accountability to a higher power – their disbelief in a watchful and 
just God makes them targets of suspicion because they do not subscribe to the spiritual incentive 
structure that religious people do. Gervais and Norenzayan (2011) found that reminders of the 
effectiveness of secular authorities reduced distrust of atheists in religious people. This suggests 
that making effective sources of social assurance more salient can reduce the distrust people feel 
toward others. Similarly, countries with more effective secular systems of authority tend to have 
lower rates of distrust for atheists (Norenzayan & Gervais, 2015). 
Distrust being an active state means it places demands on limited cognitive resources. In 
order to conserve these resources, people will be motivated to find reasons to trust others, or at 
least to limit their need to engage in distrusting cognitions. This implies that where one system of 
assurance is ineffective, people will seek another. For example, the degree to which one relies on 
God and governments for assurance appears to be hydraulic in nature – as people lose confidence 
in their government, they rely more on God (or the inherent goodness of others), and vice-versa 
(Kay, Shepherd, Blatz, et al., 2010). Assurance is a means by which we can produce an 
11 
 
environment where we can trust most people, most of the time. By having a system in place that 
governs everyone, we free ourselves from the need to be suspicious of every new person we 
interact with. It is only when we perceive some cue that social assurance is insufficient and that 
others may have some interest in exploiting or deceiving us that we activate distrusting cognitive 
processes. 
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Chapter 3 
Cognitive Processing in a State of Distrust 
Given that it is characterized as a response to a situation in which messages may be 
misleading, it should not be surprising that distrust seems to make people interpret information in 
a more critical, creative, and effortful manner. This has often been described as non-routine 
information processing (Schul et al., 2008; 2004). 
Although this mode of cognition has some conceptual similarities with, and at times may 
intersect with central route processing as articulated in the Elaboration Likelihood Model 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1984), it does differ in some important ways in terms of both mechanism and 
prediction. Central route processing is often understood as the cognitively expensive, effortful, 
rational evaluation of the presented message. Distrust is more defensive than it is truly rational – 
where central processing is characterized as evaluating the available evidence and the internal 
consistency of the message, (focused) distrust involves active resistance to persuasion, and is 
better described as a reluctance to accept the message and consists of seeking-out contradictions 
and an eagerness to accept ideas that oppose the one being presented.  
While some experiments deal in focused distrust (Schul et al., 2004), many recent 
experiments concentrate on diffuse distrust – inducing distrust in one context, and then observing 
its effects in the context of a totally different task, free of contact with the person or stimulus that 
was used to induce the distrust in the participant (Schul, Mayo, & Burnstein, 2006; Mayer & 
Mussweiler, 2011; Posten & Mussweiler, 2013; Friesen & Sinclair, 2011). Several different 
methods have been used to provoke this state of distrust. 
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Inducing Distrust 
Distrust researchers have used a variety of induction methods to manipulate trust and 
distrust in their experiments. Semantic primes are often used, though some methods of inducing 
distrust involve the participant in a situation that attempts to simulate the elements of a distrust-
inducing encounter. 
Semantic primes. Researchers often use semantic priming methods such as the 
scrambled sentence task (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996) or a modified lexical decision task 
(Dijksterhuis, Aaerts, Bargh, & van Knippenberg, 2000) to induce a state of distrust. The 
scrambled sentence method presents participants with a set of five words, arranged randomly, 
and requires them to use four of those words to create a grammatically-correct sentence. 
Researchers insert words relevant to trust or distrust into these sets in order to inconspicuously 
get participants to process these concepts, priming them toward a trusting or distrusting mindset 
(Friesen & Sinclair, 2011; Posten & Mussweiler, 2013; Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011). 
Researchers have also used a modified lexical decision task, in which strings of 
characters are flashed on a computer screen very quickly, and participants must decide whether 
the characters form a word or not, to induce participants to be more trusting or distrusting. In 
order to induce these states of mind, researchers construct the program so that many or all of the 
real words are semantically close to “trust” or “distrust” (or their German equivalents, as is often 
the case; Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011; Posten & Mussweiler, 2013). As with the scrambled 
sentence task, this procedure works by activating the concepts of trust or distrust, which shapes 
the style of cognitive processing that follows. 
Pattern detection/training inductions. Another strategy researchers have used to induce 
distrust is to put participants into a situation that simulates one of the main features of a real life 
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situation that would promote distrust, namely the need to determine whether or not another 
person is trying to deceive them. Posten and Mussweiler (2013) accomplish this by using an 
economic deception game, in which a computer was used to give participants the impression 
they were playing with another participant over a network. Participants in the trust condition 
were provided with advice from their “partner” that was in their best interest. Participants in the 
distrust condition were provided with advice that would result in them being shorted to the 
advantage of their “partner”. Participants in the control condition were not given any advice 
throughout the task. 
Another technique involves providing participants with collections of several question-
and-answer exchanges to read, some of which have answers from actual women, while others 
have been answered by men trying to impersonate women. Participants in the distrust condition 
are asked to pick out the “impostors,” and participants in the control condition are asked to rate 
how spontaneous each respondent was (Schul et al., 2004). Similarly, participants have also been 
trained to distrust specific faces and trust others through a task in which narrow-eyed faces are 
consistently paired with false statements, and wide-eyed faces are consistently paired with true 
statements (Schul et al., 2004). An abbreviated version of this ‘eyes and lies’ paradigm described 
previously in which participants were asked to memorize and form an impression of either a 
narrow-eyed (distrust-inducing) or round-eyed (trust-inducing) face, based on the idea that these 
are facial features that are generally perceived as negatively associated with trustworthiness 
(Zebrowitz, 1997).  
The effects of these distrust manipulations have often been described with the blanket 
term “non-routine.” Though the effects seem to be widely varied at a glance, they can be 
organized into a few related categories. 
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Non-routine Information Processing 
From a very young age on through adulthood, we generally trust the things that others tell 
us to be true, particularly if we have no reason to doubt the information (Harris, 2012; Gilbert, 
1991). In other words, to trust is ‘routine’. However, when we find ourselves in a potentially 
misleading environment, we are more likely to take on non-routine ways of interpreting the 
information that comes our way. This is advantageous in a few different ways. First, we are more 
prepared for the unexpected. Second, we are more sensitive to non-routine actions, which could 
provide clues that we are being deceived. Third, when we behave in a non-routine manner 
ourselves, we become less predictable and therefore less controllable by others who may be 
trying to manipulate us through deception. Distrust has often been said to facilitate non-routine 
cognitions (Posten & Mussweiller, 2013; Schul et al., 2004; 2008), though this non-routine-ness 
apparently takes a variety of forms. 
Stereotype reduction and difference bias. Posten and Mussweiller (2013) used an 
economic deception game to induce participants to either trust or distrust. After completing the 
induction task, participants were asked to provide feedback on a portrait of either a male or 
female person (disguised as a filler task). They found that distrust-primed participants judged 
female targets to be less stereotypically female than their counterparts in the control and trust-
prime conditions, and even judged male targets to be more stereotypically female than controls 
or trust-primed participants, suggesting that male stereotypes were reduced under distrust as 
well. They found similar stereotype-reducing effects for ethnic and weight-based stereotypes. 
They found that this effect could be nullified if they had participants complete a similarity-
detection task between the distrust prime and trait rating task, concluding that the observed 
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stereotype reduction was due to participants comparing the target to their stereotypes and seeing 
more difference than usual. 
Simultaneous contradictory cognitions. Distrust has been shown to facilitate cognitions 
that conflict with the information provided, as if the participant is automatically preparing for the 
information to be false. Shul, et al. (2004) trained participants to trust wide-eyed faces and 
distrust narrow-eyed faces. Participants were then presented with the faces again, this time with a 
subliminal prime adjective followed by a target word that they were to identify as a noun or an 
adjective. On trials with a target adjective, it was either semantically congruent or incongruent 
with the prime adjective (target nouns were filler trials; virtually all nouns and adjectives are 
potentially congruent when paired together). Participants were faster to recognize the target 
adjective of an incongruent word pair (e.g., Hollow-Solid) when the words were presented with a 
distrusted face than when they were presented with a trusted face. 
 This activation of incongruent concepts has also been demonstrated when activating 
social categories in response to perceiving another person. Friesen and Sinclair (2011) primed 
participants with distrust or trust, and then showed them a video of either a White doctor or a 
Black doctor. The only group to show evidence of category activation were distrusting 
participants who watched the Black doctor video. They showed activation of both Black and 
doctor categories. This result is interesting, not only because it suggests that distrust can lead to 
the activation of multiple social categories pertaining to the same person, but also because the 
words used in the lexical decision task to represent each social category were often directly 
opposed to one another. Words in the doctor category included terms such as health, intelligent, 
educated, caring, and compassionate, whereas words in the Black category included terms such 
as dealer, gang, crime, violent, aggressive, and dangerous. So, in addition to finding that distrust 
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seems to lead to the activation of more categories, this finding also supports the notion that 
distrust facilitates the simultaneous activation of incongruent cognitions. 
Schul and his colleages (2008, experiments 1 and 2) found that participants induced to be 
distrusting, either by means of a task asking them to discriminate gender imposters from genuine 
women, or to process an untrustworthy face, were faster to adapt to counter-intuitive prediction 
environments, in which higher scores on unnamed character traits predicted lower job 
performance. 
Creativity. Mayer and Mussweiller (2011) found that creativity could be enhanced by 
priming distrust. Creativity was judged in terms of the number of unique ideas, originality of 
ideas, and the number of different semantic categories used when freely generating alternative 
uses for household items. They found, decomposing their creativity measure into its component 
parts, that flexibility (defined as the number of semantic categories used) mediated the 
relationship between distrust and originality (judged creativity). 
In sum, distrust has been found to increase a person’s ability to detect differences and 
also their ability to think creatively and unconventionally, becoming more alert to non-obvious 
alternatives and possibilities. 
Two Underlying Themes of the “Non-Routine” 
The literature on the cognitive effects of distrust often makes the claim that a state of 
distrust facilitates non-routine cognitions, and indeed, the activation of adjectives of incongruent 
meaning to a prime word (Schul et al., 2004), reduced stereotypicality of trait ratings (Posten & 
Mussweiller, 2013), increased creativity (Mayer & Mussweiller, 2011), and enhanced 
performance on more complex puzzles (Schul et al., 2008) are all outcomes that differ from 
typical or routine patterns of thought. Then again, the phrase “non-routine” is vague and does not 
18 
 
provide information about what it is about distrust that produces these non-routine cognitions. 
The term is also unhelpful in that it does not imply specific outcomes. “Non-routine” can 
potentially describe a wide variety of outcomes, and leaves too much room for interpretation. 
After all, most psychology experiments involve many behaviors that would be considered non-
routine by most people.  It appears to me that laboratory studies involving distrust can be 
explained better by attributing distrust effects to two mechanisms – increased cognitive 
flexibility and contrast sensitivity. 
Cognitive flexibility. When we are distrusting of our surroundings, it makes intuitive 
sense that we ought to be more open to a wider variety of interpretations of the information 
presented to us. This may help us to detect another person’s attempts at deception, or in a more 
impersonal situation, allow us to regain our bearings after being disoriented. In other words, we 
become more flexible in our thinking – we rapidly activate multiple categories, connect the 
stimuli we perceive to more different categories and associates, and entertain more creative 
interpretations of the things we see and hear. 
This flexibility is on display in a series of studies conducted by Friesen and Sinclair 
(2008), in which distrust-primed participants who viewed a video of a Black doctor were faster 
to identify words associated with both Black people and doctors than control participants or 
participants who viewed a White doctor. In fact, distrusting participants viewing the Black 
doctor were the only participants to respond quickly enough to category-relevant words to even 
be considered evidence of category activation. It is difficult to explain why the doctor category 
was not still activated among distrust-primed participants who viewed a White doctor, but these 
findings still do appear to support the notion that distrust promotes the activation of multiple 
categories in response to a stimulus. 
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Another clear case is a series of studies reported by Mayer and Mussweiller (2011), in 
which distrust-primed participants were found to generate more creative ideas for alternative 
uses of common household items. Further exploration of the phenomenon revealed that the 
relationship between distrust and originality was moderated by cognitive flexibility, 
operationalized as the number of semantic categories participants used in their responses. 
A third case that suggests that distrust promotes cognitive flexibility is an experiment in 
which distrusting participants were given a set of puzzles consisting of arithmetic problems made 
out of matchsticks. Participants were to change incorrect equations into correct equations by 
moving one matchstick and thus changing two characters in the problem. The routine set of 
problems only required participants to move a matchstick to one number to another number, 
changing only the values of different numbers (e.g. IX=X-III is solved: IX-XI-II). The non-
routine set, however, required participants to remove a matchstick from one of the numbers and 
move it to one of the arithmetic signs in order to make the equation correct (e.g. XI=VI-IV is 
solved: X=VI+IV). Distrusting participants had a higher success rate for the non-routine items, 
and trusting participants had a higher success rate for the routine items (Schul et al., 2008, 
experiment 3). Because the non-routine problems required participants to consider both the 
numbers and the arithmetic signs for alteration, it suggests that participants who had greater 
success at these problems were attending to both categories of symbols presented to them, 
allowing them to imagine a greater variety of possible solutions. Although the processing of the 
problem can certainly be considered to be outside the routine, it seems to exemplify cognitive 
flexibility rather well, because it requires participants to consider a wider variety of possibilities 
when approaching the problem. 
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Together, these findings suggest that it is helpful to understand distrust at least in part, as 
a state that promotes cognitive flexibility. This implies that we might predict that people who are 
already thinking in a distrusting way may find it easier to imagine ulterior motives, side effects, 
and alternative courses of action that a more trusting person might dismiss without a second 
thought. This prediction differs from what we would expect if distrust effects were assumed to be 
merely due to use of central processing because this enhanced receptivity to selected subsequent 
messages relies on the activation of or search for new ideas, and not necessarily the actual 
critical evaluation of the arguments being presented, or of the alternative positions being 
generated. 
Contrast sensitivity. It seems that in addition to making cognitions more flexible, a state 
of distrust could also promote an emphasis toward detecting inconsistencies – between stimuli in 
the environment, between the words and actions of others, and between categories and their 
exemplars. The utility of this feature of distrust is that it allows distrusting persons to prepare 
themselves for the possibility that the information they receive is misleading (Schul et al., 2004). 
Schul et al. (2004) used an “eyes and lies” paradigm to induce distrust, and found that 
participants were faster to identify adjectives that were incongruent with a subliminal prime 
word when the pair of words was accompanied by a narrow-eyed face, and were faster to 
identify adjectives that were congruent with the prime word when a wide-eyed face was on the 
screen. In a second experiment, they used the gender imposter paradigm. Using the same 
adjective-identification task, they found the same result as in the first experiment – distrusting 
participants were faster to identify incongruent target adjectives and control participants were 
faster to identify congruent target adjectives. In both cases, it seems that when people are in a 
distrusting state, they are in a state of readiness to detect contrasting information. 
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The same research team reprised their “gender imposter” paradigm (Schul et al., 2008), 
and found that participants in the distrust condition were faster to learn a counter-intuitive 
prediction pattern – in which higher scores on important job-relevant characteristics predicted 
worse job performance – than participants in the control condition. The same result was found 
with a second version of the prediction task, in which outcomes were determined by either the 
greater (routine) or lesser (non-routine) of two predictors. Distrusting participants were faster to 
catch on to the prediction pattern in which the lower of the two predictors influenced the 
outcome than participants in the control condition. 
Because these studies were designed to demonstrate non-routine ways of processing 
information, these studies do not seem to directly support the idea that distrust necessarily results 
in contrast sensitivity. Nevertheless, when Schul et al.’s (2008) findings are understood in the 
context of other literature on the topic, it seems that this instance of non-routine information 
processing is really a finding of contrast sensitivity. In order to adapt to these abnormal 
prediction patterns faster than their trusting peers, distrusting participants would have to be more 
ready to perceive an abnormal pattern in which outcomes followed predictor variables in a 
different way than is usually expected. In other words, they were more ready to perceive a 
different kind of pattern. 
Posten and Mussweiller (2013) found that a state of distrust can reduce stereotype-based 
judgments of individuals regarding gender, ethnicity, and weight. They then found that this effect 
could be eliminated by giving distrust-primed participants a task in which they listed the 
similarities between two sides of a picture, so it appears that the decrement in stereotype-based 
judgments is due to a focus on how the individual being judged differs from the stereotypes 
associated with their social group. 
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This use of a similarity-seeking task to nullify the contrast sensitivity enhancing effects 
of distrust serves as a particularly strong argument for contrast sensitivity as a basis of many of 
the effects of distrust previously described simply as “non-routine”. The fact that the mechanism 
has been identified and can be interrupted holds much promise for future research into the 
mechanisms behind distrust’s effect on information processing. 
Interestingly, the study by Friesen and Sinclair (2011) referenced in the above section is 
relevant to both the cognitive flexibility and contrast sensitivity dimensions of distrust. Since 
they found that distrusting participants activated both Black and doctor categories after watching 
a video of a Black doctor, while all control participants and distrusting participants viewing a 
White doctor showed no evidence of category activation at all, this not only supports the idea 
that distrust promotes the activation of multiple categories, but due to the fact that the words 
used to represent the doctor category were also overwhelmingly positively-valenced, and the 
words used to represent the Black category were overwhelmingly negatively-valenced, their 
findings also imply that the distrusting participants were more sensitive to contrasting 
information. 
Given the variety of ways that distrust-primed participants have found contrasts – 
detecting contrasting adjectives more quickly, contrasting an individual with their social 
category, activating both positively and negatively-valenced categories when presented with a 
stimulus – it seems that the contrast sensitivity prompted by distrust is rather general, and that 
distrusting people in real-world situations may find the contrasting information they are looking 
for just about anywhere. They may find contrary information in the message itself, in 
remembered anecdotes, or possibly even in their imagination. 
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This process can be distinguished from biased central route processing, at least as it is 
typically understood, in that it predicts reactions to subsequent messages. This feature of distrust 
is not incompatible with elaboration likelihood processes, but it does look beyond the predictions 
of that model temporally. 
 Next Steps 
Breaking down the predicted nonroutine cognitive effects of distrust into these two main 
categories of effects – cognitive flexibility and contrast sensitivity – affords us the opportunity to 
make further predictions about how these changes in cognitive processing might translate to 
changes in how information is interpreted, and ultimately in how attitudes are developed and 
changed in response to that information. The extension of this theory from cognitive processes to 
one’s beliefs about the world will be the focus of the experiments in this dissertation. 
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Chapter 4 
Implications for Attitude Theories 
The body of research concerning distrust and cognition up to this point has addressed 
socially-relevant topics such as stereotyping (Posten & Mussweiler, 2013; Friesen & Sinclair, 
2011), and creativity in the workplace (Meyer & Mussweiler, 2011), but the effects of distrust on 
more complex information-processing tasks such as deciding whether or not to support a cause 
or seek a particular form of medical treatment over other options have yet to be investigated. 
Now that the research into the basic cognitive mechanisms of distrust has uncovered some of its 
basic characteristics, it seems that the time is ripe to apply these findings to activities that are 
closer to what people experience in vivo. How does enhanced contrast sensitivity change the way 
a citizen votes? How might increased cognitive flexibility change the way a person evaluates 
their health care options? In order to understand the social consequences of the cognitive features 
of distrust, we first need to understand the role they play in shaping attitudes and, ultimately, 
behaviors.  
One informative example of the relationship between distrust and attitude change is the 
current public health issue of vaccine refusal. The rate of nonmedical exemptions from childhood 
immunizations has been on the rise in recent years (Omer, Richards, Ward, Michelle, et al., 
2012). Lack of trust in physicians and the healthcare system in general has been indicated as an 
important contributor to this increase (Benin, Wisler-Scher, Shapiro, et al., 2005). Anti-
vaccination websites tend to promote this distrust, emphasizing the notion that medical 
professionals are ignorant of the facts, incompetent, or actively deceiving their patients, while 
actively promoting naturopathy, homeopathy, and other complementary/alternative medicine 
(CAM)  treatments and forms of prevention (Wolfe, Sharp, & Lipsky, 2002; Zimmerman, Wolfe, 
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Fox, et al., 2005), the use of which has been linked both to vaccine refusal and to the acquisition 
of vaccine-preventable illnesses (Downey, Tyree, Huebner, et al., 2010; Salmon, Haber, 
Gangarosa, et al., 1999). 
Like much of the existing distrust research (Posten & Mussweiler, 2013; Meyer & 
Mussweiler, 2011; Schul et al., 2008), the present investigation conceptualizes distrust as a 
diffuse state, and not necessarily as a specific attitude toward a specific person or entity. Distrust 
is essentially the feeling that the environment may not behave quite in the way you would 
normally expect – a person may be telling you falsehoods; a company might have undisclosed, 
sinister motives for working with you; a familiar walking surface may suddenly be slippery. In 
each of these situations, you have a feeling that each action you take requires more thought than 
usual, and is accompanied by some degree of uncertainty about the consequences that will come 
of it. And in each case, this feeling and this way of processing information would still be 
operating even if you were accompanied by your most trusted friend. 
Because the concepts of trust and distrust are directly related to one’s degree of certainty 
about objective reality, the effects of distrust may be less likely to apply to messages regarding 
matters of opinion or of cultural values and norms, such as support for same-sex marriage or 
abortion. Distrust’s effects should be most robust when it comes to questions for which there can 
be such a thing as an expert consensus, such as the efficacy and safety of vaccines, the shape of 
the earth, or the evolution of humans. 
Furthermore, based on these cognitive influences on attitudinal processes, distrust should 
usually bias people against that expert consensus. Because the consensus position will shape 
nearly any conversation on the topic, it will be the most available position against which to 
search for contrasting information, and to which alternatives will be sought. One rarely needs to 
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justify adhering to mainstream medical advice – following the normal vaccination schedule, for 
example, is the default. But a state of distrust carries with it the implication that assumptions 
should be challenged, making it harder to accept arguments from authority, even when that 
authority is legitimate.  
Conceptualizing distrust as a state in which a person activates a wider variety of 
categories in response to a stimulus, as evidenced by studies demonstrating that distrust resulted 
in the activation of more social categories (Friesen & Sinclair, 2011) and more unique uses for 
common items (Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011), and in which a person will be more sensitive to 
dissimilarities within their environment (Posten & Mussweiler, 2013; Schul et al., 2004), has 
some potentially useful applications to attitude change and persuasion theories. Whereas a 
distrusting person is colloquially believed to be relatively resistant to persuasion and more 
cautious in general, breaking distrust down into specific mechanisms may help us to understand 
more specifically why this pattern of cognition appears to be the norm, and in what ways distrust 
is unique among routes to resisting attitude change. Given what is already known about how 
distrust impacts cognition, it seems likely to change the way people respond to both the source of 
an argument, and the argument itself.  
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Chapter 5 
Distrust and the Source of a Persuasive Argument 
 The source of a persuasive message plays an important role in determining its 
effectiveness. We are not likely to be persuaded by people who appear to lack expertise or who 
we believe to be biased by their own personal motives (Eagly, Chaiken, & Wood, 1981). Person-
specific distrust is an obvious barrier to being persuaded by a particular person, but the cognitive 
patterns associated with a diffuse state of distrust (Schul & Peri, 2015) may also influence how 
persuasive we find anyone, even if we have no prior reason to distrust them personally. The 
increased cognitive flexibility and contrast sensitivity that have been observed in tests of basic 
cognitive functioning may extend to how we develop our beliefs by making other people appear 
more biased, by devaluing expertise, and by increasing the credibility of fringe figures. 
Cognitive Flexibility and Attribution 
 Attributional approaches to persuasion (Eagly, Chaiken, & Wood, 1981) indicate that 
people tend to have expectations about what a given communicator might say before he or she 
says it, and that the more the communicator’s message conforms to these premessage 
expectations, the more that communicator will be considered to be biased, and thus less credible 
(unless the position can be accounted for by the communicator’s expertise). Those 
communicators who contradict a person’s premessage expectations tend to gain extra credibility 
with that person. The fact that distrust appears to facilitate the activation of more and more 
varying social categories (Friesen & Sinclair, 2011) seems to indicate that a distrusting person 
will be more likely to believe that a communicator is biased (because they have more 
expectations available in memory). The activation of more social categories should result in a 
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wider variety of premessage expectations. Therefore they will be less convinced by what a 
credible communicator says than he or she would be otherwise. 
For example, given the findings of the distrust literature that a state of distrust promotes 
the activation of multiple simultaneous categories in response to a single stimulus (Friesen & 
Sinclair, 2011; Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011), it is possible that a distrusting message recipient 
will activate a wider variety of categories in response to reading a message from a medical  
doctor, some of which may even be contradictory. Even categories with conflicting stereotypes 
may be activated simultaneously – the doctor may also be seen as a business owner, an associate 
of large and powerful pharmaceutical companies, or even an agent of a religious group or the 
government. This wide range of activated categories would be liable to lead to a considerably 
wider range of premessage expectations, and more reasons why the doctor may be motivated to 
distort or withhold some of the facts in the eyes of the message recipient. 
This notion that one’s own distrust would make others seem to possess a broader range of 
personal biases corresponds with a basic element of distrust – the suspicion that the other person 
has ulterior motives, or goals that are incompatible with your own that may poison the exchange. 
It should certainly be no surprise that a person who is in a state of distrust would find it 
difficult to take another person’s words at face value, since that is what anyone would think of 
when they hear the word “distrust,” but this cognitive flexibility hypothesis may help clarify the 
mechanism behind that disinclination to change one’s position that is so characteristic of the 
concept of distrust - the pre-activation of more social categories makes it easier to dismiss other 
people’s opinions as biased.  
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Contrast Sensitivity – Reduced Impact of Good and Bad Qualifications 
A curious side-effect of distrust’s facilitation of difference-finding is that it appears to 
actually reduce stereotyped judgments. Posten and Mussweiler’s (2013) research into the topic 
has demonstrated this by showing that participants primed with distrust rated Turkish, female, 
and overweight individuals lower on their respective stereotypical traits. Presumably, this is 
because when a person is being judged according to a particular trait, they are being judged 
relative to that trait. A dissimilarity-oriented approach thus makes it seem as if the target and the 
standard are further apart. 
What this seems to say for communicators is that characteristics that increase or decrease 
their credibility to a typical audience will have a weaker impact when addressing a distrusting 
audience. Experts will be judged to be less expert-like. “Quacks” (people who do not have the 
legitimacy of a doctor, but espouse/have the trappings of being a doctor) will be judged less 
quack-like.  
However, this prediction depends a great deal on context. If an expert and a quack are 
presented together, and the viewer is more prepared to find dissimilarities, then it follows that the 
two would be judged to be more different from each other, and the discrepancies in their levels 
of expertise would become more apparent. 
So, distrust should make the difference between experts and sham artists appear smaller 
than they normally would, when they are each presented in isolation, because the viewer will 
look for differences between the individual and their most salient social group. That same 
difference between the two individuals will seem larger than it normally would when they are 
presented together, because the viewer will have the opportunity to look for differences between 
the two individuals. 
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Still, at least in the case of the vaccination debate, proponents and opponents rarely do 
occupy the same space. It seems that distrusting people who aren’t sure about whether to 
vaccinate will have an increased vulnerability to quackery and an increased resistance to 
qualified experts at the same time, elevating the likelihood of vaccine refusal. 
If this prediction bears out, it could have interesting implications for public debates about 
vaccination and other science-based policies. Many experts avoid having face-to-face debates 
with quacks because they believe it will only lend legitimacy to the quack (To paraphrase 
Richard Dawkins, it would look great on the quack’s CV, but not so good on his own). This may 
hold true for most of the viewing public, but for the subset who are perhaps more prone to 
distrust, having the opportunity to make side-by-side comparisons may allow their contrast 
sensitivity to serve an adaptive purpose, and make it more clear which party is qualified to speak 
on the issue. 
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Chapter 6 
Distrust and the Issues or Arguments at Hand  
Whether or not we are suspicious of the person who communicates a message to us, we 
may be suspicious of the information itself. It may be second-hand information from an 
untrusted source, it may share features with other messages we have found to be suspicious, or 
we may have been recently primed to take a distrusting approach to stimuli. In any of these 
cases, distrust would lead us to interpret messages in different ways than we would if we were 
feeling more trusting. Based on what we know about the cognitive characteristics of distrust, it 
should lead people to entertain more alternatives to what they are being told, and to put more 
effort into searching for contradictions. 
Cognitive Flexibility – What Else Might Be True?  
Increased cognitive flexibility that comes with a state of distrust is bound to lead us to 
entertain different ways of interpreting the content of an argument, possibly even going beyond 
the argument itself in an effort to devise what relevant information might not be present in the 
argument. In particular, a distrusting person will be interested in 1) what other outcomes are 
likely to result from the recommended course of action (i.e. “side effects”), and 2) what other 
actions are available to him or her that could also result in the desired outcome (alternative 
actions). 
This pattern can be observed among people suspicious of vaccination. The fear of side 
effects such as autism, autoimmune disorders, or even diabetes pervade discussions about the 
safety of vaccination, and antivaccination advocates often promote alternative, often ineffective, 
methods of avoiding viral diseases such as hand washing, homeopathic treatments, and proper 
nutrition (Wolfe et al., 2002). 
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Contrast Sensitivity – A Reason To Disbelieve.  
We can also expect people in a distrusting state to be more vigilant in their mental search 
for contradictions with the position being presented to them. Distrusting people will more readily 
generate examples from as wider variety of sources in response to an argument than trusting 
people will. This critical examination is often helpful for protecting people in situations where 
misinformation abounds (Lewandowski, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012), but the same 
processes may promote an unhelpful level of resistance where the general consensus is 
legitimate. 
This tendency is also on display in people who are suspicious of vaccines. Arguments 
against the safety and efficacy of vaccines are often supported by anecdotes of people getting 
sick despite vaccination, or suffering symptoms of a neurological disorder soon after 
administration of a vaccine (Zimmerman et al., 2005). 
The Present Research 
The present studies represent an effort to examine how contrast sensitivity and cognitive 
flexibility may change the way people respond to the content and source of persuasive messages. 
The first three studies will test my predictions about the contrast-sensitizing effects of distrust. 
Study 1 will address how this sensitivity to contrast may make statements that contradict 
previously presented positions seem more plausible by increasing the availability of opposing 
cognitions. Study 2 will address how sensitivity to contrast can make members of different 
professions seem more or less stereotypical of their group, and therefore more or less 
authoritative, depending on whether they are presented alone or with members of contrasting 
groups. Study 3 will then apply this principle directly to the elaboration likelihood model of 
33 
 
persuasion and examine whether the contrast-sensitizing effects of distrust lead to the generation 
of more counterarguments in response to an argument. 
The final three studies will address the attitudinal implications of how cognitive 
flexibility and creative thinking are promoted by a state of distrust. Study 4 will address how 
distrust increases the accessibility of semantic categories, which may make it easier for people to 
generate opposing arguments to a position. Study 5 will demonstrate how distrust may make it 
easier for people to assimilate disparate concepts by adding intermediary cognitions, which is a 
likely engine for belief in, and maintenance of, conspiracy beliefs. Study 6 will test the 
prediction that distrust does not necessarily lead to a tendency to reject claims, and that 
arguments that take advantage of the contrast sensitization and cognitive flexibility that come 
with a state of distrust will be more effective when presented to distrusting persons. 
This line of research will serve to apply the findings of previous research on the cognitive 
effects of distrust to the realm of persuasion, a necessary step toward using these findings for the 
public good, and will also help to advance and expand our understanding of the cognitive 
features of distrust. 
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Chapter 7 
Pilot Studies 
 For a variety of reasons, it was necessary to perform a series of pilot tests on 
manipulations of trust and distrust before beginning with theory-testing experiments. I wanted to 
test four different methods of inducing a state of distrust, some of which involve semantic 
priming – word searches containing distrust- or trust- related words, and a classic scrambled 
sentence paradigm using the same distrust- and trust-related words. Others involve more realistic 
situations designed to promote distrust – an economic deception game (Posten & Mussweiler, 
2013) in which a simulated partner behaves in either a trustworthy or untrustworthy manner, and 
an imposter-detection task in which participants in the distrust condition were asked to evaluate 
whether or not an interview subject was a genuine student athlete, or a non-athlete impersonating 
one.  
 Past studies have done little to demonstrate the validity of these methods. Direct 
measures of participants’ mindset regarding trust or distrust are generally not included in these 
studies (Friesen & Sinclair, 2011; Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011; Posten & Mussweiler, 2013; 
Schul, Mayo, & Burnstein, 2008). Schul, Mayo, and Burnstein (2004) did validate their ‘eyes 
and lies’ induction technique – in which wide-eyed faces were consistently paired with true 
information and narrow-eyed faces were paired with false information – in a manipulation check 
where participants rated the trustworthiness of the different faces after completing the induction 
task. However, this measure does not fully validate the induction procedure, because the narrow-
eyed faces were designed to look untrustworthy in the first place. Participants likely would judge 
these faces to be less trustworthy even  without paired false information (Akehurst et al., 1996; 
Schul et al., 2008). 
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Many of the core studies that form the empirical basis for this dissertation were 
conducted in Germany (Posten & Mussweiler, 2013; Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011) or Israel, 
(Schul et al., 2004; Schul et al., 2008) with materials presented in languages other than English. 
The lone English language study was conducted in Canada (Friesen & Sinclair, 2011). So it was 
necessary to adapt prime words from their original languages. Cultural differences needed to be 
taken into account as well. A manipulation in which participants are asked to identify “gender 
impostors” posing as women (Schul et al., 2004; 2008), for instance, could be considered 
disrespectful when used in a participant population that is majority female and contains 
transgender people. To avoid this, the task was adapted to have participants identify impostor 
student athletes. 
 It also seems essential to validate priming methods, in particular, before using them in an 
experiment. Researchers frequently have been unable to replicate semantic priming effects 
(Bohannon, 2014; Cesario, 2014; Pashler, Rohrer, & Harris, 2013), calling into question the 
validity of these manipulations. On the other hand, recent meta-analysis has found that priming 
can be effective, at least when the target measure is both behavioral and directly related to the 
prime. Weingarten, Chen, McAdams, and colleagues (2016) conducted a meta-analysis 
specifically investigating the efficacy of priming studies in which the target of the priming 
manipulation were behavioral (not attitudinal or judgmental) in nature, and were directly (not 
abstractly) related to the target behavior (e.g. prime: words related to giving; target: amount of 
money given to another person). In these favorable conditions, they found that semantic priming 
can have an effect, especially if the prime is designed to activate a goal. It did not directly speak 
to priming studies that were non-behavioral or in which the target behavior was indirectly related 
to the prime. The distrust priming reviewed here and present in the pilot studies is directed 
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toward targets that are often indirectly related to the prime or else attitudinal rather than 
behavioral, so this series of pilots will also contribute to a broader perspective on this current 
controversy. 
 Finally, social cognitive experiments on the effects of distrust have yet to use any 
manipulation checks validating that distrust-related states were aroused. Thus, the work to date 
leaves open the question of whether distrust really is the construct being induced in those studies, 
or even what specifically is the state of “distrust” that causes observed effects in experiments. 
So, in addition to seeking replication of some consequences of inductions observed by other 
researchers, such as differences in similarity ratings of different objects (Posten & Mussweiler, 
2013) and the ability to solve routine and non-routine matchstick puzzles (Schul et al., 2008), I 
used a variety of self-report distrust measures as well. 
Outcome Measures from Other Studies 
 I tried to reproduce the effects of distrust manipulations on participants’ judgments of the 
similarity of different objects observed by (Posten & Mussweiler, 2013) and their effect on 
participants’ performance on object-manipulation puzzles observed by (Schul et al., 2008). These 
findings have contributed to establishing the notion that distrust leads to non-routine processing 
of information, but were performed in non-English-speaking populations in different countries. It 
was therefore important to determine whether the same effects would be observed in American 
participants. 
 Similarity Judgments. Posten and Mussweiler (2013) have found that participants 
judged pairs of objects to be less similar after their distrust induction, implying that a state of 
distrust facilitates the perception of contrast. Each of the following distrust induction methods 
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were evaluated using an adapted version of this measure, using English rather than German word 
pairs. 
Matchstick puzzles. Schul, Mayo, and Burnstein (2008) found that distrust-primed 
participants were able to solve a greater number of matchstick puzzles that required more 
complex thinking to solve, though they had no such advantage with the simpler puzzles. They 
interpreted this to mean that distrust promotes non-routine cognition, in which people think more 
unconventionally in response to feeling subject to the possibility of being fooled. This measure 
was reproduced in these pilot studies in order to see if our adaptations of their distrust 
manipulations would have the same effect. 
General Trust and Distrust 
 In order to directly measure participants’ subjective feeling of how trusting they felt 
toward others, and how generally distrusting they were as people, direct self-report measures 
were used.    
 Interpersonal Trust and Caution. General trust for others and interpersonal caution was 
measured according to Yamagishi and Yamagishi’s (1994) two-factor scale. The trust factor of 
the scale assesses confidence in the beneficence of other people’s intentions, and the caution 
factor assesses the felt need to be wary of others’ motives. 
 Mistrust. The IPIP mistrust scale (Goldberg et al., 2006) was also used to assess general 
distrust, or suspicion of other people. In order to make this measure more reflective of present, 
in-the-moment distrust, participants were instructed specifically to respond to the questions as 
they felt in the present moment.  
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Domain-Specific Trust/Distrust 
 Trust for specific others was also measured in order to see if the various trust 
manipulations would change participants’ trust for particular kinds of people. Participants were 
asked to report how much they trusted their neighbors, relatives, self, science, police, and 
religion.  
Uncertainty and Lack of Control 
 The concept of distrust is closely related to feelings of uncertainty and lack of personal 
control. Research on control deprivation has revealed similar effects to those that have recently 
been associated with distrust – increased information-seeking, increased effort in processing 
information, and more conservative, cautious evaluation of information (Pittman & D’Agostino, 
1985, 1989; Pittman & Pittman, 1980). 
Variety-Seeking and Intellectual Openness 
 Based on the findings that distrusting participants were faster to identify words that 
conflicted with prime words (Schul et al., 2004), came up with more creative uses for common 
items (Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011), and judged members of social groups in less stereotypical 
terms (Posten & Mussweiler, 2013), it was hypothesized that distrust may be associated with 
greater open-mindedness and a preference for novelty. The variety-seeking and intellectual 
openness scales found on the international personality item pool (IPIP; Goldberg et al., 2006) 
were used to try to capture these effects. As with the IPIP mistrust scale, participants were 
instructed to answer the questions based on how they presently felt, not necessarily as they felt 
generally. 
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Pilot 1A Word Search Pilot – Student Sample 
 Semantic primes have been one of the main ways that experimenters have promoted a 
distrusting state of mind in participants (Friesen & Sinclair, 2011; Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011; 
Posten & Mussweiler, 2013). A word search puzzle has not yet been specifically used to promote 
distrust, but it is an established vehicle for semantic priming (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, 
Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001). Its reliability, however, has been questioned as of late due to 
some documented failures to replicate (Harris, Coburn, Rohrer, Pashler, 2013). These concerns 
make an exploratory study essential before conducting experiments using the manipulations. 
Two studies were conducted using an interactive word search as a method of delivering semantic 
primes for trust and distrust. One used a university student sample, the other a sample of MTurk 
workers – online laborers in Amazon’s crowdsourcing marketplace platform. 
 Participants who received the distrust-prime words were expected to score higher on 
measures of distrust, variety-seeking, openness, caution, and uncertainty than participants who 
placed in the no-prime (control) condition. They were expected to score lower on measures of 
trust, and were expected to solve more of the matchstick puzzles that required more complex 
manipulation of the matchsticks (nonroutine cognitions), and solve fewer of the puzzles that 
required more simple manipulation of the matchsticks (routine cognitions).  
Method 
Participants and Design 
 Of all 201 participants, 30.3% were male, 68.7% were female, and 0.5% were 
transgender. They were 60.7% White, 8.5% Black, 12% Asian, and 17% Latino. The 3.5% who 
selected “other” in response to the question identified themselves as Indian, Indo-Guyanese 
American, Sri Lankan, European American, and American. Ninety percent of participants 
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identified as either lower-middle class, middle class, or upper-middle class. Economically, .5% 
identified themselves as impoverished, 3.5% lower class, 17.2% lower-middle class, 44.9% 
middle class, 29.3% upper-middle class, 3% upper class, and 1.5% super rich. 
 This pilot study was a between-subjects, two-condition experiment. Participants were 
randomly assigned to the distrust or control condition. 
Materials  
 The two levels of the independent variable were carried out by providing links from 
within the Qualtrics survey to interactive word search puzzles created by the researchers and 
hosted on the website Teachers-direct.co.uk. Each word search contained the neutral words 
entertain, plaster, varnish, grapes, stride, llama, ocean, and tea, in addition to eight condition-
specific prime words. In the distrust condition, prime words were distrust, fake, doubt, suspicion, 
uncertain, questionable, suspicious, and mistaken. Distrust prime words were adapted from the 
prime words used by Posten and Mussweiler (2013) in their scrambled sentence task. The 
control condition contained eight additional words that were not intended to prime any particular 
concept: apartment, training, elephant, oldest, excited, bookish, swift, and fancy. Every effort 
was made to create the easiest, least frustrating puzzles possible. All letters were set to 
uppercase, words were spelled only in natural (left-to-right or top-to-bottom) directions, and the 
un-used letters were put on the “easy” setting provided by the website. The link to the website 
opened in a new window so that it would be easy for participants to stay on the same survey page 
while completing the puzzle. 
Measures 
 Confidence and Personal Control. Two single-item questions (Appendix A) were 
adapted from research on depression, uncertainty, and personal control. The items, “at this 
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moment, I feel confident in the correctness of my opinions, judgments, and decisions,” and “at 
this moment, I feel I have sufficient personal control and power over the things that happen in 
my life” were taken verbatim from Weary and colleagues' (1993) work on depression, control 
motivation and social information processing, and were used to measure confidence and personal 
control. These items have generally been assumed to capture fairly stable states of certainty and 
judgmental confidence, and the extent to which a person feels events are under their control or 
not.  
 IPIP Mistrust. The six-item “Mistrust” questionnaire from the International Personality 
Item Pool (IPIP; Goldberg et al., 2006; Appendix B) was used to measure general mistrust for 
other people. Participants were instructed to “Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as 
you wish to be in the future,” in order to encourage participants to report their current state of 
mistrust rather than their more stable, dispositional levels of mistrust, which is the way the items 
are typically used. The instrument is six items long, two of which are reverse-scored before items 
are averaged.  Each item was measured on a five-point Likert-style scale (1 = “Very Inaccurate – 
5 = “Very Accurate). In community samples, inter-rater reliability was high (α=.83; Goldberg et 
al., 2006). Higher scores indicate more mistrust. 
 Trust For Specific Other Persons and Institutions. In a set of questions adapted from 
Goertzel’s (1994) research on the relationship between trust and belief in conspiracy theories, 
participants were asked to report how much they trusted their neighbors, relatives, self, science, 
and religion (Appendix C). Goertzel’s original investigation only asked about trust in the police, 
their neighbors, and their relatives. He found that these measures had relatively low inter-item 
reliability (α=.57), but correlated significantly and positively with belief in conspiracy theories. 
Responses were recorded on a 5-point scale (1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree) 
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 Trust and Caution Toward Others. A six-item scale measuring participants’ perception 
of the trustworthiness of other people was included, as was a seven-item scale to measure the 
amount of caution participants felt was necessary to use around other people (Yamagishi & 
Yamagishi, 1994; Appendix D). Responses were recorded on a 5-point scale from “strongly 
disagree” to “strongly agree.” Reliability has been found to be moderate for both factors (α 
ranged from .70 to 7.8 for general trust, and .61 to .74 for caution; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 
1994). These two measures are generally used to measure dispositional distrust and have been 
found to correlate positively with the use of negative hypothesis testing in evaluating initial 
hunches (Mayo, Alfasi, & Schwarz, 2014), but participants in these pilots were instructed to 
“Describe yourself as you feel at this very moment,  not necessarily as you feel generally.” 
 Matchstick Puzzles. A series of mathematical puzzles illustrated in the form of 
matchsticks was created to replicate Schul, Mayo, and Burnstein’s (2008) test of nonroutine 
cognition after distrust inductions. In all, there were eight mathematical equations written in 
Roman numerals, as opposed to the Arabic numerals that participants are presumed to be more 
accustomed to. The numerals were shown to participants in the form of arrangements of 
matchsticks. Each equation was incorrect. For each equation, participants were asked to make the 
equation correct by mentally moving one matchstick from one symbol to another, thus changing 
both symbols (Appendix E). They were to type the answer they came up with in a text field.  
 Of these eight equations, four of them could be solved by moving a matchstick from one 
numeral to another, and the other four could only be solved by moving a matchstick from a 
numeral to one of the operational symbols (+,-,=). Performance was scored 0-4 for each set of 
puzzles, one point for each correct answer. Participants were given three minutes to complete the 
task. 
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 Similarity Judgments. Fifteen pairs of nouns were presented to participants, such as 
Lake and Ocean, Lion and House Cat, etc., with the request that they judge how similar or 
dissimilar the two things were on a six-point scale (Posten & Mussweiler, 2013; Appendix F). 
These ratings were averaged for each participant, with higher scores indicating a greater 
tendency toward judging objects to be more similar. 
 IPIP Variety and Openness. IPIP scales for variety-seeking (Appendix G) and 
intellectual openness (Appendix H) were used (Goldberg et al., 2006). Both of these instruments 
are measured using a five-point Likert-type scale from “very inaccurate” to “very accurate.” The 
variety-seeking scale consisted of 10 items, three of which are reverse-scored. Inter-item 
reliability was adequate in a community sample (α=.80). The intellectual openness scale was also 
10 items long, with five reverse-scored. It also demonstrated adequate inter-item reliability in the 
same community sample (α=.80). 
 Demographics. Participants were asked their gender, race/ethnicity, and the economic 
class they identify with (Appendix I). 
 Stance on Childhood Vaccinations. Participants were also asked whether they believed 
children should receive all recommended vaccinations, only some of the recommended 
vaccinations, or no vaccinations at all (Appendix J). This measure was included for use in a 
different study. 
Procedure 
 Participants were recruited online from the University of Connecticut Psychology 
participant pools of either the Storrs campus, or the pool covering all of the regional campuses. 
Storrs participants reserved a time and received a link to the study via email at the designated 
time. Regional campus participants followed the link on the pool website to get to the study.  
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 The study was administered electronically and distributed online. After reading the 
information sheet, the program randomly assigned the participant to the distrust or control 
condition, providing a link to the appropriate word search. The interactive word search puzzles 
displayed a particular animation upon completion. In order to confirm that participants had 
completed the word search, they were asked on the following page of the survey to briefly 
describe what they had seen when they completed the puzzle. After this manipulation was 
complete, participants were introduced to the measures described above in that order.  
 Throughout the survey, items serving as attention checks were included. These included 
an item included on the same page as the questions concerning trust for specific others that read, 
“Please answer ‘Disagree’ for this item,” an item embedded in the page of similarity ratings that 
asked participants to judge how similar water was to water (the correct answer was “Very 
Similar”), and an item included among the IPIP Variety questions asking participants to answer, 
“neither accurate nor inaccurate.” These questions were included with the goal of identifying 
participants who were going through the experiment without reading the items.  
 At the end of the survey, participants were presented with the debriefing statement, which 
revealed to them the full purpose of the experiment, the intent behind the priming task, and the 
hypotheses of the study. After the debriefing statement participants were given the opportunity to 
provide open-ended feedback to the question, “Now that you have finished with this study, do 
you have any comments for the researchers? Did anything seem off? Do you have any ideas for 
improving the study's implementation?” Participants were thanked for their participation. 
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Results 
Data Preparation 
 Total time spent on participation was calculated by subtracting the starting time from the 
ending time. Test runs through the experiment took approximately 11 minutes to complete, so 
participants were excluded from analyses if their total time was less than nine minutes, or more 
than thirty minutes (included participants took an average of 21 minutes to complete the study, 
SD = 5.19). Participants were also excluded if they failed one or more of the attention checks, or 
if they did not indicate any knowledge of the completion animation of the word search, which 
was an explosion of letters followed by a green check mark and the words, “puzzle complete.” 
Responses were judged to indicate non-completion if they gave no answer, reported skipping the 
puzzle, or otherwise failed to mention any features of the completion screen. Of the 201 total 
participants, 107 survived the screening process. Because this was a pilot study, these stringent 
criteria were used in order to make sure, to the highest degree possible, that the participants 
included in analysis had actually gone through the manipulation, and that the priming effect of 
the word search itself was being evaluated. 
Analyses 
IPIP Mistrust. Distrust-primed participants scored lower on the IPIP mistrust scale (M = 
2.37, SD = .646) than control participants (M = 2.62, SD = .728) t(199) = -2.564, p = .011, d = 
.12, suggesting that the distrust prime actually reduced feelings of mistrust. 
Trust For Specific Other Persons and Institutions. Similarly, distrust-primed 
participants reported trusting their relatives more (M = 4.31, SD = .776) than control participants 
did (M = 3.95, SD = 1.041), t(105) = -2.006, p = .047, d = .39.  
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There were no other significant effects of the distrust manipulation. Descriptive statistics 
and outcomes of all t-tests are reported in Table 1. 
Based on these results, it does not appear that the word search priming method will be a 
good candidate for studying the effects of distrust. The manipulation had no effect on the 
majority of the measures, and if anything, made participants report a more trusting attitude 
instead of a distrusting one. Scores were lower on the IPIP measure of mistrust, and higher for 
trust in one’s relatives. It’s possible that greater general distrust drives someone to trust their own 
family more, but the lower score for general mistrust conflicts with such a conclusion.  
Discussion 
These findings seem to suggest that this method of priming for distrust may only activate 
trust. Because the processing of negatives requires more work than processing the root concept 
itself, and semantic priming works by means of implicit processes, it could be that the root 
concept (trust) is activated without being negated (see Gilbert, 1991). Further studies that include 
a trust prime condition may help to clarify this issue.  
Pilot 1B Word Search Pilot – Mturk Sample 
Method 
Participants and Design 
 Sixty participants were recruited via Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) – a 
service that offers small payments for people who complete short tasks over the Internet. Of the 
60 participants in the MTurk sample, 83.3% were White, 10% Black, 6.7% Asian, and 3.3% 
Latino. Economically, 5.6% identified as impoverished, 22.2% lower class, 27.8% lower-middle 
class, 33.3% middle class, and 9.3% upper-middle class. 
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 This pilot study was a three-condition experiment. Participants were randomly placed in 
the trust, distrust or control condition. The word search for the trust condition contained the 
prime words trusting, credible, authentic, dependence, certain, reliable, honest, and sympathetic. 
The distrust and control primes were the same as in the student sample version of this pilot. 
 Participants were included in analyses if they met the criteria described in the student 
pilot described previously, and 54 met full inclusion criteria. On average, included participants 
completed the experiment in 18.46 minutes (SD = 4.72). 
Materials  
 The same study materials were used for this sample as for the student sample. 
Measures 
 The measures were identical to those used in the UCONN student sample, with the 
exception that the gender item was unintentionally omitted from the survey questions. 
Results 
Analyses 
 Fifty-four participants met full inclusion criteria. One-way between-subjects analyses of 
variance (ANOVAs) were calculated to examine differences in each of the dependent variables 
between the trust, distrust, and control conditions. No significant effects of condition were 
observed for any of the dependent measures. Solved non-routine matchstick puzzles did show a 
marginal effect F(2, 51) = 2.24, p = .081, in which control (M = .53, SD = .96) participants 
solved slightly more of the four puzzles than did trust primed (M = 0.00, SD = 0.00) and distrust 
primed (M = .28, SD = .83) participants. Effect sizes tended to be small on most measures (η2 = 
.02 or lower), with the exception of performance on the non-routine matchstick puzzles, which 
had a medium effect size (η2 = .08). Tests for all variables for this study are reported in Table 2. 
48 
 
 Post hoc exploratory analyses contrasting the combined prime conditions to the control 
condition also failed to show a significant effect of priming. 
Discussion 
 This pilot did not provide any evidence that the word search priming procedure 
effectively influenced MTurk workers’ state of trust or distrust. The unanimously non-significant 
comparisons also yielded overwhelmingly small effect sizes, with the exception of the number of 
solved non-routine matchstick puzzles.  
Pilot 2A Scrambled Sentence Task Pilot – Student Sample 
 The scrambled sentence task has been used in the past to prime distrust specifically, but 
only in Germany, using stimuli presented in German  (Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011; Posten & 
Mussweiler, 2013). Priming as a general procedure has of course been used with English words, 
conducted with U.S. samples (Bargh et al., 1996), but has rarely been used to prime distrust 
specifically. So again, pilot studies using both student and MTurk populations seemed essential. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
 All 122 participants were recruited online from the University of Connecticut Psychology 
participant pool. Of this sample, 68% were White, 3.3% were Black, 22.1% were Asian, and 
10.7% were Latino. The 3.3% who provided text responses to the question identified themselves 
as Middle Eastern, Native American, and Nepali. Economically, 3.3% identified themselves as 
lower class, 16.5% lower-middle class, 38.8% middle class, 34.7% upper-middle class, and 6.6% 
upper class. 
 This pilot study was a three-condition experiment. Participants were randomly placed in 
the trust, distrust or control condition. 
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Inclusion in analyses was determined the same way as it was in the word search studies, 
with the exception that participants were not given the completion test designed for the word 
search task. For this study, 114 participants met full inclusion criteria. On average, included 
participants finished the experiment in 16.91 minutes (SD = 4.79). 
Materials and Procedure  
 Fifteen scrambled sentences with prime words embedded in them were presented at the 
beginning of the Qualtrics survey. This manipulation was adapted from that used by Posten and 
Mussweiler’s (2013) English translations of the German stimuli they used in their study. Some of 
the German words had two comparable English word translations. These words were replaced 
with the nearest one-word English alternative. Prime words for the trust condition were trusting, 
credible, authentic, dependence, certain, reliable, honest, and sympathetic. For the distrust 
condition, they were distrust, fake, doubt, suspicion, uncertain, questionable, suspicious, and 
mistaken. For the control condition, there were no prime words, but the words apartment, 
training, elephant, oldest, excited, bookish, swift, and fancy were put in the place where the 
prime word would have been (Appendix K). 
 The study was administered electronically over the Internet. Directly after reading the 
information sheet, the program randomly assigned participants to the trust, distrust, or control 
condition and presented them with the corresponding version of the scrambled sentence task. In 
this task, participants were presented with 15 sets of five words, randomly arranged. They were 
instructed to mentally remove one of the words and make a grammatically correct sentence out 
of the remaining four words (the string stay doubt to they had, for example, could be solved by 
either “they had to doubt” or “they had to stay.”). After this task was complete, the rest of the 
procedure was identical to that of the previous word search studies. 
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Results  
 The only standard for inclusion in analyses that yielded even one significant result was 
the most stringent – participants who completed the manipulation, passed all attention checks, 
and finished the study within two standard deviations of the average completion time (longer 
than 4.66 minutes, and shorter than 31.32 minutes) were included. Between-subjects ANOVAs 
were performed for each dependent measure to detect differences between the three conditions.   
 In this sample, there was a significant effect of condition on reported trust in relatives 
F(2, 110) = 3.35, p = .039, η2 = .06. Post-hoc analysis using the Bonferroni adjustment revealed 
that trust-primed participants reported trusting their relatives significantly more (M = 4.62, SD = 
.54) than did control participants (M = 4.26, SD = .72), p = .034, d = .57. Tests for all measures 
are reported in Table 3. 
Discussion 
The fact that the distrust prime did not significantly affect this measure while the trust 
prime did, may suggest that my hunch is correct that the inherent negation of the concept of  
“trust” in priming distrust poses problems from a cognitive processing standpoint. However, the 
fact that this is one significant finding among a large number of measures, and could only be 
found using stringent inclusion criteria should make one cautious in drawing any broad 
conclusions.  
Pilot 2B: Scrambled Sentence Task Pilot – Mturk Sample 
Method 
Participants and Design 
 Of all 60 participants, 85% were White, 6.7% were Black, 5% were Asian, and 3.3% 
were Latino. Of the 1.7% who provided text responses to the question, they identified themselves 
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as Central Asian/Eastern European. Economically, 6.7% identified themselves as impoverished, 
15% lower class, 31.7% lower-middle class, 40% middle class, and 6.7% upper-middle class. 
Only one participant was excluded from the final data for failing an attentional check. On 
average, included participants completed the experiment in 14.26 minutes (SD = 4.41). 
Procedure  
 The design and procedure of this study was identical to that of Pilot 2A, and the 
recruitment and payment procedure was identical to that of Pilot 1A. 
Results and Discussion 
  One-way between-subjects ANOVAs were conducted on all dependent measures. A one-
way ANOVA on the IPIP variety-seeking and openness measures revealed significant effects of 
the manipulation, F(2, 56) = 1.85, p = .047, η2 = .10, and F(2, 56) = 1.55, p = .014 ,η2 = .14, 
respectively. No post-hoc tests were significant for variety-seeking (see Table D for descriptive 
statistics). Post-hoc tests for openness using the Bonferroni adjustment found that participants in 
the distrust condition reported less openness (M = 3.35, SD = .63) than participants in the control 
condition (M = 3.87, SD = .56), p = .02, d = .87 and participants in the trust condition (M = 3.82, 
SD = .54), p = .05, d = .80. Tests for all measures are reported in Table 4. 
Pilot 3A Impostor Detection Task Pilot – Student Sample 
 Other researchers have used ‘gender impostor’ paradigms in the past (Schul et al., 2004; 
2008), in which answers to various gender-salient questions, such as how to change a flat tire, or 
what the contents of one’s purse are, are provided by some actual women, and some men are 
asked to give responses in which they try  to impersonate a woman. Participants are then asked to 
rate the spontaneity of each respondent in the control condition, and to try to identify the 
impostors in the distrust condition. I found it necessary to adapt this manipulation in a way that 
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would preserve the emphasis on deception-detection while excluding the casual sexism and 
transphobia that might be implied by a gender impostor task. Student athletes were chosen as a 
substitute for women because, like gender, it is both a socially meaningful and relatively 
impermeable social category on a large university campus. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
 Of all 85 participants, 22.4% were male, and 77.7% were female. In terms of race and 
ethnicity, 72.9% were White, 5.9% were Black, 22.1% were Asian, and 15.3% were Asian, and 
7.1% were Hispanic/Latino. Of those 2.4%who provided text responses to the question, they 
identified themselves as human, and White/Asian. Economically, 1.2% identified themselves as 
lower class, 10.5% lower-middle class, 45.9% middle class, 36.5% upper-middle class, and 5.9% 
upper class. They were 18.5 years old on average. 
 This pilot study was simple two-condition experiment. Participants were randomly placed 
in the distrust or control condition. Participants took an average of 17.85 minutes to complete the 
experiment (SD = 9.18). 
Materials  
 To create materials for use in the manipulation, six volunteers were recruited; two were 
student athletes at the University of Connecticut, and four were non-athletes. Each of them was 
asked a series of questions about their everyday life and their participation in college athletics. 
Athletes were asked to respond truthfully, and non-athletes were asked to respond as if 
impersonating a student athlete. The questions were as follows. 
1. What are the most important traits for a successful athlete to have? 
2. What sport do you play for this school?   
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3. What do you enjoy most about your sport?   
4. What do you like to do in your free time?   
5. If you could change one rule about your sport, what would it be?   
6. What is the hardest part about being a student athlete? 
7. What is your major area of study?   
8. What is most satisfying about your sport?   
Two of the four non-athletes were selected for use in the study, so there would be equal 
representation of both groups. 
Participants in the distrust condition were told that some of the respondents were 
imposters, and were asked to judge whether each respondent was an athlete or an impostor. 
Participants in the control condition were uninformed that some were impostors, and were only 
asked to rate the spontaneity of each respondent. The complete text of the manipulation is 
provided in Appendix L.  
Measures 
 The dependent measures used in this pilot study were the same as the other pilot studies 
in this series, except the item measuring trust for police was unintentionally excluded. 
Procedure 
 All participants were recruited online from the University of Connecticut Psychology 
participant pool. The study was administered electronically.  
After reading the information sheet, the program randomly assigned each participant to 
the distrust or control condition. Participants in the distrust condition received the following 
instructions: 
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You are about to read some statements collected from some 
athletes at the University of Connecticut about life as a student 
athlete.  
 
Here's the trick - some of these responses were collected from 
actual student athletes, and some of them were collected from non-
athletes trying to impersonate athletes.  
 
Your task will be to carefully read the responses, and to determine 
which responses were given by athletes, and which ones were 
given by impostors.  
 
First, just carefully read each of the responses. After you have read 
each one, they will be shown to you again for you to make your 
final decisions. 
 
Participants in the control condition received these instructions instead: 
You are about to read some statements collected from some 
athletes at the University of Connecticut about life as a student 
athlete.  
 
Your task will be to carefully read the responses, and to judge the 
spontaneity of each respondent. 
 
First, just carefully read each of the responses. After you have read 
each one, they will be shown to you again for you to make your 
final decisions. 
 
Participants were given four sets of responses to the eight questions, half of which were 
actually from athletes and half which were not. Afterward participants in the distrust condition 
were told:   
Now, you are going to see the very same sets of responses. Now 
that you have seen them all and had a chance to think about them, 
indicate whether you believe the respondent is a genuine student 
athlete or an impostor.    
 
and were asked to read back over the responses and for each, give a dichotomous response as to 
whether the individual answer was said an impostor or a genuine athlete. 
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For participants in the control condition, their instructions prior to rereading the answers were as 
follows:   
Now, you are going to see the very same sets of responses. Now 
that you have seen them all and had a chance to think about them, 
indicate how spontaneous you feel each respondent is. 
 
They gave their spontaneity ratings on a scale of 1 to 6. Afterwards, participants completed the 
same dependent measures used in Pilot 1A, and same attentional checks used in Pilot 2A, and 
debriefing procedure  
Results 
T-tests were used to test for differences between conditions in each of the measures. All 
of these tests are reported in Table 5. 
Confidence and Personal Control  
 Participants in the distrust condition reported lower judgmental confidence (higher 
uncertainty) (M = 3.35, SD = .85) than those in the control condition (M = 3.81, SD = .66), 
t(62.24) = 2.52, p = .014, d = .60. 
Domain-Specific Trust  
Unexpectedly, participants in the distrust condition reported more trust for their relatives 
(M = 4.53, SD = .71) than control participants (M = 4.11, SD = .84), t(69) = -2.27, p = .026, d = 
.54. 
IPIP Variety and Openness 
Contrary to expectations, participants in the distrust condition judged themselves to be 
less variety-seeking (M = 3.26, SD = .58) than control participants (M = 3.54, SD = .45), t(69) = 
2.29, p = .025, d = .54, and marginally less intellectually open (M = 3.41, SD = .52) than 
controls(M = 3.64, SD = .53) t(68) = 1.85, p = .068, d = .44. 
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Discussion 
This impostor detection task was more effective in generating effects than the semantic 
prime-based methods in Pilots 1 and 2. Participants in the distrust condition actually reported 
higher uncertainty in their judgments, as predicted, which is encouraging. Distrusting 
participants did, however, report greater trust for their relatives, though this could possibly 
indicate increased relative trust for  people who are socially closer to oneself in response to the 
deceptive behavior of strangers – an interpretation supported by the lower scores on variety 
seeking and intellectual openness.   
Pilot 3B Impostor Detection Task Pilot – Mturk Sample 
Methods 
Participants and Design 
 All participants were recruited online from Amazon.com’s MTurk. Of all 70 participants, 
the average age was 32.18. Ethnically/racially, 71.4% were White, 8.6% were Black, 4.3% were 
Asian, and 2.9% were Hispanic/Latino. Economically, 1.6% identified themselves as 
impoverished, 19.7% lower class, 27.9% lower-middle class, 31.1 % middle class, and 19.7% 
upper-middle class. Fifty-five participants met inclusion criteria. On average, included 
participants completed the experiment in 11.4 minutes (SD = 3.54). 
Procedure 
 The experimental procedure was the same as with the student sample above, except that 
participants received payment of $0.70 for their time.  
Results 
 T-tests were performed to test for differences between conditions. See Table 6 for 
descriptive statistics on all measures.  
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Trust for Relatives and Neighbors. Distrusting MTurk workers reported significantly less trust 
in their relatives (M = 3.77, SD = 1.040) than control MTurk workers (M = 4.36, SD = .860), 
t(53) = 2.276, p = .027, d = .62.  
They also reported marginally less trust in their neighbors (M = 3.30, SD = .837) than 
controls (M = 3.72, SD = .891) t(53) = 1.8, p = .078, d = .49.  
 IPIP Mistrust. Participants in the distrust condition reported greater mistrust (M = 2.55, 
SD = .833) than control participants (M = 2.00, SD = .798) t(53) = 2.494, p = .016, d = .68. 
 IPIP Variety Seeking. Participants in the distrust condition reported greater variety 
seeking (M = 3.47, SD = .726) than control participants (M = 2.99, SD = .914) t(53) = 2.193, p = 
.033, d = .59. 
 Interpersonal Trust and Caution. On Yamagishi and Yamagishi’s (1994) measure of 
interpersonal trust, distrusting participants reported less trust (M = 3.30, SD = .694) than control 
participants (M = 3.74, SD = .895) t(53) = 2.048, p = .046, d = .55.  
 Distrusting participants also reported marginally greater caution toward others (M = 
3.30, SD = .713) than control participants (M = 2.90, SD = .796) t(53) = 1.95, p = .056, d = .53. 
Discussion 
 It is an encouraging sign that every one of these effects were in the predicted direction, 
and that there were so many of them. But why these effects when UCONN students, who are 
presumably more involved in discerning imposter athletes from genuine athletes, show such a 
different pattern? My best guess is that is has to do with the fact that MTurk workers moved 
through the study considerably more quickly than students did, and thus, didn’t think as carefully 
about how they were responding to the different questions, allowing automatic processes to have 
a greater influence on their responses.  
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Pilot 4A Economic Deception Game – Student Sample 
   Posten and Mussweiler (2013) have used an economic deception game to create a state 
of distrust. This is an appealing paradigm because it actually creates a situation in which 
participants encounter an attempt at deception and exploitation, a situation which could 
realistically promote distrust in everyday life. Their procedure was adapted for use in the 
Qualtrics system, with English-speaking participants.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
 Of all 358 participants, 71.2% were White, 5.6% were Black, 16.5% were Asian, .8% 
were Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, and 8.7% were Hispanic/Latino. Of those 2.2% who 
provided text responses to the question, they identified themselves as Asian/White, Greek, 
Haitian, Jamaican, Mixed, South Asian, and West Indian. Economically, 1.1% identified 
themselves as impoverished, 2.8% lower class, 12.8% lower-middle class, 42.7% middle class, 
35.8% were upper-middle class, 3.9% upper class, and .3% super rich. They were 18.9 years old 
on average. Inclusion criteria were the same as for the previously reported studies. There were 
306 participants that met inclusion criteria. Included participants finished the experiment in 
16.56 minutes (SD = 3.18). 
 This pilot study was a two-condition experiment. Participants were randomly assigned to 
the distrust or trust condition. 
 Measures 
 The dependent measures used in this pilot study were the same as Pilot Study 1A except 
the item measuring trust for police was unintentionally omitted. 
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Procedure 
 All participants were recruited online from the University of Connecticut Storrs campus 
psychology participant pool.  
The study was administered via Qualtrics. Directly after reading the information sheet, 
participants were presented with  a set of instructions describing the economic game they would 
be playing in detail:  
When you go to the next page, you will be connected to another 
participant. Together, the two of you will be deciding how to 
distribute a maximum of 6 virtual raffle tickets for a $20 Amazon 
gift card between yourselves. 
 
There are two ways the tickets can be distributed: 
 
- Each Player gets 3 tickets 
 
- 4 tickets for Player 1 and 1 ticket for Player 2 
 
You will be randomly assigned to be either Player 1 or Player 2. 
Each player will have a unique role in the decision-making 
process: 
 
- Player 1 will be able to see which option (A or B) represents 
which distribution, and will recommend one of the options to 
Player 2. 
 
- Player 2 will not be able to see which option represents which 
distribution, but will receive Player 1's recommendation and will 
make the final decision about which option will be chosen. 
 
 After reading these instructions, participants were quizzed for comprehension of the 
instructions. Those who failed the test were given one more chance to read the instructions and 
answer correctly. 
 Participants were then presented with a screen claiming to wait for another participant to 
connect. Actually, the webpage was programmed to wait eight seconds before moving on to the 
next screen.  
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 The next screen was timed for three seconds, and claimed to be assigning roles to the 
participants. All participants were “assigned” to Player 2. The website paused for three seconds 
for the simulated “Player 1” to evaluate their options. 
 In all cases, Player 1 suggested option A, and provided a text message, “that gives each 
of us 3.” Up to this point, both experimental conditions were identical. They diverge only in the 
outcomes of participant responses.  
 In the trust condition, participants who did go with Player 1’s advice to pick option A 
received the following message in large print: 
The Selected Distribution is: 
  
You:        3 TICKETS 
Player 1:  3 TICKETS  
  
If you had gone against your partner's advice, you would have 
received 1 ticket, and they would have received 4. 
 
 If they picked option B, against Player 1’s advice, they would receive this message: 
The Selected Distribution is: 
  
You:         1 TICKET 
Player 1:  4 TICKETS 
 
If you had taken Player 1's advice, you would each have been 
awarded 3 tickets. 
 
 Participants in the distrust condition were given essentially the same messages, but in 
reverse. They were given the egalitarian outcome (3 - 3) if they went against Player 1’s advice, 
and were given the disadvantageous outcome (1 – 4) if they followed Player 1’s advice. For a 
view of how this looks within the qualtrics software, with branching logic, see Appendix M. 
 After the manipulation phase was complete, participants were given the same measures 
as in the above reported pilot studies. 
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 After dependent measures were taken, participants were asked to type an open-ended 
response to the question, “What do you think about your interaction partner (Player 1)?” They 
were also asked whether or not they thought their partner thought they were real (yes/no), and 
whether they believed their partner was real (yes/no). Then they were told that their partner was 
not real, and were asked to report on a seven-point scale how surprised they were to find this out. 
Results 
 All dependent variables were analyzed using  2 (Manipulation: trust vs. distrust) x 2 ( 
Belief: Believed partner real vs. did not) between-subjects ANOVAs. The latter variable was 
included in order to statistically control for whether or not the contrivance of the manipulation 
was convincing, and to determine the role of the believability of the scenario. It was possible that 
the economic game could only change state distrust if the participant believes they are interacting 
with a real person (121 reported that they believed their partner was a real person), but it was 
also possible that the scenario itself could affect a person’s level of distrust regardless of their 
belief that they were dealing with another human directly. The majority (94%) of participants 
took Player 1’s advice and chose option A. Results for each measure can be found in Table 7. 
  Confidence and Personal Control. Participants with an untrustworthy partner had less 
judgmental confidence/certainty (M = 3.15, SD = 1.10), than those with a trustworthy partner (M 
= 3.99, SD = .85) F(1, 299) = 47.75, p < .001, d = .85, and felt less personal control over life 
events (M = 3.39, SD = .98) than those with a trustworthy partner (M = 3.84, SD = .81) F(1, 299) 
= 18.15, p < .001, d = .50. Belief had no significant main or interactive effects (ds<.09). 
IPIP Mistrust. As predicted, participants in the untrustworthy partner condition reported 
greater mistrust of others (M = 2.95, SD = .35) than those in the trustworthy partner condition (M 
= 2.80, SD = .32) F(1,299) = 16, p < .001, d = .45. 
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Matchstick Puzzles. As in the previous pilot, participants with an untrustworthy 
partner solved fewer of the “routine” matchstick problems (M = .90, SD = 1.04) than participants 
with a trustworthy partner (M = 1.18, SD = 1.20) F(1, 299) = 6.37, p = .012, d = .25. Participants 
in this condition also solved fewer matchstick problems overall (M = .99, SD = 1.25) than 
participants with a trustworthy partner (M = 1.30, SD = 1.38) F(1, 299) = 6.47, p = .011, d = .24. 
There was a significant interaction between belief that Player 1 was a human and whether Player 
1 was a trustworthy or untrustworthy partner for the total number of matchstick problems solved 
F(1, 299) = 4.11, p = .044. There appeared to be no partner effect when participants were not 
convinced of their partner’s realness (trustworthy partner: M = 1.17, SD = 1.29; untrustworthy 
partner: M = 1.09, SD = 1.32, d = .06), and a decrement in puzzles solved for participants with 
untrustworthy partners whom they believed to be real (trustworthy partner: M = 1.48, SD = 1.48; 
untrustworthy partner: M = .74, SD = .99, d = .59) . 
IPIP Openness. Distrusting participants reported less intellectual openness (M = 3.43, 
SD = .71) than trusting participants (M = 3.65, SD = .53) F(1, 299) = 5.69, p = .018, d = .35. 
Discussion 
The economic deception game seems to have successfully influenced participants’ levels 
of trust, moving several trust measures in the appropriate direction, with the exception of the 
IPIP intellectual openness measure, for which participants in the distrust condition became more 
intellectually conservative. Pairing with an untrustworthy partner also appears to cause 
participants to solve fewer matchstick puzzles, which could also indicate increased intellectual 
conservatism, or cautiousness. Participants paired with an untrustworthy partner were 
significantly less confident in the correctness of their judgments, reported lower feelings of 
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personal control over what happens to them, reported greater mistrust for other people generally, 
solved fewer matchstick puzzles, and reported less intellectual openness.  
Pilot 4B Economic Deception Game – Mturk Sample 
Method 
Participants and Design 
 Of all 60 participants, 73.3% were White, 13.3% were Black, 11.7% were Asian, and 
3.3% were Hispanic/Latino. Economically, 15% identified themselves as lower class, 26.7% 
lower-middle class, 46.7% middle class, and 11.7% upper-middle class. They were 36 years old 
on average. Included participants completed the experiment on average in 16.62 minutes (SD = 
4.95). 
 This pilot study was a simple two-condition experiment. Participants were randomly 
placed in the distrust or trust condition. 
Procedure 
 All participants were recruited online on MTurk. The procedure of this study was 
identical to that of the student sample, with the exception that this version of the study had 
participants competing for raffle tickets for a $5 bonus instead of a $20 gift card. Participants 
were also paid $0.70 for completing the study. 
Results 
Analyses 
 Inclusion criteria were the same as for the previously reported studies.  Fifty-three 
participants met inclusion criteria. Participants were distributed fairly evenly between the four 
conditions – of those assigned to a trustworthy partner, 15 believed them to be real, and 13 
disbelieved. Of those with an untrustworthy partner, 14 believed, and 11 disbelieved. Most 
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participants (86%) took Player 1’s advice and chose option A. Results for all measures can be 
found in Table 8. 
 Confidence and Personal Control. Distrusting participants reported less confidence (M 
= 3.47, SD = 1.33) than trusting participants (M = 4.19, SD = .79) F(1, 49) = 5.67, p = .021, d = 
.66. 
Matchstick Puzzles.  A 2 (Experimental condition: trust vs. distrust) x 2 (Belief in 
partner: Believed partner real vs. did not) between-subjects ANOVA revealed an interaction 
effect on nonroutine matchstick puzzle performance, F(1, 49) = 4.47, p = .04, η2 = .08. Among 
participants who believed in their partner, distrusting participants appeared to have solved more 
of the puzzles (M = .27, SD = .65), than trusting participants (none – M = 0, SD = 0) , d = .59. 
For those who did not believe their partner was a real person, the opposite pattern emerged – 
distrusting participants solved no puzzles while trusting participants solved some, though less 
than one on average (M = .13, SD = .35), d = .52.  
IPIP Variety. Participants who believed in their partner reported being more variety 
seeking (M = 3.72, SD = .79) than participants who did not believe in their partner (M = 3.17, SD 
= .77) F(1, 49) = 6.03, p = .018, d = .71. 
No other effects were significant for any measures. 
Discussion 
 In spite of a considerably smaller sample, this iteration of the economic deception game 
still managed to replicate significant effects in terms of confidence in the correctness of one’s 
judgments, and the ability to solve complex puzzles. Regardless of belief in their partner, 
participants in the distrust condition reported feeling less confident in their own thoughts and 
perceptions. This distrust manipulation also had an effect on participants’ ability to solve 
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counterintuitive puzzles, though the direction of that effect was subject to whether the participant 
believed their partner was a real person. Encountering an untrustworthy partner made people 
solve more puzzles, provided they believed that partner was a real person. This is in line with 
previous findings (Schul et al., 2008), and suggests that is will be important, when using this type 
of paradigm in an online setting, to evaluate whether or not participants believe they are dealing 
with a real human being. 
General Discussion of Pilot Studies 
General Overview of Pilot Results 
 Across populations and methods of delivery, semantic primes were not found to be a 
reliable means of manipulating reported levels of trust, distrust, caution, or performance on 
cognitive tasks. 
 Of all the priming-driven pilot studies, the most compelling was the word search study 
with a student sample, which still failed to produce effects of encouraging size, all of which were 
in the opposite of the predicted direction. The same method produced no effects with an MTurk 
sample. The scrambled sentence task failed entirely in both populations to produce changes in 
the dependent measures.  
 A recent meta-analysis found that direct behavioral primes have their strongest effect 
when the target behavior has high value to the participant, and that the effect last longer when the 
prime activates a goal (Weingarten, Chen, McAdams et al., 2016). Although the analysis was 
restricted to direct behavioral primes, and the experiments here have attitudinal and indirect 
targets (e.g. distrust primes and similarity judgments), it is worth pointing out that the target 
tasks were unlikely to have a high value to participants and did not activate any goals. In that 
respect, these results were congruent with the larger priming literature. 
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 Fortunately, the manipulations that simulated actual distrust-relevant social situations 
worked considerably better. Surprisingly, the impostor detection task was very effective at 
reducing trust, increasing caution, and even increasing self-reported variety-seeking, all 
movements in the predicted direction for MTurk workers – all this despite being specifically 
designed for University of Connecticut students. The UCONN students did show effects of 
condition in this manipulation on measures of confidence, trust, variety-seeking and intellectual 
openness, but only the effect on confidence was in the predicted direction.  
 In another surprising turn of events, MTurk workers did not seem to be as impacted by 
the economic deception game as UCONN students were, despite the manipulation being 
designed with their population in mind. MTurk workers in the distrust condition were feeling 
more general mistrust according to the IPIP scale, but also felt more trusting of police. 
Meanwhile, students in the distrust condition of the economic deception game reported lower 
levels of confidence and control, and lower levels of trust on a variety of measures. Also, when 
they believed their interaction partner was human, they solved more counterintuitive matchstick 
puzzles in the distrust condition than in the trust condition, which is in line, though not perfectly 
so with Schul et al.’s (2007) finding that distrusting participants performed better on the counter-
intuitive set, but worse on the intuitive set than did trusting participants.  
Differences between Methods 
 Lack of priming effects. Two methods of semantic priming in two different populations 
failed to provide compelling evidence for the effectiveness of distrust primes. In recent years, 
social psychological priming has been embroiled in controversy, with some large-scale studies 
failing to replicate classic effects (Harris et al., 2013; Pashler, Coburn, & Harris, 2012; Pashler et 
al., 2013; Shanks, Newell, Lee, Balakrishnan, Ekelund, Cenac, Kavvadia, & Moore, 2013). 
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However, semantic primes have been successfully used to induce distrust in the past (Posten & 
Mussweiler, 2013; Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011; Friesen & Sinclair, 2011), so why not here? 
 Language and culture. One of the most pressing reasons to conduct pilot studies on the 
semantic priming of distrust in the first place was that all of the other studies that had 
successfully used the method were conducted outside the US, and usually in the German 
language (Posten & Mussweiler, 2013; Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011; Friesen & Sinclair (2011) 
was conducted in Canada, in English). It is possible that the words used in the German studies 
had somewhat different connotations or associations than their translations do in American 
English. It is also possible that people in different cultures react to the concept of distrust in 
different ways. For instance, people in societies with more social assurances find interpersonal 
trust to be a less important factor in their interactions with others, because they can rely on their 
social and cultural institutions to ensure that it is in the other person’s best interest to behave in a 
sufficiently trustworthy way, regardless of that person’s feeling toward them (Yamagishi & 
Yamagishi, 1994).  
 Increased trust? Students who were given distrust primes embedded in a word search 
were actually more trusting on some measures. The first explanation that might come to mind is 
that participants were reacting against the manipulation and working to re-establish their ability 
to trust others. This explanation seems unlikely, however, because other methods of inducing 
distrust, such as the impostor detection task and the economic deception game produced even 
more effects in the predicted direction.  
 A more likely explanation is that this effect has to do with the semantic characteristics of 
distrust-relevant terms. In the English language, distrust is semantically a negation of trust. It is 
difficult to describe distrust without referencing the concept of trust. Prime words for distrust 
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inevitably included such entries as dishonest or uncertain – negations of trust-evoking words. 
Even words that do not include trust-words, such as fake or suspicion are difficult to comprehend 
without contrasting them to concepts like authentic or security. If this is the case, then semantic 
distrust primes may be inadvertently priming for trust at the same time to some degree.  
 Non-priming methods. The imposter-detection task and economic deception game likely 
worked better than the semantic primes because they created a situation in which participants 
were required to engage in some of the mental tactics that are necessary in real life distrust-
relevant situations – looking for signs of deceit in the imposter-detection task, and being 
betrayed/successfully avoiding betrayal in the economic deception game. In short, they 
compelled people to be distrusting, rather than make them think about distrust.  
 In fact, these methods may have succeeded for the same reason that priming failed – that 
is, the fact that they promoted effortful, conscious distrust may have been key to their success. If 
distrust is active rather than passive, manipulations that promote active distrust may be necessary 
to achieve distrust effects. The fact that such an overwhelming majority of participants in the 
economic deception game went along with Player 1’s advice further supports the idea that trust is 
the default “mode,” and that distrust requires some effort. 
Differences between Sample Populations 
 Impostor detection. Why did MTurk workers respond so much better to the impostor 
detection task than UCONN students? After all, the manipulation was designed specifically for 
students at the Storrs campus. It is surprising that MTurk workers, who presumably have no 
personal connection with UCONN athletics, would show greater distrust effects than the 
students, for whom the ability to tell genuine athletes from fakers is more personally relevant. 
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 One possible explanation is that students’ social proximity to the issue made it 
psychologically necessary for them to personally reaffirm that they could trust the people close 
to them, even if some students are deceitful. Because these were students who lived and learned 
among other UCONN students, it may be important to them to believe they can trust the people 
around them. The fact that students in the distrust condition did report less confidence in the 
correctness of their opinions and then reported greater trust in their relatives and other 
individuals, and less variety-seeking and intellectual openness suggests that they could be 
responding to a threat to their personal confidence by bolstering their trust in their own group 
members and avoiding outside influences.  
 It is also possible that the effects of the distrust manipulation are short-lived. Students 
took an average of six minutes longer to complete the experiment than MTurk workers, so they 
may have had more time post-manipulation to overcompensate for their uncomfortable feelings 
of distrust. 
 Economic deception. Just as MTurk workers responded better to the manipulation 
designed for university students, the students responded better to the manipulation that was 
implemented with MTurk workers in mind – the economic deception game. Where MTurk 
workers showed slightly-increased trust for police, and increased mistrust on the IPIP mistrust 
scale, students reported reduced confidence and control, and reduced trust on a majority of the 
measures we used.  
 One reason for this may be a difference in motivation. Although a $5 bonus for such a 
short task is almost unheard of on MTurk, it may not be as motivating as the $20 gift card that 
university students were competing for. Additionally, MTurk workers may not have felt 
confident that the bonus offer was legitimate. Researchers have obtained a bad reputation among 
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MTurkers for taking too long to pay, or not paying at all (Jacques & Kristensson, 2013). Bonuses 
in particular may be considered by some to be unreliable, as they must be given out manually, 
and the process is unintuitive.  
 The manipulation also may have seemed more novel to students, and thus, more worthy 
of their attention. It is relatively common that MTurk workers are asked to interact with one 
another in some mediated way. They may have just gone through without giving the game much 
thought. Additionally, MTurkers were purportedly interacting with some random person in the 
world, while students were led to believe that they were interacting with a fellow UCONN 
student, possibly even a classmate. This may have given the betrayal more of a “sting” for the 
students, impacting their responses on the subsequent measures. 
Distrust or Uncertainty? 
 It is possible that the outcomes observed in this series of pilot studies is due to the 
manipulation of participants’ feelings of certainty, and not distrust per se. These experiments did 
find some effect of the distrust manipulations on reported personal control and certainty (Marsh 
& Weary, 1994) among students in the impostor detection and economic deception studies. At 
this point, it is even difficult to distinguish between uncertainty and distrust. Uncertainty and 
lack of personal control has been linked with more conservative, deliberative, and diagnostic 
processing of information (Marsh & Weary, 1994; Pittman & D’Agostino, 1985; Pittman & 
Pittman, 1980; Weary et al., 1993), which seems to be very similar to some of the outcomes 
associated with distrust – reduced stereotyping (Posten & Mussweiler, 2013), activation of more 
social categories in response to a complex stimulus (Friesen & Sinclair, 2011), and higher 
performance with  complex puzzles (Schul et al., 2008).  
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 Control motivation and uncertainty do not, however, seem to explain the apparent 
preference for alternatives and simultaneous activation of conflicting concepts (Friesen & 
Sinclair, 2011; Schul et al., 2004), or increased creativity (Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011) also 
included among the non-routine cognitive patterns associated with distrust. The question also 
remains whether experimentally manipulated distrust is conceptually similar enough to be 
equated with more stable concepts of distrust, such as distrust of institutions or outgroup 
members. 
Conclusion 
 The most important thing to learn from these pilot studies is that, regardless of sample 
population, online priming manipulations have not been shown to be a reliable means of 
inducing a state of distrust, at least according to the variety of measures used here. Although both 
imposter-detection and economic deception manipulations have been fairly effective, they do not 
always have the same effects across populations. Moving forward, only the non-priming methods 
will be used to induce distrust. 
 In the upcoming studies, both the imposter detection and economic deception procedures 
will be used for both populations, though the majority of studies performed on students will 
make use of the economic deception task.  While the effects of these manipulations are now 
known for these pilot measures, they of course remain unknown for the measures being used in 
the coming studies, so some variety in the manipulations used is desirable. 
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Chapter 8   
Experiment 1 
 This study used one of the manipulation techniques that worked relatively well in pilot 
studies, the impostor detection task, in order to investigate how distrust changes the way that 
statements are interpreted. In particular, it addressed the type of asymmetrical criticism that has 
frustrated advocates of science-based medicine for some time. Many people who are highly 
critical to the point of rejecting established medical interventions such as vaccines or antibiotics 
for their children, also uncritically accept CAM treatments for which there is, at best, dubious 
evidence. The existence of this unbalanced criticism implies that distrust does not lead to a 
generalized resistance to persuasion, but instead leads to a systematic bias toward criticizing a 
default, or established position. 
Previous research on distrust has demonstrated that distrust, as a state, appears to 
facilitate a readiness to identify information that contrasts with what they are being exposed to 
currently – for example, by identifying contrasting adjectives more quickly, or judging members 
of an outgroup less stereotypically (Schul et al., 2004; Schul et al., 2008; Posten & Mussweiler, 
2013). This seems to imply that distrusting people will find a statement to be comparatively less 
likely when it agrees with an earlier, established statement – reading the first statement should 
prompt the search for contrasting information, making the eventual discovery of an agreeing 
statement feel less “correct” because it matches less closely with the information they were 
searching for, whereas trusting people may find the agreeing statements more likely to be true, 
because the statement seems familiar to them. 
In this study, participants were placed either in a situation where they needed to judge 
whether or not someone was lying to them (distrust), or in which they needed only to judge their 
73 
 
spontaneity (control), and were then exposed to two sets of statements. The first set included a 
variety of trivia-type statements, some of which were true, some false. The second set also 
consisted of trivia-type statements, each of which either agreed with, contradicted, or were 
irrelevant to one of the statements in the first set. It was predicted that participants in the distrust 
condition would be searching for information that contrasts with the first set of statements, 
making the later contradictory statements seem more likely to be true, due to this increased 
availability of ideas that contrast with the statements in the first set. Some of the questionnaire 
measures from the pilot studies were included in the interest of exploring whether or not self-
report distrust measures also influenced belief in three statement types. 
 Method 
Participants 
 Sixty-two University of Connecticut students followed the link to the Qualtrics survey. 
Of those who reported their gender and ethnic background, and 67.7% female; 66.1% were 
White, 4.8% Black, 17.7% Asian, 3.2% Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, and 6.5% 
Hispanic/Latino. One student identified as a member of the Blackfoot Tribe, and one as Sri 
Lankan. Economically, 1.6% identified as lower class, 11.3% lower-middle class, 45.2% middle 
class, 35.5% upper-middle class, and 3.2% upper class. The students were 19 years old on 
average. Students were assigned randomly to the distrust or control condition. 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were recruited through the psychology department’s participant pool website. 
Upon signing up, they were presented with a link to the Qualtrics survey that contained the 
study. 
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After reading the information sheet for the study, participants were taken through the 
impostor detection version of a judgment task or a control version of the judgment task. 
 Impostor detection judgment task. The athlete impostor detection task piloted in the 
previous chapter was used to induce a state of distrust in participants in the distrust condition. 
Participants were presented with four respondents’ answers to eight questions about being a 
student athlete. In the distrust condition, participants were informed that two of the four 
respondents were genuinely student athletes at the University of Connecticut, and two were non-
athletes doing their best impersonation of a student athlete. They were asked to read each of 
these responses and for each, give a dichotomous response indicating whether they thought each 
respondent was genuine or an impostor.  
Control judgment task. In the control condition, participants were presented with the 
same responses about being a student athlete, but participants were not told that some of the 
responses were actually from non-athletes. Instead, participants were asked to read the responses 
and rate the  spontaneity of the response on a six-point scale (as in Schul, Mayo, Burnstein, 
2004). 
Statements. Once the manipulation was completed, students completed an unrelated 
second task in which they were asked to rate the plausibility of various statements. Thirty 
statements were facts taken from a cultural literacy test (adapted from  Julka, 1993) based on a 
book about cultural literacy covering basic facts of history, literature, and science that literate 
Americans should know (Hirsh, 1988). The statements were split into two 15-statement halves. 
The primary dependent measure was the responses to the second set of 15 statements, with these 
target statements belonging to one of three categories. Five statements were directly 
contradictory to a statement presented in the first half, five were directly in agreement with a 
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statement presented in the first half, and the five statements in the third condition were irrelevant 
to all previous statements. To create contradictory statements, one detail of a statement in set one 
was changed, and the statement rephrased in order to make the contradiction less obvious. 
Statements were presented in the same semi-randomized order for all participants. To eliminate 
the confound of participants only being exposed to false statements that contradict an earlier 
statement, two contradictory target statements were true (and thus, the corresponding set 1 
statement false), and three of these target statements were false. The two halves were presented 
to the students as one continuous set. Eight of the 15 statements in the first set, and six of the 15 
target statements were factually true (See Appendix N). 
 Each statement was presented to participants on its own webpage, to prevent them from 
looking back or ahead at other statements while responding. After reading the statement, the 
participant was asked, “please estimate your confidence in the truth of the following statement.” 
Plausibility ratings were recorded by having the participants move a cursor between 0 and 100 
on a slide located just below the statement, with the cursor’s starting location automatically 
appearing at 50 before participants responded. (See Appendix O for a visual depiction). The 
focus of my analyses were responses to the second set of statements, broken into three groups of 
five, and averaged, yielding one score for each type – agreeing, contradicting, and irrelevant 
statements. Finally, the participants completed the following self-report measures. 
Uncertainty and perceived control. The items that were most sensitive to the 
manipulations in the pilot studies were included for assessing degree of confidence and certainty 
in one’s judgments and degree of perceived control over outcomes. Two single-item measures 
used in research on chronic uncertainty and perceived control deprivation (Marsh & Weary, 
1989; Weary, Marsh, Gleicher, & Edwards, 1993) were adapted for assessing transient feelings 
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of undermined confidence and certainty and transient feelings of undermined feelings of personal 
control.  These items were included as manipulation checks to assess the degree to which a 
person is uncertain or is confident in the correctness of their opinions, judgments, and decisions, 
and how much they feel that they lack or have sufficient personal control over the things that 
happen to them. 
Medical mistrust. The Revised Health Care System Distrust Scale (Shea, Micco, Dean, 
McMurphy, Schwartz, & Armstrong, 2008; Appendix P) was used as one measure of real-world 
distrust. This scale measures two dimensions of mistrust for the health care system – how 
competent participants feel the health care system is (MMC; α = .76), and how much its values 
align with their own (MMV; α = .68). These dimensions correspond rather well with the present 
notion that distrust involves a conflict of interest between parties. Recent studies have found that 
African-Americans indicate higher distrust on this scale, particularly on the values dimension 
(Armstrong et al., 2013), and this relationship appears to be moderated by the amount of racial 
discrimination a person experiences (Shoff & Yang, 2012).  
This scale was used as the primary dispositional measurement of distrust because it 
conveys distrust in an explicit, real-world entity. Most measures of trust and distrust ask 
participants to report their agreement with general statements about how trusting they are, and 
how selfish or untrustworthy others are (Goldberg et al., 2006; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). 
Such measures can be expected to reflect a person’s opinion of how much they trust others 
generally, but may not reflect the way they respond to entities that ask for their trust. The 
Revised Health Care System Distrust Scale (Shea, Micco, Dean, McMurphy, Schwartz, & 
Armstrong, 2008) evaluates actual beliefs about a major social institution. Instead of measuring 
distrust as a kind of misanthropy, this scale measures it as in terms of their beliefs about a 
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specific entity’s competence and moral integrity. It was included as a means to conduct 
exploratory analyses concerning how this form of dispositional distrust relates to the manipulated 
distrust found in laboratory studies. 
Trust For Specific Other Persons and Institutions. As in the pilot studies, participants 
were asked to report how much they trusted their neighbors, relatives, self, science, police, and 
religion. Additionally, they were asked to report how much they trusted their government. Each 
of these measures was a single item. 
 IPIP Variety and Openness. IPIP scales for variety-seeking (α = .83) and intellectual 
openness (α = .66; Goldberg et al., 2006) were also used again for this study, because they often 
were affected by this manipulation in pilot studies, and serve as a way of measuring people’s 
self-perceived open-mindedness, which may relate to their level of cognitive flexibility. As such, 
these measures were expected to actually increase under distrust. 
 Additional items. At the end of the study, participants completed some exploratory items  
as part of a separate research project examining what dispositional and attitudinal factors might 
be associated with attitudes toward vaccines. These measures were included at the end of all 
subsequent studies. 
Social dominance orientation. The four-item Short Social Dominance Orientation 
(SSDO; α = .791) scale was given to participants to measure their favorability toward group-
based inequality (Pratto et al., 2013).  
 Right wing authoritarianism. The RWA scale was used as a measure of authoritarianism 
(α = .931; Altemeyer, 2006).  
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 Abortion, vaccines and politics. Participants completed a variety of items assessing their 
attitudes toward abortion rights and childhood vaccines. They also completed a measure 
assessing their political ideology (far-left liberal to far-right conservative).  
Results 
Data Preparation  
 Interpretation of missing plausibility ratings. In the Qualtrics data output for 
plausibility ratings, about 63% of participant data contained seemingly randomly-distributed 
missing data, but only on the plausibility ratings and not the other measures. It did not seem 
likely that a participant would occasionally decline to rate the plausibility of a statement, while 
rating many others, and completing the rest of the study without incident. A closer examination 
of the display of the “slider” input device on the webpage for assessing plausibility makes it 
apparent that the slider had a default position at the midpoint (50). Thus it seems most likely that 
participants with the occasional blank space in their statement ratings meant to give it a rating of 
50, rather than intentionally skipping the item. Thus, for all participants who had missing data 
only on plausibility responses, their missing ratings were assumed to be 50 in the primary 
analyses. Analyses were also conducted eliminating missing responses; those results did not 
differ substantially from the primary analyses. See Appendix O for pictures of the sliders. 
Manipulated Distrust 
Likelihood ratings. A 2 (Judgment type: Distrust vs. Control) x 3(Statement type: 
Agreeing vs. Contradictory vs. Irrelevant) mixed analysis of variance, with statement type as the 
within subjects variable, revealed a main effect of statement type, F(2,120) = 12.31, p < .001, ηp2 
= .17. Post-hoc tests of differences between statement types revealed that contradictory 
statements that contradicted a prior statement were viewed as significantly less plausible (M = 
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49.46, SD = 12.19) than agreeing (M = 59.62, SD = 13.25) t(63) = 4.876, p < .001, d = .80, and 
irrelevant statement types (M = 58.57, SD = 17.20) t(63) = 3.72, p < .001 , d = .61 (familywise 
alpha = .0167). Contrary to predictions, there was no significant effect of judgment type, and no 
interaction between judgment type and statement type.  
In order to determine the role that the truth or falseness of a statement played in 
participants’ likelihood judgments, a 2(Judgment type: Distrust vs. Control) x 2(Statement type: 
Agreeing vs. Contradictory) x 2(Veracity: True vs. False) mixed ANOVA was conducted. 
Irrelevant statements were excluded from this analysis because they were all false. Truth value 
did have a main effect, with true statements judged to be more likely (M = 64.82, SD = 19.42) 
than false statements (M = 44.85, SD = 18.36) F(1, 60) = 49.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .45. The main 
effects for Statement type remained significant, with agreeing statements judged more likely (M 
= 58.09, SD = 18.89) than contradicting statements (M = 51.59, SD = 18.89) F(1, 60) = 8.81, p = 
.004, ηp2 = .13. There were no significant interactions between the variables on plausibility 
ratings.  
 Difference scores. Although the plausibility of the statements themselves may not have 
responded to judgment type, it was possible that the ‘change’ in plausibility from a previously-
related statement could be affected. If an apparently likely statement had been previously read 
under distrust, the comparative likelihood of the new, contradictory statement could possibly be 
increased compared to what it would have been otherwise, and yet still have a low likelihood 
judgment. Similarly, apparently unlikely statements’ contradictions may have simply been rated 
more likely than they would be otherwise, but when raw scores were combined, this difference 
would be lost. Thus an analysis that takes into account the judged plausibility of the 
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corresponding comparison statements in set 1 could be more sensitive at detecting distrust 
effects. 
The difference between each of the target statements and their corresponding statement in 
the first half of the set was taken by subtracting the rating of the earlier statement from the later 
target statement. Then, the average change was calculated for each statement type, with more 
positive numbers meaning increased plausibility of the target statements relative to its pair. 
Irrelevant statements, by definition, had no corresponding statement, so the average of the first-
half irrelevant statements’ ratings was subtracted from the average rating of the later target 
irrelevant statements. Irrelevant statements were included in this manner merely to provide 
control for time, providing a baseline for how much statements’ likelihood changed generally 
from set 1 to set 2. All irrelevant statements were factually false.  
A 2(Judgment type: Distrust vs. Control) x 3(Statement type: Agreeing vs. Contradicting 
vs. Irrelevant) mixed ANOVA on the difference scores, with statement type as the within 
subjects variable, again revealed a main effect of statement type F(2,120) = 6.829, p = .002, ηp2 = 
.102. Post-hoc comparison by statement type found that contradictory target statements were 
rated as less plausible than the statements in set 1 that they disagreed with (M = -6.95, SD = 
18.17), compared to irrelevant (control) statements presented in the second half of the statement 
set (M = 4.92, SD = 19.39), t(63) = 3.562, p = .001, d = .63. Neither were significantly different 
from agreeing statements (M = -.75, SD = 16.56). 
Distrust of the Medical System 
 To test the exploratory hypothesis that dispositional differences in trust might interact 
with statement type in a way analogous to what was predicted for the experimental manipulation, 
analyses were conducted replacing the categorical manipulated distrust variable with a 
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continuous measure of dispositional mistrust.  This analysis also took into account the actual 
truthfulness of the statements; a hierarchical linear model was used to test the effects as it 
required analyzing the data at the level of individual statements rather than relying on composite 
measures as in the primary analyses reported above. Manipulated distrust did not have a 
significant effect on reported medical mistrust, either in terms of the values-based factor t(58) = -
.25, p= .80, d = -.06, or the competence-based factor t(58) = -.09, p = .93, d = -.02. 
 Model theory and alignment. Because the three statement types were nested within 
participants, a multilevel analysis was conducted on set 2 statements, with statement type as the 
level-1 variable, and medical mistrust as the level-2 variables (Table 11). Statements type was 
further divided into true and false statements, because both the agreeing and contradictory groups 
contained statements that were true and false. Irrelevant statements were all false in the critical 
set of statements. The criterion variable was the average likelihood rating of the type of target 
statement (agreeing, contradictory, or irrelevant). MMC and MMV were grand-mean centered, 
which will be described in greater detail in the “centering” section. 
Random effects. In modeling these relationships, the intercept was allowed to vary 
freely, as different individuals may generally tend to judge claims to be more or less plausible. 
The statement-type slopes, on the other hand, were held fixed, because individual differences in 
statement-type-based plausibility differences were not expected to be meaningful beyond what 
could be explained by dispositional distrust.  
Presentation of the statistical model. The first model was estimated including all five 
statement types, and both medical mistrust factors – competence-based medical mistrust (MMC) 
and values-based medical mistrust (MMV). The intercept (β0j) represents the estimated 
plausibility rating for irrelevant-false statements.  
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Yij = β0j + β1j(Agreeing-True) + β2j(Agreeing-False) + β3j(Contradictory-
True) + β4j(Contradictory-False) + rij 
β0j = γ00 + γ01(MMC) + γ02(MMV) 
β1j = γ10 + γ11(MMC) + γ12(MMV) 
β2j = γ20 + γ21(MMC) + γ22(MMV) 
β3j = γ20 + γ21(MMC) + γ22(MMV) 
 
β4j = γ20 + γ21(MMC) + γ22(MMV) 
 
 Because MMC was not found to significantly add to the model, it was removed as a 
predictor, resulting in the following model: 
 
Yij = β0j + β1j(Agreeing-True) + β2j(Agreeing-False) + β3j(Contradictory-
True) + β4j(Contradictory-False) + rij 
β0j = γ00 + γ01(MMV)  
β1j = γ10 + γ11(MMV)  
β2j = γ20 + γ21(MMV)  
β3j = γ20 + γ21(MMV)  
 
β4j = γ20 + γ21(MMV)  
 
Centering. The two factors of the revised medical mistrust scale, MMV and MMC, were 
both grand-mean centered in the multilevel models, because a value of zero is not otherwise 
helpful in interpreting the models – minimal score on the scale does not necessarily indicate a 
complete lack of mistrust, so it is more useful to frame the expression of the model in terms of 
distance from the mean. The intercept in the model therefore represents the predicted statement 
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plausibility for a person with the average amount of medical mistrust judging a false statement 
that is irrelevant to the other statements read. 
Software and parameter estimation. The models in this analysis were estimated using 
full maximum likelihood in HLM for Windows (Raudenbush, Bryk, Congdon, 2013).  
Assumptions and descriptive statistics. All variables in the model appeared to be 
normally distributed. Means for both medical mistrust factors were near the midpoint (MMC: M 
= 3.04, SD = .65; MMV: M = 2.75, SD = .64). Means and standard deviations of plausibility 
judgments by statement type can be found in Tables 9 and 10. The intraclass correlation (ICC) 
for a null model of statement plausibility was .07.   
Model building. Adding statement type to the null model (the random effects model) 
significantly reduced the deviance, Akaike information criterion (AIC), and Bayesian 
information criterion (BIC), while adding four more parameters to the model. In this random 
effects model, contradictory-true statements were not found to be significantly different in 
plausibility from irrelevant statements, while agreeing-true, agreeing-false statements, and 
contradictory-false statements were significantly different from ratings of irrelevant statements. 
As expected, agreeing-true statements were estimated to be 8.49 points more plausible, agreeing-
false statements were 9.78 points less plausible, and contradictory-false statements were 18.21 
points less plausible than irrelevant statements. All models in this analysis are detailed in Table 
11. 
Full contextual model. The full contextual model, which added both MMV and MMC as 
level-2 variables, estimated each of the statement-type intercepts to be virtually identical to those 
in the random effects model. Because there were no significant effects of MMC, the model 
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excluding it will be the one discussed here. The parameter estimations of the full contextual 
model can be found in Table 11. 
Model excluding MMC. Removing MMC from the model reduced the number of 
parameters from 17 to 12, while only increasing the deviance from 2588.42 to 2593.23, and 
resulting in lower AIC and BIC compared to the full contextual model.  
 False contradictory statements viewed by participants with average MMV were estimated 
to be judged as significantly less plausible than irrelevant statements, by 18.21 points, while true 
contradictory statements  did not differ in likelihood from irrelevant statements among 
participants with the average MMV. Both true and false contradictory statement types  had 
significant negative MMV slopes, which estimated that for each point of increased mistrust 
above (or below) the mean, a true, but contradictory statement would be judged 10.42 points less 
(or more, if below the mean) likely than an irrelevant statement would be at the same value of 
MMV, and a false, contradictory statement would be judged less likely by 11.79 points. These 
negative slopes suggest that medical distrust did not have the hypothesized effect of increasing 
the perceived likelihood of contradictory statements (see Figure 1 for a visual representation).  
 On the other hand, other patterns were somewhat more consistent with my general theory 
of distrust. The MMV slope for irrelevant statements was 9.84, indicating that greater medical 
distrust was associated with higher perceived plausibility of these false statements relative to 
individuals with less distrust. False agreeing statements did not have significantly different 
MMV slopes from the irrelevant statements; thus greater distrust was associated with a higher 
judged plausibility of these statements (relative to more trust folks) as well. True agreeing 
statements had a negative MMV slope of 8.58, almost entirely cancelling-out the positive slope 
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found for irrelevant statements, and implying that MMV does not have an effect on the judged 
likelihood of true agreeing statements. 
Initial Statements. The first half of the comparison statements – the set 1 items that are 
being contradicted or agreed with by the target statements in this study – were approximately 
half true and half false. Set 1 statements were analyzed in order to determine whether the 
impostor detection task or medical mistrust had an effect on participants’ impressions about 
statements for which these earlier statements that were yet to be supported or contradicted. 
Ratings of the true comparison statements in set 1 were averaged, as were the false comparison 
statements and a mixed effects analysis with truth value as the within-subjects variable, and 
values-based medical mistrust (MMV; higher values indicate more mistrust) as a continuous 
variable revealed that true statements from set 1 (M = 60.83, SD = 14.07) were judged to be 
significantly more plausible than the false statements were (M = 52.20, SD = 14.48), F(1, 58) = 
8.04, p = .006, d = .60. MMV was not found to have a main effect on statement plausibility of set 
1 statements, F(1, 58) = 1.26, p = .27, η2 = .08, but plausibility was significantly affected by a 
MMV x truth value interaction, F(1, 58) = 5.04, p = .029,  ηp2 = .08.  
Decomposition of the interaction found that there was a significant slope in the false 
statements condition. Consistent with distrust hypotheses, higher levels of values-based medical 
mistrust were associated with increased ratings of the plausibility of false statements, B = 6.89, p 
= .017; medical mistrust was not associated with differences in the plausibility of true statements, 
B = -2.85, p = .319. 
Discussion 
 This study did not find the predicted effect of the impostor-detection task on the 
likelihood judgements of statements that contradict previous statements. In fact, the impostor 
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detection task was not found to have any effect on the judged likelihood of any of the statements. 
Thus, I did not find support for the notion that inducing distrust in Americans makes 
contradictions easier to believe.  
 Although manipulated distrust was not predictive of likelihood judgments, the 
dispositional measure MMV was. Those with more values-based distrust of the medical system 
saw only irrelevant statements (all of which were false) and agreeing-false statements as more 
plausible than did those who were more trusting. This seems to suggest that people high in 
dispositional distrust find novel ideas that do not contradict available knowledge more believable 
than do people who are lower in dispositional distrust. So, I have not found support for the 
notion that distrust promotes the belief of ideas that contradict the status quo, but the data do 
seem to suggest that dispositional distrust may promote greater receptivity to  alternatives. 
 The lack of an effect of manipulated distrust may be due to a shortcoming of the impostor 
detection task, or it could also be possible that dispositional distrust of an institution is 
qualitatively distinct from prompted suspicion or skepticism of a particular person’s honesty or 
trustworthiness. This appears likely, at least as far as the imposter detection task goes, especially 
in light of the finding that medical mistrust did not respond to the manipulation.  
 This seems to conflict with Schul et al.’s (2004) finding that participants were faster to 
identify target adjectives that contradicted prime adjectives. If contradictory information is more 
easily activated, it ought to be easier to believe. Again it seems possible that there are more than 
one construct at work within what we have been calling “distrust.” The next study uses a 
different technique for manipulating distrust, and provides a different context for processing 
contrasting information. 
 
  
87 
 
Chapter 9 
Experiment 2 
Whereas Study 1 examined how distrust affects the judged likelihood of a statement, this 
study looks at how distrust influences the perceived credibility and competence of a given 
communicator. Recent research has shown that distrust can reduce stereotyping in trait 
judgments of individuals by causing the perceiver to focus on how the individual is different 
from the stereotype, rather than similar to it (Posten & Mussweiler, 2013), rather than 
assimilating that individual to the stereotypes of their salient group (Devine, 1989; Dijkterhuis & 
Bargh, 2001; Kawakami, Young, & Dovidio, 2002; Winter & Uleman, 1984). This effect has 
interesting implications for source credibility. If distrust makes individual women seem less like 
the stereotypical woman, individual Turks less like stereotypical Turks, and individual 
overweight people less like the stereotypical overweight person, then it could potentially also 
make experts seem less expert-like, and quacks seem less quack-like. If distrust makes group 
members seem less representative of their group, it could make individual medical experts’ 
advice seem less credible, and thus easier to ignore. By the same principle, for someone who 
belongs to a group generally not considered to be credible, contrasting the individual with his or 
her group would make that individual more credible. 
This effect should be reduced, or even eliminated, in circumstances where members of 
other, contrasting groups are also present – if an expert and a quack are presented next to each 
other, for instance, the most available contrasts would be those between the two individuals, not 
those differences between the individuals and their groups. In this context, a distrusting person 
should generally draw conclusions about the credibility of an expert versus a quack in the same 
way that a trusting person would.  
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 In this study, participants were paired with either a trustworthy or untrustworthy partner 
in an economic deception game, and viewed photos and descriptions of a healthcare expert, a 
healthcare related non-expert, a person with no relationship to health care, and an obvious quack 
- an energy healer trained in vibrational therapy. They were then asked to rate each of them on a 
variety of traits relevant to their credibility, knowledge, and skill in providing care. They were 
also asked to report how good this person would be at giving medical advice to their friends. In 
another condition, participants saw all four characters together, and were asked to provide the 
same feedback for all four on the same page. When presented separately, it was predicted that the 
characters will be judged more moderately by participants in the distrust condition on all traits, 
leading to fewer differences among the characters than occurs for trusting participants. The 
opposite pattern of character differences is predicted when all characters are presented together 
to distrusting individuals (i.e. ratings of the different characters should diverge from one another, 
to a greater degree than they do for trusting individuals). Thus, the key prediction was that 
presentation (alone or together) would interact with partner (trustworthy or untrustworthy) on 
trait judgments of each of the key characters. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred thirty-seven men, 133 women, and one transgender person were recruited 
through MTurk, and were paid $1.50 for their participation. Of those who provided racial 
demographic information, 80% were White, 8% were Black, 6% were Asian, and 4% were 
Hispanic/Latino/a. Two percent considered themselves impoverished, 20% middle class, 23% 
lower middle class, 43% middle class, 11% upper middle class, and appropriately, 1% identified 
as economic elite. They were 37 years old on average.  
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Materials 
 Inducing distrust. This study used the economic deception game detailed in the pilot 
studies. Participants were randomly assigned to the distrust or control condition of the game. 
Characters. For each character, a picture and a brief biographical sketch were provided, 
stating their credentials, their position, the services they provide, and some of their personal 
interests (see Appendix T). Characters consisted of a medical doctor (expert), a hospital 
administrator (related non-expert), a music teacher (non-related non-expert), and an intuitive 
healer (quack).  
Trait ratings. A list of 16 traits were presented to participants, including eight traits 
relevant to health care – intelligent, caring, competent, professional, skilled, knowledgeable 
about health, knowledgeable about the body, and capable of giving health advice – and eight 
generic traits  provided as filler– Excitable, athletic, outgoing, shy, knowledgeable about ethics, 
knowledgeable about the mind, and capable of giving life advice. Participants evaluated each 
character’s possession of the traits on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). Trait 
ratings for medically-relevant traits and medically-irrelevant traits were averaged for each 
participant, with higher scores indicating the character exemplifies the trait more.  
Memory Check. Immediately after the trait ratings were completed, participants were 
briefly quizzed on their memory of the characters’ biographies. This was included in an effort to 
identify which participants were paying close attention to the task and which were not. 
Personal use of CAM treatments. Because some participants may be biased in favor of 
pseudoscientific health care treatments independently of the context of this study, they were 
asked about their use of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) products and services, 
such as (non-prescribed) dietary supplements, homeopathic and herbal medicines, faith healing, 
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reiki, acupuncture, chiropractic, and reflexology (Appendix U). During analysis, retail products 
were separated from services administered by practitioners before being totaled. These ancillary 
measures were primarily intended to serve as controls for personal bias against mainstream 
medicine and in favor of the quack character. 
 Trust/distrust measures. The measures of confidence and personal control from the 
pilot studies were again used here. Participants were also asked to report their trust of the police, 
their neighbors, relatives, self, science, religion, and government, to be used for a different 
research question involving the influence of distrust on the choice to vaccinate. Distrust of the 
health care system was again evaluated via the revised health care system distrust scale (Shea et 
al., 2008). This measure was included in order to examine whether people respond differently to 
their partner based on their expectations of fair treatment and honesty in the real world.  
 Questions about “Player 1.” At the end of the study, participants were asked to type an 
open-ended response to the question, “What do you think about your interaction partner (Player 
1)?” They were also asked whether or not they thought their partner thought they were real, and 
whether they believed their partner was real. Then they were told that their partner was not real, 
and were asked to report on a seven-point scale how surprised they were to find this out. 
Procedure 
 All participants were recruited online on MTurk. A link was provided to the Qualtrics-
based study. Participants were paid $1.50 for their time, with the added incentive of possibly 
winning a $5 bonus based on raffle tickets awarded during the economic deception game. 
Participants went through the economic deception game described in the pilot studies above. 
Next, they were presented with the picture and biography for all four characters, either one at a 
time, or arranged next to each other in a table-like format to facilitate direct comparisons. If the 
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characters were presented together, they were arranged on the screen left to right - administrator, 
doctor, quack, and teacher. When presented alone, they were also presented in this order, just one 
at a time.   
 The other measures outlined above were administered after the trait rating task. Each web 
page used contained a hidden timer that measured how many seconds were spent on that page. 
Results 
Participation Evaluation 
 In total, 307 people clicked the link to the Qualtrics survey for this study, 289 of which 
stayed in the study at least far enough to complete the economic deception game.  
 Participants were warned in the MTurk description not to use a smart phone or a tablet to 
participate in this study because their screens are too small to show all four characters side by 
side simultaneously, so participants whose metadata revealed that they had used one of these 
small screens to complete the study were excluded from analysis. Ninety-six percent (278) of 
eligible participants passed this criterion.  
Participants were also quizzed on their retention of the content of the character 
descriptions in order to ascertain whether they carefully read these descriptions. They were asked 
two questions about the details of the characters’ written descriptions, such which character had 
which hobby or which job. If they could not answer the two questions correctly, the participant 
was also excluded from analyses. Seventy percent (205) of the total eligible participants passed 
this criterion. This would be considered a high rate of exclusion for most university participant 
pool studies, but is not abnormal for a cognitively-demanding MTurk study – exclusion rates of 
40% or more are not uncommon (Kaufman, Shulze, & Veit, 2011; Kittur, Chi, & Suh, 2008). 
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Ancillary Measures  
Of the participants included in analyses, 22 (11.2%) went against Player 1’s advice, 
demonstrating initial distrust. 
One hundred twenty-six (64%) of participants reported using none of the pseudoscientific 
medical products in the survey, 53 (27%) reported using one, and 17 (9%) reported using more 
than one in the past year.  
One hundred seventy-five of included participants (89%) reported using none of the 
pseudoscientific medical services in the survey, 18 (9%) used one service, and three (1%) used 
two in the past year. 
Seventy-nine participants (57%) reported that they thought that Player 1 believed they 
were a real person, and 88 (45%) reported that they believed that Player 1 was a real person. 
When it was revealed that Player 1 was actually a simulation, participants were fairly 
unsurprised (M = 2.92, SD = 1.75) on a scale of 1 (extremely unsurprised) to 6 (extremely 
surprised). 
Character Trait Judgments 
 One hypothesis for this study was that all characters would receive more extreme ratings 
in the distrust condition when presented together than when presented apart, because with no 
other character available to find dissimilarities with, participants would instead contrast the 
character with his own group, most likely estimating him to be less stereotypical, as 
demonstrated in a past study by Posten and Mussweiler (2014). The extremity of trait judgments 
was calculated by taking the absolute value of the difference between each individual trait rating 
and the midpoint (3). Medically-relevant traits and non-medically-relevant traits were averaged 
separately to create two composite measures (one key dependent measure and one filler 
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measure). ANCOVAs were conducted on the two measures, for each of the four characters 
separately, in which effects of the partner and presentation conditions (alone vs. with others) 
were examined, controlling for reported use of pseudoscientific products and services. A 
secondary analysis looked at the direction of trait ratings, using a mixed factors ANOVA, 
comparing the doctor and quack only, with medically-relevant traits as the dependent variable. 
 Extremity of medically-relevant trait ratings. Contrary to expectations, the doctor 
received marginally more extreme trait ratings when presented alone (M = 1.80, SD = .32) than 
when presented with others (M = 1.70, SD = .43), F(1, 190) = 3.46, p = .064, d = .28.  There was 
no significant main effect of partner,  F(1, 190) = 1.47, p = .227, d = .12, nor was the predicted 
interaction significant,  F(1, 190) = 3.46, p = .064, ηp2 = .01. Use of pseudoscientific products 
and services did not have an effect, F < 1. 
For the quack character, there was a significant interaction between partner and 
presentation on the extremity of the quack’s trait ratings F(1, 190) = 4.99, p = .027, ηp2 = .026, as 
predicted. However the direction of effects was also contrary to predictions. Trait ratings were 
more extreme in the distrust condition when the quack was presented alone (M = .93, SD = .57) 
than with others (M = .79, SD = .49). In the trust condition the direction of effects was normative 
– the  direct comparison available in the with others condition appeared to make differences 
larger (M = .92, SD = .48) than if characters were presented one at a time, (M = .78, SD = .46) . 
However, decomposition of the interaction into simple main effects revealed that the simple 
effects of presentation were not reliable in either the trust or distrust conditions, ps > .10.    
There were no significant effects of distrust or presentation on the extremity of the 
hospital administrator’s trait ratings.  
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There were no significant main or interactive effects of partner or presentation on the 
extremity of the teacher’s ratings. 
Descriptive statistics for medically-relevant trait ratings can be found in Table 13. 
Extremity of non-medically-relevant trait ratings. No effects were predicted on this 
composite measure, and indeed no significant main or interactive effects of partner or 
presentation were found for any of the four characters, ps > .20.   However, use of CAM 
products was a significant covariate in several of the analyses, which was not true for the 
medical traits composite measure.  
Use of CAM products was associated with more extreme generic ratings of the doctor, 
F(1, 190) = 4.20, p = .042,  ηp2 = .02, while use of CAM services was associated with less 
extreme ratings of the same character F(1, 190) = 3.06, p = .082,  ηp2 = .02. Examination of the 
average directional trait ratings indicated that the mean trait rating was slightly above the 
midpoint (3; M = 3.50, SD = .42). Thus more CAM products led to exaggeratedly positive 
impressions of the doctor on nonmedical traits, and more CAM services led to more muted 
impressions.  
Similarly, use of CAM products led to more extreme ratings of the quack on medically 
unrelated traits, F(1, 190) = 7.201, p = .008,  ηp2 = .037. The quack was judged on average to be 
within one standard deviation of the midpoint on these traits (M  = 3.12, SD = .54), and the use 
of CAM products correlated positively with trait ratings r(195) = .27, p <.001.  
The same pattern held for the teacher. There were no effects of condition, but use of 
CAM products F(1, 190) = 5.42, p = .021,  ηp2 = .03 and services F(1, 190) = 4.27, p = .022,  ηp2 
= .02 covaried significantly with the non-medically-relevant traits, with CAM product use 
associated with more extreme judgments, and the use of CAM services being associated with 
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less extreme judgments. The teacher was judged on average to be slightly more than a standard 
deviation from the midpoint for these traits (M = 3.48, SD = .45), so the greater extremity of 
ratings indicates more positive ratings on these traits.   
 Belief in partner was not a significant predictor of the extremity of ratings for any of the 
characters (p > .05). 
 Medical competence and skill. To examine directional effects, a 2(Partner: trustworthy 
vs. untrustworthy) x 2(Presentation: together vs. apart) ANCOVA with use of CAM products 
and services as covariates was performed on the average medically-relevant trait ratings for each 
of the characters. Ratings for the doctor were predicted to be lower in the distrust condition when 
the doctor was presented alone than when he was presented with the other characters, and ratings 
for the quack were predicted to show the opposite pattern – higher in the distrust condition when 
presented alone than when presented with others. Descriptive statistics for medically-relevant 
trait ratings of all characters can be found in Table 12. 
 For the doctor, there was a significant effect of presentation on medically-relevant trait 
ratings. Participants who saw him with the other characters rated him lower on these traits (M = 
4.66, SD = .51) than those who saw him alone (M = 4.80, SD = .32), F(1, 190) = 4.79, p = .030, d 
= .34, contrary to expectations. There was no main effect of partner, F(1,190) = .09, p = .770, 
and the predicted interaction was not significant, F(1,190) = 1.37, p = .243. Use of CAM 
products and services were not significant covariates in this analysis. 
 For the quack, there were no effects of either partner or presentation on medically-
relevant trait ratings. Contrary to prediction, the interaction was not significant either, F(1,190) = 
1.53, p = .217. CAM product use significantly covaried with the traits F(1, 190) = 16.51, p < 
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.001,  ηp2 = .08, such that those who used more gave higher trait ratings. CAM service use was 
not a significant covariate.  
Belief in partner was not a significant predictor of these ratings (p > .05). 
 Dispositional distrust and medical competence. MMV, along with trust in police, 
neighbors, relatives, and the government, was not found to correlate significantly with 
medically-relevant trait ratings for either doctor or quack (ps > .09).  
 Confidence in one’s own judgments correlated positively with medically-relevant trait 
ratings of the doctor, r(196) = .19, p = .007, but not the quack, r(196) = .045, p = .527. Personal 
control correlated positively with medically-relevant trait ratings of both the doctor, r(196) = .15, 
p = .037 and the quack, r(196) = .21, p = .004. Self-trust also correlated positively with 
medically relevant traits of both the doctor, r(196) = .22, p = .002 and the quack, r(196) = .18, p 
= .011. As one might expect, trust in science correlated positively with medical trait ratings of 
the doctor, r(195) = .20, p = .005, but negatively with those of the quack, r(195) = -.18, p = .011. 
Trust in one’s religion did not correlate with medical traits of the doctor, r(196) = .12, p = .869, 
but did correlate positively with medical traits of the quack, r(196) = .32, p < .001. 
There were no specific hypotheses concerning the hospital administrator, but medically-
relevant trait ratings followed an intuitive pattern. There was a marginal main effect of partner on 
the medically-relevant trait ratings of the hospital administrator, in which distrusting participants 
rated him slightly lower (M = 3.87, SD = .61) than trusting participants (M = 3.95, SD = .56), 
F(1, 190) = 2.87, p = .092, d = .13, and a marginal main effect of presentation, with ratings being 
lower when the administrator was presented with others (M = 3.87, SD = .56) than when he was 
presented alone (M = 3.98, SD = .64), F(1, 190) = 2.75, p = .099, d = .19, which is in line with 
expectations, since it invites comparison to an actual physician. There was a significant 
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interaction between these two variables, F(1, 190) = 5.30, p = .022,  ηp2 = .03, such that trusting 
participants rated him higher on the traits when he was presented alone (M = 4.19, SD = .50) than 
with others (M = 3.85, SD = .56) F(1, 95) = 3.78, p = .010, d = .64, and distrusting participants 
showed no simple effect of presentation. Use of CAM services and products did not significantly 
covary with trait ratings. 
For the teacher, there was a significant main effect of presentation. The teacher was rated 
higher on medically-relevant traits when presented alone (M = 3.65, SD = .49) than when 
presented with others (M = 3.49, SD = .51), F(1, 190) = 7.03, p = .009, d = .32. The use of CAM 
products F(1, 190) = 10.48, p = .001, ηp2 = .05 and CAM services F(1, 190) = 7.18, p = .008, ηp2 
= .04 were significant covariates in the analysis. CAM product use was associated with higher 
trait ratings, and CAM services were associated with lower trait ratings. 
Direct Comparison of the Doctor Versus Quack Impressions.  As noted above, no 
directional predictions were made about impressions of the administrator and teacher on trait 
ratings of medical competence and skill; the key predictions focused on the doctor and quack. A 
follow-up analysis directly comparing ratings of these characters was thus conducted: a 2 
(Character: Doctor vs. Quack) x 2 (Partner: Trustworthy vs. Untrustworthy) x 2 (Presentation: 
Alone vs. Together) mixed factors ANOVA, with character as the within-subjects variable. As 
expected, there was a large main effect of character, with the doctor rated more highly on the 
traits (M = 4.71, SD = .46) than the quack (M = 3.29, SD = .86) F(1, 192) = 481.94, p < .001, d = 
2.06.  
There was a marginal interaction between character and presentation on impressions. 
Presenting the characters together with others resulted in lower ratings of the doctor (alone, M = 
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4.80, SD = .32; together, M = 4.68, SD = .51), and more positive impressions of the quack, 
(alone, M = 3.23, SD = .90; together, M = 3.33, SD = .83), F(1, 192) = 3.25, p = .073, ηp2 = .02.  
This two-way interaction primarily held for participants in the trust condition, a  
marginally significant 3-way interaction between character, partner, and presentation revealed, 
F(1, 192) = 3.13, p = .078, ηp2 = .02.  The convergence in trait ratings for the doctor and the 
quack when they were presented together was only apparent in the trustworthy partner condition 
as the means in Table M indicate.  
Discussion 
 The predicted interaction between presentation and partner on the extremity of medically-
relevant traits was not supported by the data for any of the four characters. Although it was 
statistically significant for the quack, the interaction effect was in the opposite direction than 
what was predicted. Likewise, the hypothesis that medically-relevant trait judgments of the 
doctor and the quack would converge among participants in the distrust condition who viewed 
the characters separately was also not supported by the data. In fact, trends in the data pointed to 
this convergence being somewhat more likely in the trust condition.  
 Taken at face value, these results represent a failure to find evidence for the effect of 
distrust on trait judgments relevant to medical competence, regardless of whether they are 
presented to participants together or one-at-a-time. As with Study 1, it could be that this 
particular manipulation was not strong enough to produce an increase in contrast sensitivity 
detectable by this dependent measure, or it could be that the basic cognitive effects observed by 
other researchers do not extend to character judgments as I theorized they might. And again, we 
must wonder whether “distrust” can be understood as one construct, or if different ways of 
promoting distrust are actually acting on adjacent, but still distinct, processes. 
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On CAM Use 
 Participants were asked to report what CAM products and services they had used in the 
past year so that the total number of products or services used could be used to control for 
favorability toward alternative medicine – which could have confounded judgments of the quack 
vs. the doctor. While CAM product use did correlate with judgments of the quack’s medical 
competence, they did not correlate with the same judgments pertaining to the doctor. This may 
suggest that CAM use corresponds with a general openness to alternative treatments that does 
not necessarily include a devaluing of science-based medical practice.  
 CAM service use did not covary with judgments of medical competence for either 
character, but so few participants reported the use of CAM services that it would not be 
appropriate to draw any strong conclusions about this particular relationship based on the data at 
hand.  
 So far, manipulated distrust has not been shown to have the predicted influence on either 
the judged likelihood of statements, or the judged competence of persons. The next question I 
will ask is whether manipulated distrust can influence the favorability or unfavorability of 
cognitive responses to persuasive arguments. 
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Chapter 10 
Experiment 3 
 This study will attempt to explain one of the more stereotypical qualities believed to be 
associated with  distrust – resistance to attitude change – in terms of elevated contrast sensitivity.  
 So far we have found that experimentally manipulated distrust failed to make novel 
claims more believable, and also did not appear to promote individual-group contrasts in 
stereotypical judgments. It is possible then, that distrust may simply make people more resistant 
to attitude change.  
According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo 1986), when the issue 
at hand is personally relevant, people become more likely to evaluate arguments more carefully, 
generating cognitive responses, and rely less on heuristics. This leads them to favor strong 
arguments over weak arguments. Theoretically, this is because strong arguments generate more 
favorable and fewer unfavorable thoughts than do weak arguments. However, if a state of 
distrust increases the availability of contrasting information (Schul et al., 2004), then involved 
message recipients may generate more contrarian cognitive responses, resulting in a less 
favorable attitude toward even relatively strong arguments. 
This study makes use of a topic that college students tend to have strong feelings about - 
comprehensive senior examinations as a requirement for graduation (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). 
Students are generally understood to be biased against such a requirement, though they can 
become more favorable toward the idea if they are given strong arguments to justify it. In the 
current study, participants in the distrust condition were predicted to resist attitude change and 
report more negative responses to the pro-exam arguments, to report more positive responses and 
fewer negative responses to an anti-exam argument, and to report more cognitive responses, 
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overall. An anti-exam argument was added so that it would be possible to measure participants’ 
favorability toward an opposing argument. Presumably, if distrust facilitates the activation of 
contrasting information, then a statement that contrasts with the previously-read statements 
might be viewed more favorably by distrusting than trusting participants. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
 One hundred sixty-nine participants clicked the survey link, and 161 stayed in the study 
long enough to complete the critical measures. Participants were 30% male, 70% female, 70% 
White, 5% Black, 17% Asian, and 3% wrote-in that they identified as American, human, Indian, 
or Native American. Despite the elimination of eight participants, they were evenly distributed 
between conditions – 49.7% were assigned to a trustworthy simulated “partner,” and 50.3% to an 
untrustworthy one. 
Materials and Procedure 
Acquisition and adaptation of materials. Six strong arguments in favor of 
implementing senior comprehensive examinations gleaned from classic elaboration likelihood 
studies were presented to students (See arguments listed in Appendix W; adapted from Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1979), and a seventh statement was written in opposition to senior comprehensive 
exams.  
Distrust manipulation. The economic deception game detailed in the pilot studies, and 
employed in Study 2 was used again in this study. Participants were randomly assigned to 
condition by the computer. In both conditions, a description of the procedure was provided. 
Participants were then quizzed for comprehension of that description. If they picked the wrong 
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answer, they were given another chance to read the description and answer the question again 
before moving on.  
Presentation of and response to arguments. After the economic deception game, 
participants were presented with all seven arguments, one at a time (the anti-exam argument was 
presented last). First, the argument was presented, with instructions telling participants to simply 
read it. On the next page, the argument was presented again, and participants were asked to “list 
ANY thoughts that occurred to you while you were reading this statement.” They were given a 
maximum of 120 seconds to give their response before the page automatically moved them to the 
next page. Participants were asked to separate their individual thoughts by starting a new line.  
On the next page after that, participants were again presented with the same argument 
and asked to rate their agreement with the statement on a seven-point scale. This entire process 
was repeated for each of the seven arguments. 
Other measures. After these critical measures, other measures of general trust and 
openness were administered, as in the previous two studies. Confidence and Control, the Revised 
Health Care System Distrust Scale (Shea et al, 2008), measures of trust in neighbors, relatives, 
self, science, police, and religion, and government, the IPIP scale of intellectual openness, and 
demographic measures were included.  
Questions about “Player 1.” Participants completed the same questions about their 
thoughts about and belief in “Player 1” as in the previous studies – their opinion of Player 1, 
whether Player 1 believed they were real, whether they believed Player 1 was real, and their level 
of surprise that Player 1 was not real.  
At the end, participants were given the debriefing materials explaining the deception used 
in the study and the hypotheses of the study, and were thanked for their participation. 
103 
 
Results 
 All 161 participants who stayed in the study long enough to take the critical measures 
were included for analyses. Examining the initial distrust responses revealed low initial distrust. 
Of the participants included in analysis, six (3.8%) went against Player 1’s advice, indicating an 
initial tendency toward distrust. 
Cognitive responses. Consistent with previous studies, two coders coded each thought as 
either favorable, unfavorable, or neutral. Interrater reliability was generally high (see Appendix 
W for Kappa scores). Analyses were conducted on composite measures averaging how many 
favorable, unfavorable, neutral, and total thoughts were calculated in response to the six pro-
exam arguments. Separate analyses were conducted on the number of thoughts in each of these 
categories generated in response to the final, and only, anti-exam argument.  
 Separate t-tests (See Table 15) were performed on each of the thought measures in order 
to test the hypothesis that participants in the untrustworthy partner condition would report more 
unfavorable thoughts, and more thoughts total. There were no significant effects of partner on the 
mean positive, negative, neutral, or total responses per pro-exam argument, The same was true 
for responses to the one anti-exam argument (absolute value of all t-tests was <1.5, all ps > .1).  
 For exploratory purposes, responses to individual arguments were analyzed. Consistent 
with predictions, participants with a trustworthy partner reported more positive thoughts (M = 
.67, SD = .94) in response to the sixth argument (this argument suggested that comprehensive 
exams could reduce tuition rates by increasing alumni support) than did participants with an 
untrustworthy partner (M = .41, SD = .65) t(138.27) = 2.01, p = .047, d = .32 (equal variances not 
assumed). Descriptive statistics for all arguments can be found in Table 14. 
104 
 
Additionally, an exploratory 2 (position: pro-exam vs. anti-exam) x 2 (partner: 
trustworthy vs. untrustworthy) x2 (Believe vs. Disbelieve in partner) mixed ANOVAs were 
performed with MMV as a covariate representing dispositional distrust for each category of 
response (favorable, unfavorable, neutral, and total thoughts, and agreement with the arguments), 
and revealed one three-way interaction between position, partner, and belief on total cognitive 
responses, F(1, 152) = 3.89, p = .05, η2 = .025 in which participants who believed in their partner 
had fewer cognitive responses to the anti-exam argument if their partner was untrustworthy, and 
had more cognitive responses to the anti-exam argument when their partner was trustworthy (See 
Figure 2), and participants who believed in their partner generally agreed more (M = 4.49, SD = 
.83) than those who did not (M = 4.05, SD = .97) with all statements, regardless of condition, 
F(1, 152) = 3.90, p = .05, d = .49. No other main or interaction effects were observed. MMV did 
not covary in any of these analyses. 
 Agreement with the arguments. Agreement with pro-exam arguments was calculated 
by averaging the reported agreement with each pro-exam argument. There was no significant 
effect of partner on mean agreement with the pro-exam arguments, t(157) = -.582, p = .561, or 
agreement with the anti-exam argument t(155) = .65, p = .517. 
Having a trustworthy partner was also marginally associated with reporting greater 
agreement with the sixth argument (M = 4.41, SD = 1.46) than having an untrustworthy partner 
(M = 3.96, SD = 1.69), t(154) = 1.78, p = .078, d = .29.   
Effects of Initial Distrust  
For exploratory purposes, t-tests on all measures were also performed to look for the 
effects of initial distrust. As was the case with the partner effect analyses above, the only 
significant difference occurred with the sixth argument. Contrary to my theoretical rationale, 
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participants who were initially distrusting had fewer negative thoughts in response to argument 
six (M = .17, SD = .41) than those who were initially trusting (M = .91, SD = 1.14) t(8.48) = 
3.90, p = .004, d = .87 (equal variances not assumed).  
 There were also marginal effects of initial distrust on positive thoughts in response to the 
fifth argument – initially trusting participants had more positive thoughts (M = .97, SD = 1.04) in 
response to the argument than did initially distrusting participants (M = .17, SD = .41) t(157) = 
1.87, p = .063, d = 1.01 – and agreement with the sixth argument – initially trusting participants 
agreed less strongly with the argument (M = 4.14, SD = 1.56) than initially distrusting 
participants (M = 5.33, SD = 2.07) t(154) = -1.82, p = .071, d = -.65. 
 Note that due to the small number of initially distrusting participants in this sample (6), 
these findings should be interpreted with caution. 
Dispositional Distrust Effects 
 Medical mistrust. An exploratory correlative analysis found that neither subscale of 
medical mistrust correlated with responses to the arguments (all absolute rs <.13). 
 Other measures of trust. Self-reported confidence correlated positively with positive 
responses to pro-exam arguments r(157) = .19, p = .019. Trust in relatives was positively 
correlated with positive responses to pro-exam arguments, r(157) = .16, p = .048, and negatively 
correlated with neutral responses to pro-exam arguments, r(157) = -.16, p = .047.  Trust in 
religion was negatively related to negative responses to pro-exam arguments, r(157) = -.16, p = 
.046.  
 Intellectual openness. IPIP intellectual openness was positively correlated with negative 
responses to pro-exam arguments, r(157) = .20, p = .013, and positively correlated with total 
responses to pro-exam arguments, r(157) = .16, p = .044. 
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Discussion 
 The predicted pattern of results – that participants paired with untrustworthy partners 
would produce more negative responses to pro-exam arguments, more positive responses to an 
anti-exam argument, and provide overall more cognitive responses – was not found in the results 
of this study. That said, participants who had an untrustworthy partner did report significantly 
fewer positive thoughts in response to the sixth argument, which stated that instituting 
comprehensive exams would increase alumni donations, and thus, lower tuition. They also 
reported less agreement with this argument than did participants with a trustworthy partner. So, 
while distrust did not promote a bias against most of the arguments, it did seem to bias 
participants against this particular argument.  
 Argument six might have been particularly susceptible to the economic deception game’s 
manipulation of trust because the manipulation specifically did have to do with a monetary prize, 
and simulated an interaction with another student. Being so recently deceived by a fellow student 
in a game for a chance at winning money might make student participants particularly more 
cynical about the prospect of alumni donating enough for tuition costs to go down.  
 By the same token, it is also possible that, upon having a trustworthy fellow student try to 
help them get a chance at winning the prize money, participants in the trust condition may have 
become more confident in the generosity of their school’s alumni. This second explanation, 
though less in line with the theoretical idea that trust is normal and distrust a departure from the 
norm, is more supported by the data here, because participants in the distrust condition did not 
produce more unfavorable cognitive responses to the argument, only fewer favorable ones. This 
seems to suggest that participants in the trust condition were simply coming up with more 
positive responses to the argument than their distrusting counterparts.  
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 At this point, manipulated distrust has not been shown to increase contrast sensitivity, in 
the realms of the judged likelihood of truth statements, the judged competence of professionals, 
or in the generation of cognitive responses to counter-attitudinal arguments. The next set of 
studies will address the other hypothesized effect of distrust on cognition - cognitive flexibility. 
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Chapter 11 
Experiment 4 
The three studies above have addressed contrast sensitivity as a mechanism through 
which distrust could change the way persuasive messages are interpreted. The main thrust of that 
hypothesis was that if a state of distrust facilitates the search for contrasting information or for 
contradictions to the present information, then by way of the availability heuristic (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973) – which states that concepts which are easier to bring to mind are assumed to 
be more likely to be true, or more likely to occur – opposing messages should seem more 
convincing than they otherwise would.  
That hypothesis did not find strong support in those studies, though there were some 
interesting findings concerning dispositional distrust of the medical establishment.  
The present study, as well as study 5, will address the hypothesized cognitive flexibility 
associated with a state of distrust. If, as some studies seem to suggest (Mayer & Mussweiler, 
2011; Schul, Mayo, & Burnstein, 2008), distrust promotes cognitive flexibility, then that may 
mean that people in a state of distrust can be expected to be more oriented toward alternatives to 
the norm, or may be more likely to believe that information is being concealed from them.  
In this study, cognitive flexibility was operationalized as the number of unique 
completions of two-letter word stems. Distrust was induced via the imposter detection task. 
Participants in the impostor-detection condition were expected to generate more complete words 
per stem than participants who were asked to judge each respondent’s spontaneousness. 
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Method 
Participants and Design 
 Participants were recruited through MTurk. They were offered $1.50 for their 
participation if they completed the study and entered the confirmation code given to them at the 
end. Two hundred eighty-five people clicked the survey link, 274 stayed in the study long 
enough to complete the manipulation, and 242 passed the attention check item that asked them to 
“Please answer "Disagree" for this item to confirm you are reading these questions.” These 242 
participants were included in the analyses. 
 The sample was 43% male, 56% female, and .4% transgender. Eighty percent of 
participants identified as White, 12% Black, 6% Asian, .4% Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, 
5% Latino, and 2% wrote in that they were Indian, mixed, or Native American. Participants were 
36 years old on average.  
 Participants were randomly assigned to either the impostor detection or spontaneity rating 
condition. 
Materials and Procedure  
 Upon beginning the study, participants were presented with an information sheet 
summarizing the things that they would be asked to do in the study. 
 Imposter detection task. This experiment used the same athlete impostor detection 
judgment task and control judgment task described in the pilot studies above, and in study 1. In 
the pilot studies, this task was the most effective for MTurk workers, despite the fact that it 
directly referenced University of Connecticut athletics. Participants were distributed evenly 
between conditions – 51% (123) were assigned to the impostor detection condition, and 49% 
(119) were assigned to the spontaneity judgment condition. 
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 Word Stems. After either completing the imposter detection task, or the spontaneity-
rating task, participants were introduced to the word stems they would be completing. Each stem 
consisted of two letters, and participants were given 30 seconds to type as many words that 
began with those two letters as they could. At the end of the 30 seconds, the next word stem was 
presented. Word stems were generated for this study by me. Participants were given two practice 
word stems before starting the proper set of 25 word stems (See Appendix X for a complete 
depiction of the presentation of word stems).  
 Other trust measures. As in the above studies, other measures of trust were included, 
including the confidence, control, Revised Health Care System Distrust Scale (Shea et al, 2008), 
and measures of trust in neighbors, relatives, self, science, police, and religion, and government. 
These dispositional trust measures were used for the purposes of correlational analysis of the 
number of completed words. 
 At the end of the study, participants were debriefed – first they were asked what they 
thought the study was about (none guessed correctly), were told about the deception used in the 
study and hypotheses, and were asked if they had had any problems in completing the study.  
Results 
 Word stems were coded by counting the responses to each word stem for each 
participant. A response was considered to count if it was a real word, started with the appropriate 
letters, and was unique to the other responses for that participant and word stem. Occasionally, a 
participant would respond by typing only the letters that followed the word stem (e.g. for the 
stem: El____, they would respond, “ephant”). These responses were counted as if they contained 
the word stem.  
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 A t-test was used to test for the effect of the judgment type (experimental condition) on 
the average number of words per stem. There was no effect of judgment type on the average 
number of words generated on the test trials, t(240) = .64, p = .526. (Individual trial responses 
are presented in Table 16.)  
 For exploratory purposes, the number of words generated on the two practice trials were 
also analyzed. On the very first practice word stem, participants who were asked to identify 
impostors generated fewer responses (M = 4.70, SD = 2.65) than participants who were asked to 
make spontaneity judgments (M = 5.40, SD = 3.19) t(240) = 1.87, p = .063, d = .24 contrary to 
predictions.  
Effects of Dispositional Distrust on Word Generation 
Correlational analyses were conducted in order to look for associations between 
dispositional indicators of distrust and the generation of word stem responses. 
 Neither of the factors of the Revised Health Care System Distrust Scale (Shea et al, 2008) 
correlated with total stems completed. MMV: r(242) = .01; MMC: r(242) = .001, both ps > .9.      
There were some positive, weak correlations with other measures of trust – trust in neighbors 
r(242) = .14, p = .028, relatives r(241) = .21, p = .001, and science r(242) = .13, p = .04, all 
involved increased  total number of responses to word stems being associated with higher levels 
of trust. This finding was also in the opposite of the theorized direction. 
Discussion 
 The main predicted effect was not found. There was no difference between experimental 
conditions in the average number of responses per word stem. Responses to the very first word 
stem did show an effect of the distrust manipulation, albeit not in the predicted direction – the 
control group produced more solutions than did the distrust group. 
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 Dispositional measures of distrust generally did not correlate with the number of 
responses, or correlated weakly, again with greater trust being associated with more responses, 
not less. 
 Once again, my predictions were not supported by the data. While responses to word 
stems represent creativity in the sense that each response is both novel and correct (Sternberg & 
Lubart, 1999), it is also a task that does not require much in terms of judgment and reasoning. 
The next experiment tackles the way people evaluate and reconcile conflicting pieces of 
information under distrust. 
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Chapter 12 
Experiment 5 
Distrust is often thought of as being a generally contrarian or conservative mindset, but 
my interpretation of the literature also implies that it may also prompt people to become more 
creative in the way they combine information. 
Pseudoscientific and conspiracy-oriented beliefs are often associated with distrust. 
Goertzel (1994) found a lack of interpersonal trust was one of the reasons that members of racial 
minorities are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories, and a common thread in anti-vaccine 
(Wolfe et al., 2002) and climate change (Lewandowski, 2013) literature is that the scientific 
establishment cannot be trusted. At the same time, experimental studies on distrust have shown 
that having a distrusting mindset can make a person more sensitive to information that conflicts 
with what they see (Schul et al., 2004), and more sensitive to contrasts (Posten & Mussweiler, 
2013). Distrust has also been shown to be associated with increased cognitive flexibility, 
allowing for greater creativity (Meyer & Mussweiler, 2011), and enhanced performance on 
puzzles that require participants to think in unconventional ways (Schul et al., 2008). 
 This increase in creativity and the salience of contrasts may allow for the possibility that 
when someone is distrusting, they are able to maintain a position (e.g., opposition to vaccines, or 
belief that there is no climate change) by seeing pieces of information that oppose their position 
as non-representative exceptions, rather than disconfirming evidence to their position. In 
addition, a boost in cognitive flexibility may allow them to find creative ways to “bend” the facts 
into their favor by imagining possible conditions under which the encountered information does 
not contradict their position.  
 This may be a counter-intuitive interpretation of the contrast sensitizing effects of 
distrust. After all, if distrust increased sensitivity to contrasts, that could mean that they would be 
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more likely to see the inconsistencies between their beliefs and the reality they witness. 
However, distrust is not a value-free state. It is fundamentally a way of thinking that is more alert 
to attempts at manipulation or deception against the self. Someone who distrusts their 
environment is not necessarily distrusting of their own feelings and beliefs. So their distrust, and 
the mechanisms that come with it are more likely to be directed outward than directed inward. 
 Furthermore, judging two obviously conflicting statements to be in conflict with each 
other would be a routine, non-creative, compliant way to approach the problem. In a situation 
such as this, a distrusting person is predicted to find an alternative answer that contrasts with the 
surface-level implications of the information presented to them. 
 The present study will address the simple idea that distrust can make two conflicting 
statements seem more compatible than they are. Participants will be given three different kinds 
of statement pairs – statements that are unrelated to each other, statements that conflict without 
directly contradicting each other, and statements that directly contradict one another. Participants 
will be asked to rate how compatible each pair of statements are with each other, and then will be 
asked to describe what conditions would be necessary to make them compatible. Beforehand, 
participants will either be induced to distrust, or will be given a filler task. It is predicted that 
distrusting participants will judge the unrelated and directly contradicting statements similarly to 
control participants, but that moderately conflicting statements will be more likely to be judged 
to be compatible by distrusting participants than by control participants, and that explanations for 
their compatibility will be more complex. 
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Method 
Participants and Design 
 Participants were recruited through the University of Connecticut participant pool. They 
were given a survey link to follow to participate in the experiment. Two hundred eleven students 
clicked the survey link, with 12 of them dropping out before the manipulation was completed. 
The remaining 199 were included in analyses to the degree that they provided data post-
manipulation. 
 This sample was 28% male, 69% female, and 1% transgender. Sixty-nine percent 
identified themselves as White, 8.5% as Black, 15.5% Asian, .5% Native Hawaiian/Pacific 
Islander, 6.5% Hispanic/Latino/a, and 2.5% identified themselves as American, Arab, Asian 
American, Indian, or Native American. They were 19 years old on average. 
 Participants were assigned randomly to either the trustworthy partner or untrustworthy 
partner conditions, and each participant responded to all three statement pair groups – unrelated 
pairs, conflicting pairs, and directly contradicting pairs.  
Materials and Procedure 
 Economic deception game. The economic deception game detailed in the pilot studies, 
and employed in Study 2 and 3 was used again in this study. Participants were randomly 
assigned to condition by the computer. In both conditions, a description of the procedure was 
provided. Participants were then quizzed for comprehension of that description. If they picked 
the wrong answer, they were given another chance to read the description and answer the 
question again before moving on.  
 Pairs of statements. After the between-subjects manipulation, a list of 6 statement pairs 
was presented to participants. Two of these pairs consisted of two statements that do not conflict 
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with each other at all and are unrelated to each other, two pairs consisted of statements that 
conflict, but do not directly contradict each other, and a third set of two pairs consisted of 
statements that directly contradict each other (See Appendix Y).  
Each pair of statements was followed by the question, “Regardless of whether you 
believe it, assume for a moment that the first statement is true. Given that, how possible or 
impossible is it that the second statement is also true?” Participants responded to each pair on a 
scale of completely impossible (-10) to completely possible (10). This question was followed by 
the question, “Regardless of how you answered the previous question, please explain in your 
own words what conditions would be necessary to make these statements completely compatible 
with each other. If the statements are entirely compatible already, please say so.”  
 Other trust measures. As in the above studies, other measures of trust were included for 
exploratory purposes, including the confidence, control, Revised Health Care System Distrust 
Scale (Shea et al, 2008), and measures of trust in neighbors, relatives, self, science, police, and 
religion, and government.   
 Questions about “Player 1.” As in the past studies using the same distrust manipulation, 
participants were asked for their thoughts about “Player 1”– their opinion of Player 1, whether 
Player 1 believed they were real, whether they believed Player 1 was real, and their level of 
surprise that Player 1 was not real.  
At the end, participants were given the debriefing materials explaining the deception used 
in the study and the hypotheses of the study, and were thanked for their participation. 
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Results 
Economic Deception Game 
 Students were distributed evenly between conditions – 100 were assigned a trustworthy 
partner, and 99 were assigned an untrustworthy partner. Ninety percent of the sample 
demonstrated comprehension of the instructions on the first try, and 96% did so by the second 
try. Nine percent also chose to go against their partner’s advice, suggesting initial distrust.  
 Thirty-eight percent of participants thought that “Player 1” believed that they, the 
participant, were real, and 27% reported believing “Player 1” was real. On a 6-point scale from 
extremely unsurprised (1) to extremely surprised (6), participants averaged 1.90 (SD = 1.27). 
Participants who believed that their partner was real (M = 3.28, SD = 1.39) were more surprised 
than those who did not (M = 1.38 SD = .71) t(62.56) = 9.48 (equal variances not assumed), p < 
.001, d = 1.72.  
Coding Typed Responses  
 Open-ended responses to the statement pairs were copied into a document and word 
counts for each response were generated using word processing software. Number of sentences 
were counted manually. Composite measures for number of words and sentences and possibility 
judgments were created by separately averaging the two responses for the unrelated, conflicting, 
and contradicting pairs (See Table 17 for descriptive statistics). 
Effects of Pairing and Partner 
 For each dependent measure, a 2 (partner: trustworthy vs. untrustworthy) x 3 (Pairing: 
unrelated, conflicting, contradicting) mixed ANOVA was performed, with pairing type as the 
within-subjects variable. 
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 Word counts. There was no main effect of partner on the number of words used, F(1, 
197) = .13, p = .724,  ηp2 = .001. There was a main effect of pairing type F(2, 394) = 10.66, p < 
.001,  ηp2 = .05. Follow-up analyses of differences between the pairing types using the Bonferroni 
adjustment revealed that conflicting pairs were reconciled using significantly more words (M = 
19.15, SD = 13.48) than both unrelated pairs (M = 15.79, SD = 10.94), p < .001, d = .27 and 
directly contradicting pairs (M = 16.70, SD = 11.76), p < .001, d = .19. There was no significant 
interaction of partner and pairing  on number of words generated F(2, 196) = .22, p = .80, ηp2 = 
.002.  
 Sentence counts. There was no main effect of partner on the number of sentences used, 
F(1, 197) = .09, p = .761,  ηp2 < .001, nor was there a main effect of pairing F(2, 394) = 1.79, p = 
.17,  ηp2 = .01, nor was the partner x pairing interaction significant F(2, 394) = 1.56, p = .21,  ηp2 
W= .01. 
 Possibility judgments. For possibility judgments – for which participants were asked to 
assume the first statement was true, and rate the second statement’s possibility of being true 
given that assumption – there was no main effect of partner F(1, 194) = .99, p = .32,  ηp2 = .01. 
There was a main effect of pairing F(2, 388) = 106.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .35. Bonferroni contrasts 
revealed that unrelated statements were judged to be significantly more possible (M = 3.88, SD = 
5.46) than conflicting (M = -2.76, SD = 5.46) p < .001, d = 1.22 or contradicting statements (M = 
-3.60, SD = 5.82) p < .001, d = 1.33. There was not a significant interaction of partner and 
pairing on possibility ratings, F(2, 388) = .24, p = .77,  ηp2 = .001. Results for words, sentences, 
and possibility judgments by pairing and partner type can be found in Table 18. 
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Including Belief in Player 1 
 In case the participants’ belief in the conceit of the manipulation was an important factor, 
the same set of ANOVAs were performed, including reported belief that Player 1 was a real 
person. This amounted to a 2 (partner: trustworthy vs. untrustworthy) x 2(belief: yes vs. no) x 3 
(Pairing: unrelated, conflicting, contradicting) mixed ANOVA with pairing type as the within-
subjects variable. Six participants failed to respond to the question of whether they believed their 
partner was real, so the means and standard deviations have changed slightly from the previous 
analysis. 
Word counts. Again, there was no main effect of partner on the number of words used, 
F(1, 189) = 1.01, p = .317,  ηp2 = .005, and there was a main effect of pairing type F(2, 378) = 
8.97, p < .001,  ηp2 = .05. Follow-up analyses of differences between the pairing types using the 
Bonferroni adjustment revealed that conflicting pairs were reconciled using significantly more 
words (M = 19.52, SD = 13.44) than both unrelated pairs (M = 15.79, SD = 10.77), p < .001, d = 
.27 and directly contradicting pairs (M = 16.70, SD = 11.76), p < .001, d = .19. There was no 
significant interaction of partner and pairing  on number of words generated F(2, 189) = .01, p = 
.936, ηp2 < .001.  
There was no main effect of belief in one’s partner, F(1, 189) = .01, p = .904,  ηp2 < .001, 
but there was a significant interaction between partner type, and belief in that partner F(1, 189) = 
5.07, p = .026,  ηp2 = .03. While the simple effects of partner type did not attain significance, the 
data trended in a manner consistent with predictions for effective manipulations, namely: when 
participants believed their partner was real, they used more words when that partner was 
untrustworthy (M = 20.17, SD = 14.21), than when their partner was trustworthy (M = 14.70, SD 
= 7.38) ns, d = .48. When they did not believe their partner was real, a weaker effect in the 
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opposite direction was found. Participants who interacted with an untrustworthy partner used 
fewer words (M = 16.59, SD = 9.31) than those who interacted with a trustworthy partner (M = 
18.68, SD = 10.95) ns, d = .21.  
 Sentence counts. There were no main effects for sentence count, though there was a 
significant crossover interaction between partner and belief that the partner was real, F(1, 189) = 
9.42, p = .002, ηp2 = .05. Investigating the interaction further revealed a similar result to that of 
the word counts. When they believed their partner was real, participants in the distrust condition 
used more sentences (M = 1.40, SD = .53) than those in the control condition (M = 1.08, SD = 
.31). Though the difference did not reach statistical significance, the effect size of this difference 
was large, d = .73. Conversely, for participants who did not believe their partner was real, those 
in the distrust condition used slightly fewer sentences (M = 1.23, SD = .37) than did those in the 
control condition (M = 1.34, SD = .48). This difference was not significant, and the effect size 
was small d = .25 (see Figure 2). 
 Possibility judgments. For possibility judgments – for which participants were asked to 
assume the first statement was true, and rate the second statement’s possibility of being true 
given that assumption – there was no main effect of partner F(1, 189) = .14, p = .71,  ηp2 < .01. 
There was a main effect of pairing F(2, 378) = 81.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .30. Bonferroni contrasts 
revealed that unrelated statements were judged to be significantly more possible (M = 3.88, SD = 
5.46) than conflicting (M = -2.76, SD = 5.46) p < .001, d = 1.22 or contradicting statements (M = 
-3.60, SD = 5.82) p < .001, d = 1.33. There was no significant main effect of belief in partner 
F(1, 189) = .187, p = .67, ηp2  < .01, nor did belief interact with the trustworthiness of the partner 
F(1, 189) = 1.73, p = .19, ηp2  = .01. 
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Dispositional Distrust 
 Some significant correlations were found between some of the dispositional or transient 
trust measures and the dependent measures in exploratory analyses. Individuals who had lower 
feelings of personal control generated somewhat more  words r(194) = -.16, p = .029 and 
sentences r(194) = -21, p = .003 on conflicting statements than those with higher ratings of 
control. Lower feelings of control was similarly associated with generating more sentences to 
resolve contradicting statements, r(194) = -.24, p = .001. 
 Having more judgmental uncertainty was associated with judging  contradicting 
statements as more compatible, r(194) = -.17, p = .020. 
 Trust in science correlated positively with both words r(194) = .23, p = .001 and 
sentences r(194) = .148, p = .038 used in response to conflicting statements, and negatively with 
possibility judgements of contradicting statements r(194) = -.29, p < .001. 
 Additionally, those who were politically liberal used more words to resolve conflicting 
statements than those who were politically conservative, r(194) = -.15, p = .043.  
 No other measures were significantly correlated with the dependent measures.  
Discussion 
 The prediction that moderately conflicting pairs of statements would be uniquely viewed 
as more compatible compared to other nonconflicting or directly contradicting pairs of 
statements under distrust did not entirely hold, but the minority of participants in the distrust 
condition who believed their partner was a real person did use both more words and more 
sentences generally in their efforts to reconcile contradictory statements than control participants, 
suggesting that they did engage in more cognitive elaboration and, possibly, creativity in their 
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responses. Believers did not, however judge paired statements to be any more compatible than 
did control participants or disbelieving participants.  
 This suggests that while an experience with an untrustworthy partner may make people 
apply more thought in evaluating the compatibility of two statements, they ultimately arrive at 
the same conclusion as those who have a trust-affirming experience.  
 The correlations found between the main dependent variables and the measures of 
personal control, judgmental uncertainty, trust in science, and political leanings seem to have 
more to do with personality traits that may be adjacent to the concept of trust, but fairly 
independent of it, giver that the general trust/distrust measures did not correlate with them at all. 
 Having an interaction with a person in which they behave in an untrustworthy way 
toward you may make you evaluate information more carefully, but does not, at least in the 
context posed by this experiment, mean that you will come to a dramatically different conclusion 
about that information. It is possible, given the evidence found here for greater cognitive 
elaboration under distrust, that a difference in compatibility judgments may have been observed 
if participants’ cognitive resources had been limited, forcing them to rely on peripheral processes 
to make their judgments. The findings in this study appear to support a skeptical response being 
triggered by distrust, but not one suggestive of a low-grade form of paranoid thinking. 
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Chapter 13 
Experiment 6 
 The apparent association of a diffuse state of distrust with an increased sensitivity to 
contrast (Schul et al., 2004; Posten & Mussweiler, 2013) and increased cognitive flexibility 
(Meyer & Mussweiler, 2011; Schul et al., 2008) imply that when people are distrusting, they are 
more attuned toward detecting evidence that things are not quite what they seem, and that they 
are on the lookout for alternative interpretations of the information available to them, which 
could reveal possible ulterior motives, undesirable outcomes, and alternative courses of action.   
 This shift in orientation can effectively make the distrusting person more critical of the 
messages presented to them, but at the same time, according to my theory, it would seem to 
systematically bias the person in favor of counterarguments that cite contradictory anecdotes, 
conflicts of interest, side effects, and alternative routes to the desired outcome. These features 
seem to be on full display in anti-vaccination propaganda.  Websites opposed to vaccinations 
often contain statements that diseases have declined independently from the rise in vaccination, 
criticisms of the profit motives of doctors and pharmaceutical companies, anecdotes about 
illnesses of all kinds occurring soon after vaccination, and alternative methods for avoiding 
sickness such as hand washing and nutrition (Wolfe et al., 2002).  
 The present study makes use of a more benign topic – tire rotation – to demonstrate this 
model of distrust’s effects on message processing. Participants were either primed to distrust or 
not, and were presented with two essays in a point-counterpoint format. The first essay explains 
the benefits of regular tire rotation, and explains that it is recommended by the National Institute 
for Automotive Service Excellence (ASE). The second essay argues that ASE has a vested 
interest in having people spend more money on auto maintenance (ulterior motive), that the 
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benefits of tire rotation don’t justify the cost in time, money, or personal risk (side effects), and  
provides advice on how to drive in a way that wears tires evenly (alternatives).  
 Participants were asked how much they agree with each of the essays, then asked 
specifically how much they agree with each point made by each essay. It was predicted that 
distrusting participants would be more receptive to the counter-arguing essay than control 
participants, and will also find the individual counter-arguments more convincing.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
 Participants were University of Connecticut undergraduates recruited through the 
University participant pool. Upon signing up for the experiment, they were provided with a link 
to the qualtrics survey. Seventy-eight students clicked on the survey link, and of those, 65 stayed 
in the study long enough to complete the distrust manipulation, which was the first step of the 
study.  
 The sample for this study was 26% male, 72% female, and 2% transgender. They were 
69% White, 8% Black, 15% Asian, 2% Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, and 11% 
Hispanic/Latino/a. They were 19 years old on average. 
 The participants were assigned randomly to interact with either a trustworthy or 
untrustworthy simulated partner in the economic deception game, before reading and answering 
questions about two point-counterpoint essays concerning the pros and cons of tire rotation. 
Materials and Procedure 
 Economic deception game. The same economic deception game used in previous studies 
was used in this one. Sixty-three of the 65 participants passed the comprehension quiz on the 
instructions on the first try, and the other two passed on the second try.  
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 Pro-tire rotation passage. Next, participants were given a short pro-tire rotation 
message to read. The message was designed to emphasize the safety value and economic value 
of tire rotation, and to show that an authoritative professional organization supports it. 
Stylistically, it was intended to mimic the rhetorical style of typical public service messages: 
 
Tire rotation is an essential automobile maintenance practice. It ensures that your tires do 
not wear unevenly, which could reduce traction with the ground and create an unsafe 
situation on the road. Regular tire rotation has been shown to extend the life of tires and 
to help prevent cars from spinning-out on the freeway. The National Institute for 
Automotive Service Excellence (ASE) recommends that the typical driver rotate their 
tires with every other oil change. 
 
 Participants were then asked to rate their agreement with this message on a seven-point 
scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” 
Anti-tire rotation passage. Immediately following the pro-tire message, participants 
viewed an opposing message, specifically to mimic the rhetorical style of vaccination denialists - 
emphasizing the profit motive of the ASE, improbable but dramatic risks, and the importance of 
common sense, while implying that good, responsible people don’t need to take this precaution: 
 
You can’t believe everything you read. Tire rotation might be helpful some of the time 
for some people, but most of the time, it is a costly, unnecessary inconvenience. It is 
important to remember the the ASE is a business that trains and certifies auto mechanics, 
and so it has a vested financial interest in more people rotating their tires more often. If 
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you do decide to forego the financial strain of paying a mechanic to rotate your tires and 
try to do it yourself, you put yourself at risk of physical injury. The car could fall off of 
its supports, crushing any part of your body that happens to be underneath it – a high 
price to pay for unnecessary maintenance. If you are truly concerned about your tires 
wearing unevenly, just follow your common sense – don’t accelerate too fast, don’t slam 
on your brakes, and always return home the same way you came so that you balance the 
number of right and left turns. If you are driving sensibly and responsibly, there is no 
need to rotate your tires. 
 
 After reading this statement, participants were asked to report their agreement with the 
overall position of this second essay, and their agreement with each major point therein – that the 
ASE promotes tire rotation out of a desire for profit, that the monetary cost of professional tire 
rotation is not justified by its benefits, that the personal risk of do-it-yourself tire rotation is not 
justified by its benefits, and that responsible driving practices reduce the need for regular tire 
rotation. 
 Other trust measures. As in the preceding studies, other transient measures of trust were 
included just after the measures of agreement with the different points of the essay, including the 
confidence, control, measures of trust in neighbors, relatives, self, science, police, and religion, 
and government, and most importantly, the more stable Revised Health Care System Distrust 
Scale (Shea et al, 2008). 
 Questions about “Player 1.” As in the preceding studies using the same distrust 
manipulation, participants were asked for their thoughts about “Player 1”– their opinion of 
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Player 1, whether Player 1 believed they were real, whether they believed Player 1 was real, and 
their level of surprise that Player 1 was not real.  
At the end, participants were given the debriefing materials explaining the deception used 
in the study and the hypotheses of the study, and were thanked for their participation. 
Results 
 Participants were included in the study if they passed the comprehension quiz for the 
economic deception game’s instructions on the first or second try. Sixty-five participants met this 
criterion. 
Economic Deception Game 
 Distribution between conditions. Participants were fairly evenly distributed between 
conditions, with 54% having a trustworthy partner, and 46% having an untrustworthy partner. 
Only 3% of participants showed initial distrust and went against Player 1’s advice. 
 Belief questions. Due to experimenter error, 15 participants did not receive the questions 
about Player 1. When asked if they believed that Player 1 thought that they, the participant were 
real, 44% of those who received the question said yes. When asked if they believed that Player 1 
was real, 28% said yes. On a six-point scale from extremely unsurprised to extremely surprised, 
participants reported being fairly unsurprised (M = 2.22, SD = 1.42) to discover their partner was 
not a real person.  
Partner Effects 
 Agreement with pro-rotation message. An independent-samples t-test revealed no 
significant effect of partner on reported agreement with the first, pro-tire rotation message, t(63) 
= .97, p = .34, d = .24. 
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 Agreement with anti-rotation message. Independent-samples t-tests were also 
performed for participants’ agreement with the anti-tire rotation message.  
Contrary to predictions, overall agreement with the message was found to be significantly 
lower among those paired with an untrustworthy partner (M = 3.23, SD = 1.55) than with a 
trustworthy partner (M = 4.14, SD = 1.33) t(63) = 2.55, p = .013, d = .63.  
Agreement with the first point of the message – that the ASE’s advice to regularly rotate 
one’s tires was motivated by profit – was marginally lower for those with an untrustworthy 
partner (M = 4.13, SD = 1.46) than with a trustworthy partner (M = 4.80, SD = 1.59) t(63) = 1.75, 
p = .084, d = .44. 
Agreement with the fourth point – that responsible driving practices reduce the need for 
tire rotation – was also significantly lower for those paired with an untrustworthy partner (M = 
4.17, SD = 1.51)  than with a trustworthy partner (M = 5.11, SD = 1.41) t(63) = 2.61, p = .011, d 
= .64. 
The second point – that the monetary cost of tire rotation was not worth the benefits, did 
not show an effect of condition t(63) = -.18, p = .86, d = .04, nor did the third point – that the 
personal risks of tire rotation were not worth the benefits t(63) = .58, p = .56, d = .15. 
Dispositional Distrust 
 Correlations with agreement with messages. As in the preceding studies, values-based 
medical mistrust again correlated with more of the dependent measures in this study, correlating 
positively with general agreement with the anti-rotation message argument r = .36, n = 65, p = 
.004, and with the first, profit-oriented argument r(65) = .29, p = .020. 
 Agreement with the first, pro-rotation message was positively correlated with confidence 
r(65) = .25, p = .041, and trust in the police r(65) = .27, p = .029. 
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Interaction Between Dispositional Distrust and Manipulated Distrust 
 That the effects of manipulated distrust and dispositional distrust had opposite effects on 
agreement with anti-rotation arguments prompted an exploratory multiple regression analysis to 
investigate the way these variables interact to affect persuasion.  
 General agreement with anti-rotation message. First, a linear regression was 
calculated to predict agreement with the message based on partner and MMV. The “partner” 
variable was dummy coded, with a 1 indicating an untrustworthy partner and a 0 a trustworthy 
partner. MMV was mean-centered before inclusion in the model (M = 3.01, SD = .64). A 
significant regression equation was found F(2, 62) = 7.20, p = .002, with an R2 of .19. Predicted 
agreement was equal to 4.07 - .75(Untrustworthy Partner) +.73(MMV). Agreement was lower 
for participants paired with an untrustworthy partner by .75 units, and was .73 units higher (or 
lower) for every unit of MMV above the mean (below the mean). Both partner and MMV were 
significant predictors of agreement with the anti-rotation message. 
 The equation was then re-calculated, this time including an interaction term created by 
multiplying the dummy-coded partner variable by MMV. This second regression equation was 
also significant F(3, 61) = 7.02, p < .001 with an R2 of .26. Predicted agreement with the 
message was equal to 4.11 – .67(Untrustworthy Partner) +.364(MMV) + 1.41(U.P. x MMV). 
Agreement was .67 units lower for participants paired with an untrustworthy partner, .364 units 
higher per unit of MMV, and an additional 1.41 units higher (or lower) for each unit above the 
mean (below the mean) of MMV for participants paired with an untrustworthy partner only. 
Partner was a marginally-significant predictor, the interaction term was a significant predictor, 
and MMV was not (See Figure 3 for a visual representation, and Table 19 for a table of the 
models of each argument in this study).  
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 Agreement with pro-rotation message. The same regression analysis applied to 
participants’ agreement with the pro-rotation message did not reveal main effects of partner, 
MMV, or their interaction on agreement with the pro-rotation message. 
 Individual counter-arguments. The same analysis strategy was used for the individual 
anti-rotation arguments. 
 Desire for profit. The model including both partner type and MMV was significant F(2, 
62) = 3.90, p = .025, with an R2 of .11. Predicted agreement with the argument that the ASE 
recommended tire rotation out of a desire for profit was equal to 4.74 - .53(Untrustworthy 
Partner) +.63(MMV). Agreement was lower for participants paired with an untrustworthy partner 
by .53 units, and was .63 units higher for each unit of MMV. MMV was a significant predictor, 
partner type was not. Adding the interaction term did not significantly improve model fit. 
 Unjustified financial cost and personal risk. Neither partner type, MMV, nor the 
interaction between them significantly predicted agreement with either of these arguments.  
 Personal responsibility. The model including only partner type as a predictor was 
significant F(1, 63) = 6.84, p = .011, with an R2 of .10. Predicted agreement with the argument 
that responsible driving reduces the need for tire rotation was equal to 5.11 - .95(Untrustworthy 
partner). Agreement was .95 units lower for participants paired with an untrustworthy partner. 
Neither MMV nor the interaction between partner type and MMV significantly improved the 
model when added. 
 Belief in partner was not found to contribute significantly to any of these regression 
models. 
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Correlation with Pro-Vaccine Position 
 Additionally, anti-vaccine position correlated positively with participants’ agreement 
with the fourth anti-rotation argument (the appeal to personal responsibility) r(65) = .32, p = 
.010, suggesting that the intended mimicry of anti-vaccine rhetoric was at least somewhat 
successful. 
Discussion 
 Contrary to predictions, an encounter with an untrustworthy actor did not, in itself, 
promote agreement with the anti-tire-rotation arguments. However, and perhaps more 
importantly, the findings concerning general agreement with the anti-rotation message indicate 
that while a distrust-provoking experience may make a person a bit more skeptical, and a 
disposition toward distrust of an institution such as the medical establishment does not, by itself, 
predict favorable responses to criticisms of the status quo, when they are combined, these 
constructs can interact in a very interesting manner – those low in values-based medical mistrust 
became less favorable to the essay attacking the standard practice of tire rotation, whereas those 
higher than average became more favorable to it after the same distrust-provoking experience. 
This finding seems to suggest that a person’s individual tendency toward suspicious thinking 
determines whether they respond to a distrust-provoking experience with healthy skepticism or a 
state of receptivity to the kinds of arguments that are often used to undermine confidence in the 
expert consensus, and promote abstinence from or (often exploitative) alternatives to the best 
practices advocated by experts and professional organizations.  
 The finding that participants higher in MMV responded more favorably to the profit-
motive argument, regardless of experimental condition, is also notable. This may suggest that 
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MMV and institutional distrust generally is rooted in the belief that institutions have interests 
that conflict with one’s own.  
 These results may also suggest that, at least in terms of their relationship to attitudes, 
distrust-provoking events serve as triggers for underlying personal tendencies to respond with 
different degrees of skepticism vs. paranoia. Regarding general agreement with the anti-rotation 
essay, MMV did not have a significant effect when participants had a trust-affirming experience 
with their game partner. It was only when the encounter violated their trust that MMV became a 
deciding factor in their agreement with the message.  
 One clear limitation of this study is that MMV was not measured prior to the 
administration of the main dependent variables of interest. Further research on this topic should 
measure MMV prior to, and ostensibly separately from, the distrust manipulation and 
presentation of pro- and anti-rotation arguments in order to more strongly demonstrate the role of 
dispositional distrust of institutions.  
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Chapter 14 
General Discussion 
The preceding set of experiments sought to evaluate how the cognitive processing of 
messages may differ in response to a state of diffuse distrust. As discussed in the introductory 
chapters, prior work has shown that such a state results in non-routine processing. These non-
routine processes appear to consist of a heightened sensitivity to contrast, and an increase in 
cognitive flexibility. Understanding the cognitive effects of distrust from this perspective, I 
developed a series of experiments seeking to bridge the theoretical gap between the basic 
cognitive changes associated with distrust and the effect of distrust on attitudes and beliefs.  
If distrust increases both sensitivity to contrast and cognitive flexibility, these differences 
in processing should be observable in the way that people respond to messages and make 
judgments about people. For those induced to distrust, contradictions between messages should 
not undermine the believability of messages, and exposure to arguments in favor of a given 
position should prompt a mental search for contrary information, making people consider a wider 
range of possible explanations for and alternatives to the information being presented.  
Before testing these predictions, it was necessary to conduct eight pilot studies in order to 
determine which methods of inducing distrust would be effective in the populations available to 
me. Four distrust manipulations were tested – a word-search priming task, a scrambled-sentence 
priming task, an impostor-detection task (adapted from Schul, Mayo, & Burnstein, 2008), and an 
economic deception game (adapted from Posten & Mussweiler, 2013) – on two populations – 
university students and MTurk workers. These manipulations were judged to be successful if 
they made people report greater state distrust or perform better on puzzles that require outside-
the-box thinking. Both priming methods failed to meet this standard. The impostor-detection task 
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seemed to work better with MTurk workers than with students, and the economic deception 
game was fairly successful with both populations. The priming methods were abandoned, and 
the remaining two manipulations were used in the subsequent experiments. 
A few different processes appear to be routes by which the basic cognitive features of 
distrust could influence the interpretation of messages and formation of attitudes; two sets of 
experiments examine these processes. The first three experiments were designed to address the 
hypothesis that diffuse distrust promotes a sensitivity to contrast, the fourth and fifth experiments 
were designed to test the hypothesis that it promotes cognitive flexibility, and the final 
experiment was designed to test if diffuse distrust makes people more receptive to arguments in 
the style of the propaganda circulated by anti-vaccination groups and other denialist movements. 
In each of these experiments, medical mistrust (Shea et al., 2008) was also measured for 
exploratory purposes, in order to compare and contrast the role of distrusting beliefs with diffuse 
state distrust. 
Contrast Sensitivity 
  The results did not reveal strong evidence for the hypothesis that diffuse distrust would 
make people more sensitive to contrasts. In Experiment 1, participants who were asked to 
identify impostors did not find statements that contrasted with previously-presented statements 
more believable than did those who rated people’s spontaneity. However, participants who were 
higher in values-based medical mistrust (Shea et al., 2008), which includes items such as “The 
Health Care System lies to make money,” and “The Health Care System experiments on patients 
without them knowing,” had greater acceptance of factually false statements, as long as they did 
not contradict a previously-presented statement. Although the experiments in this set sought to 
better understand how diffuse distrust might promote sensitivity to contrast, this seems to be the 
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most thought-provoking finding – that a preexisting tendency toward a more paranoid form of 
distrust might affect how receptive people are to certain kinds of messages, and how able they 
are to suss out untruth.   
In Experiment 2, participants who dealt with an untrustworthy partner in an economic 
game did not make less stereotypical judgments of different professionals, nor did they find 
greater contrasts between different characters presented together than when presented alone. 
Posten and Mussweiler (2013) had found that diffuse distrust made characters elicit less 
stereotypical trait ratings, and that this effect could be eliminated by giving participants a 
similarity-finding task before they evaluated the character. Their conclusion was that distrust 
facilitates the detection of contrasts, in that case, the contrast between a person and their most 
salient social category. Experiment 2 in the present series was an effort to see if the logic of such 
a finding could extend to a medical professional’s perceived competence, which was pertinent to 
the original motivation behind this research project – to understand what makes a person more 
susceptible to anti-vaccine propaganda. The failure of Experiment 2 to find such a result could be 
due to members of professions not being  understood to have as much entitativity (Lickel et al., 
2000), or the professions themselves simply not being as strongly associated with their relevant 
traits as more deeply-ingrained social categories such as ethnicity and gender are. That could 
help to explain why there was no similar effect of diffuse distrust on the trait ratings of the 
characters presented. 
Experiment 3’s participants, having gone through the same economic deception 
manipulation, did not show increased disagreement with strong arguments for comprehensive 
senior exams, nor increased agreement with an anti-exam argument, contrary to predictions. 
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They did, however, produce fewer positive responses to one of the pro-exam arguments than did 
those who dealt with a trustworthy partner.  
 It is possible, especially in Experiments 1 and 3, that increased contrast sensitivity was 
not detected in response to the distrust manipulation because these experiments involved social 
judgment tasks, which involve inherently deeper cognitive processing than did the research they 
were designed to expand upon. These experiments were intended to extend the findings of other 
researchers that diffuse distrust led to the non-routine cognitive patterns of identifying 
contrasting adjectives more quickly than congruent adjectives, and judging exemplars as more 
distinct from their salient social categories (Posten & Mussweiler, 2013; Schul, Mayo, & 
Burnstein, 2004) to see if  sensitivity to contrasting information would extend to the way that 
propositional messages are interpreted. Thus, the tasks used in Experiments 1 and 3 were 
necessarily more cognitively demanding than those used in the experiments they were based on – 
they required participants to interpret and make judgments about the plausibility of statements 
(Experiment 1) and generate written responses to paragraph-long arguments (Experiment 3). It is 
possible that diffuse distrust has effects on the processing of information, but it is only 
observable when the tasks are quick and simple, and ultimately has no observable effect on the 
slower, more complex task of evaluating actual arguments. 
Cognitive Flexibility 
Some evidence did support the cognitive flexibility hypothesis, though, however weakly. 
In Experiment 4, participants who were asked to identify impostors did not produce more 
solutions to word stems than participants asked to rate the spontaneity of interviewees. Thus, this 
manipulation did not seem to make participants more creative in the sense of producing solutions 
that were both appropriate and novel.  
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However, in Experiment 5, participants who were paired with an untrustworthy partner in 
an economic game were more verbose in their efforts to reconcile different statements, provided 
they believed their partner was a real person. It is worth reiterating, however, that partner type 
did not interact with statement pairing, as was also predicted. The hypothesis was that diffuse 
distrust would cause participants to produce more elaborate explanations of how conflicting or 
directly contradicting statements could co-exist, but not for statements that were already 
compatible. Participants placed in a state of diffuse distrust produced more text regardless of 
statement pairing. So, though most of the cognitive-flexibility-based hypotheses did not pan out, 
diffuse distrust did appear to at least make people more creative, or at least more generative, in 
that they created more text in solving a problem.  
Mayer and Mussweiler (2011) found that creativity, particularly the activation of more 
categories, increases under distrust when the participant was not being observed by other 
participants. That the same effect was not observed in the form of completed word stems or 
reconciliation of different statements is surprising, considering participants were most likely 
completing these studies privately, without even an experimenter in the room waiting for them to 
finish (the study being conducted over the Internet).  
Schul and colleagues (2008) found that participants who were primed to distrust 
performed better on non-routine matchstick puzzles, suggesting distrust makes people more 
cognitively flexible. The present series of experiments did not directly try to replicate this effect, 
outside of the pilot studies. The failure to replicate Schul et al.’s (2008) effect in my pilot studies 
could possibly be due to the computer-mediated context (as opposed to real matchsticks on a 
table), or because of differences in distrust inductions—they used exposure to untrustworthy 
faces. Perhaps even cultural differences between Americans and Israeli university students 
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accounts for my inability to find effects son matchstick puzzles. In any case, the fact that my 
subsequent experiments failed to even conceptually replicate this cognitive flexibility effect is 
difficult to blame on any one specific procedural difference.  
Friesen and Sinclair (2011) found that distrust-primed participants activated both “Black” 
and “Doctor” categories after watching a video of a Black doctor, whereas participants who were 
not so primed activated neither. Friesen and Sinclair used a scrambled sentence priming protocol, 
which I found to be ineffective in my own pilot studies. I did not use activation of social 
category (or moral valence) as a dependent variable. I did explore category activation through 
different means (word stem completions) in Experiment 4, but did not find the cognitive 
flexibility effects I expected. It is possible that Friesen and Sinclair’s stimuli, which required 
participants to make social judgments, were more relevant to the distrust prime in a way that the 
simplistic stimuli in my experiments were not. Weingarten and colleagues (2016) recently found 
that priming can be effective when prime and target are directly relevant.  
Agreement With Anti-Vaccine-Style Rhetoric 
 This inquiry into the cognition of distrust was initially motivated by a desire to 
understand why anti-vaccination propaganda is convincing to people, but the direct cognitive 
effects of distrust were rather unpredictable in this dissertation. On the other hand, in Experiment 
6, where people were presented with the rhetorical style of anti-vaccination arguments, 
preexisting distrusting (or trusting) beliefs about the world interacted with the presence or 
absence of diffuse distrust in a fairly intuitive manner. Participants higher in medical mistrust 
were more favorable toward the novel, anti-tire-rotation arguments after encountering an 
untrustworthy partner, while those lower on the dispositional measure agreed with them 
considerably less. Of particular interest is that this effect only seems to happen after the 
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encounter with an untrustworthy partner. Participants who encountered a trustworthy partner 
agreed with the anti-rotation messages to about the same degree regardless of their medical 
mistrust. This seems to imply that a person’s beliefs about the world, such as those about the 
trustworthiness of institutions, influence how they react after they are treated in a deceptive way. 
Higher MMV score appears to be an indicator of a person’s vulnerability to a more paranoid way 
of thinking that, when activated by a deception attempt, makes them find arguments in the style 
often found in anti-vaccine propaganda more convincing than they otherwise would be.  
 People who generally see the world as a place where they can expect to be dealt with 
honestly (low MMV) seemed to respond to a deception attempt by becoming more skeptical in 
Experiment 6. They appeared to evaluate arguments more critically and rely more on established 
experts and institutions.  
According to my results, people who are already disposed to feel oppressed or unable to 
trust others seem to react to deception attempts by becoming more receptive to rhetoric that tells 
them to be suspicious of others, perhaps particularly institutions that uphold or represent the 
status quo. Though this response has some of the trappings of a skeptical approach, the tendency 
seems to be less one of careful consideration of the argument at hand, and more one of contrarian 
obstinacy. Future research looking to replicate or advance this finding should take care to 
reproduce my choice to use actionable persuasive messages – cases in which beliefs could be 
consequential – and not shallow true-or-false statements that lack important behavioral 
consequences for a participant. 
State and Trait Distrust 
 One important question that arose during the course of this investigation was that of the 
difference between state distrust and trait distrust. My hypotheses about how manipulations of 
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participants’ state distrust would impact participants’ subsequent performance or judgment were 
generally not supported in this series of experiments, except for in Experiment 6, which found 
that an interaction with an untrustworthy game partner amplified the relationship between MMV 
(a dispositional variable) and agreement with an anti-tire-rotation essay. Experiment 1 provided 
no evidence that manipulated state distrust had an effect on the judged plausibility of statements 
regardless of how they related to previous statements, but did find that false statements were 
more believable to participants higher in MMV, as long as those statements were not in 
contradiction with a previously-presented statement. Given these results, it seems that at least in 
the context of the present experiments (Americans, online studies), dispositional measures such 
as MMV are a more reliable means of studying distrust. The results of Experiment 6 also 
complicate the way we understand distrust manipulations – participants higher in MMV found 
the anti-tire-rotation message more believable, and those lower in MMV found it less believable 
– participants’ pre-existing beliefs may have important effects on how they respond to situations 
that are meant to activate distrust. My speculation is that distrust in institutions comes with a 
general receptiveness to more paranoid types of reasoning, but future research is needed to 
unpack the underlying mechanisms of this relationship.  
 Values-Based Medical Mistrust. It is my belief that MMV is useful in a way that the 
distrust measures used in the pilot studies are not, because it asks about particular concrete fears 
that a person may have when they are in a position of vulnerability or dependence on a powerful 
institution. Other measures, such as the IPIP Mistrust scale (Goldberg et al., 2006) or the Trust 
Questionnaire (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994) orient themselves toward the respondent’s 
beliefs about the general trustworthiness of other people (e.g. “Most people are basically honest,” 
“I feel like people often are out to get something from me”) and their own tendency to trust 
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others (e.g. “I am pretty trusting of others’ motives,” “I am trustful.”), whereas the MMV queries 
their beliefs about concrete events that could possibly happen to them (e.g. “The Health Care 
System experiments on patients without them knowing,” “The Health Care System covers up its 
mistakes.”). This – fearful beliefs stemming from one’s vulnerability to others – is the 
conception of distrust that is most relevant to the basic philosophical basis of the present project 
(Ullmann-Margalit, 2004), and is most relevant to how people relate to major institutions that 
have power over them, such as their employers, medical care providers, banks, and government 
agencies.  
 Given the findings of Experiment 6, it appears likely that distrust in the medical system 
can be used as a proxy for broader institutional distrust – MMV had a predictive effect on 
agreement with an anti-tire-rotation message, suggesting that a person who is disposed to believe 
that other people or systems will abuse power over them will also be likely to hold these attitudes 
across contexts. Ideally, for future research, it would be best to have a broad measure of values-
based institutional distrust that addressed explicit beliefs about what harm those institutions may 
do to them. Such a measure would go beyond the medical establishment and address individuals’ 
fears about a wide range of powerful social institutions.  
Uncertainty and Personal Control 
 Participants who reported higher uncertainty and lack of personal control produced more 
words to reconcile contradicting and conflicting pairs of statements and viewing contradicting 
statements to be more compatible. However, these preexisting tendencies did not predict 
agreement with the tire rotation essays in Experiment 6. This suggests that uncertainty is not 
enough to produce the paranoid type of response to anti-vaccine-style rhetoric that we see when 
participants high in dispositional distrust are provoked by an encounter with an untrustworthy 
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person. It seems that uncertainty leads people to engage in more extensive processing as 
demonstrated by Pittman and D’Agostino (1985, 1989; Pittman & Pittman, 1980), but does not 
inherently make a person more suspicious of another’s motives.  
Methodological Insights 
 In pilot testing, the priming methods used in this dissertation – word searches and 
scrambled sentences – were not reliably effective in changing self-reported trust or distrust 
measures, performance on routine/nonroutine puzzles, or making similarity judgments. As a 
result, they were not used in the subsequent experiments. A recent meta-analysis (Weingarten et 
al., 2016) found that priming is strongest when it activates a goal and when the outcome measure 
is directly (not indirectly or metaphorically) connected to the content of the prime. The primes in 
this study were not designed to activate behavioral goals, such as performance on a test or 
increased frequency of a target behavior. These studies used primes in order to influence 
participants’ reported attitudes and judgments, which were specifically excluded from 
Weingarten et al.’s analysis. The attitudinal measures of trust and distrust could be considered to 
be directly related, but the matchstick puzzles and similarity judgments are clearly not, so 
according to this understanding, the priming effects could be expected to short-lived and 
somewhat weak. The question remains how other researchers have observed significant effects 
of primed distrust, but based on the research contained in this document, which is some of very 
little research of this kind conducted in English, I would not recommend using semantic primes 
as a means of manipulating distrust, at least in studies conducted online. 
 The imposter detection paradigm was somewhat effective in pilot tests, but ultimately did 
not affect the believability of statements in Experiment 1, or the amount of word stem 
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completions in Experiment 4. This outcome could either be due to the ineffectiveness of the 
manipulation itself or the incorrectness of the main hypotheses of those experiments. 
 The economic deception game was fairly effective in influencing responses to various 
measures in pilot testing, and seemed to affect agreement with the two tire-rotation essays in 
Experiment 6, but not affect the cognitive process measures of the other experiments in which it 
was used. Belief in partner did interact with the manipulated variables in Experiment 3, but was 
not found to be a factor in the case of Experiment 6.  
 Considering the outcomes in this series of experiments together, it appears that the 
economic deception game was the most reliable means of experimentally manipulating distrust. 
Researchers who use this type of manipulation should include questions about partner belief, and 
should include responses to it in their analysis. Belief had an effect on the target variable in two 
out of four studies in this series, so it may be worthwhile going forward to investigate what 
experimental contexts are more or less sensitive to partner belief. They should also accompany 
this manipulation with a dispositional measure of distrust, such as MMV. Dispositional measures 
of distrust and experimentally-manipulated distrust appear to be associated with different types 
of outcomes and may interact with each other. They should not be treated as if they are 
interchangeable. 
General Limitations 
 There are some limitations to the design of the studies in this document that suggest some 
directions for future research into the cognitive and attitudinal consequences of distrust. 
 Dispositional Measures. The dispositional measures in all of these studies were 
administered after the main outcome measure. Because of this they could have been influenced 
by the main outcome measures rather than moderated them. The studies were designed this way 
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because these measures were merely exploratory, and thus were included after the critical 
outcome measures, out of a desire not to contaminate the manipulation by exposing people to the 
concept of distrust beforehand. Future work in this line of research should pre-test participants 
for dispositional distrust, particularly values-based medical mistrust in order to bypass this 
limitation. 
 Internet-Based Studies. All experiments in this series were conducted online. The most 
important issue with this choice is that one cannot know if or how participants would have 
responded differently to the manipulations or measures if they had been administered inside the 
more tightly-controlled environment of the laboratory. Though participants completed attention 
checks throughout the experiments, with participants eliminated if they failed them or finished 
the experiment too quickly or slowly, it is possible that participants were not paying as much 
attention to the manipulation or the measures as they would have paid in the presence of a human 
experimenter.  
Future research should include some in-laboratory experiments in order to address this 
unknown. At the same time, it is important to consider that, increasingly, the Internet is 
becoming the primary way that many people communicate with others, look for information, and 
even make important real-life decisions and commitments. Despite lacking the control of the 
laboratory, online studies can be conducted in the very same physical environment in which the 
participants work, find dating partners, talk with their friends, and shop. In that way, data 
collected in online studies may represent more relevant responses as to how people are engaging 
in such behaviors-- responses that correspond more closely to what their real-life responses and 
decisions would be than would being in a lab.  
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Implications and Future Directions 
 That people may respond differently to detected deception attempts according on their 
beliefs about, or perhaps experiences in the world, could have some important implications for 
how we understand the way people respond to different styles of persuasive messages. And the 
fact that such circumstances divide people into responding with a fairly strong rejection of, or a 
fairly strong agreement with the paranoid rhetorical style of anti-vaccination activists 
(Experiment 6)  seems to track rather well with other political camps that stress the danger of 
outsiders, deviousness of institutions, and the value of self-reliance and self-interest.  
It seems possible that the rising worldwide nationalist fever can in part be explained by 
growing belief that the people cannot trust their institutions to act in their best interest. At the 
risk of overextending my findings here, I think they can be applied to our current situation.  
With public distrust rising, encouraged by institutional failures both real and concocted 
by powerful propaganda outlets, the only thing needed for a mass movement based on a paranoid 
worldview would be for enough people to have some experience of detecting a deception 
attempt. Just as in the experiments presented here, such an experience can be readily 
manufactured. From documentaries like “Loose Change,” and “Zeitgeist,” which manipulatively 
walked their audience through 9/11 conspiracy theories, to “Gamer Gate,” a movement among 
video gamers filled with misogynistic and anti-media ‘exposé’ videos, there is an entire genre of 
internet videos to tell the already-suspicious that someone has tricked them in some horrible 
way.  
Returning to the issue of the anti-vaccination movement, one can imagine that for 
someone who already has distrusting beliefs about the healthcare system, seeing the videos 
circulating on the internet, or hearing stories from celebrities and politicians about children 
146 
 
experiencing neurological harm in response to vaccination could perform a similar function to 
being tricked in the economic deception game, and make an already-distrusting person more 
receptive to the line of arguments that anti-vaccination advocates tend to use. 
Of course, in order to confirm and determine how far this interpretation can be extended, 
further research is necessary. Many questions remain – is this interaction with diffuse distrust 
unique to values-based distrust in the medical system? Does the distrust need to be directed at an 
institution? Is it necessary for the deception attempt to be personal and directly experienced, or 
could a similar effect be achieved by simply explaining to someone how themselves or their 
group has been deceived?  
Furthermore, it seems that it may be fruitful to explore what kinds of life experiences 
correlate with values-based distrust in the healthcare system. One obvious place to look would be 
a person’s past experiences with the healthcare system, but it may also be worthwhile to see if 
victims of abuse or other forms of trauma are more likely to endorse these beliefs. Consumption 
of conspiracy-peddling media could be another predictor of distrust in the medical system or 
institutions generally. 
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Appendix A 
Confidence and Personal Control Measures  
From: (Weary, Marsh, Gleicher, & Edwards, 1993) 
Scale: 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree) 
Confidence: 
At this moment, I feel confident in the correctness of my opinions, judgments, and decisions. 
 
Personal Control: 
At this moment, I feel I have sufficient personal control and power over the things that happen in 
my life. 
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Appendix B 
IPIP Mistrust (Goldberg et al., 2006) 
Describe yourself as you feel at this very moment,  not necessarily as you feel generally.  
Scale: 1 (Very Inaccurate) to 5 (Very Accurate) 
 
1. I feel that others are out to get me   
2. I am pretty trusting of others' motives (Reverse-scored)  
3. I feel like people often are out to get something from me  
4. I suspect hidden motives in others  
5. I believe that, sooner or later, people always let you down  
6. I believe that people are basically honest and good (Reverse-scored) 
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Appendix C 
Trust for Specific Other Persons and Institutions 
(Adapted from Goertzel, 1994) 
Scale: 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree) 
1. I feel I can trust my neighbors.  
2. I feel I can trust my relatives.  
3. I feel I can trust myself.  
4. Please answer "Disagree" for this item. (attention check) 
5. I feel I can trust science.  
6. I feel I can trust my religion.  
7. I feel I can trust the police. (Included when stated in methods) 
8. I feel I can trust the government (Included when stated in methods) 
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Appendix D 
Trust Questionnaire (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994):  
Scale:1 (Strongly Disagree) to 6 (Strongly Agree) 
Trust Factor 
1. Most people are basically honest.   
2. Most people are trustworthy.  
3. Most people are basically good and kind.  
4. Most people are trustful of others.  
5. I am trustful.  
6. Most people will respond in kind when they are trusted by others.   
Caution Factor 
1. No matter what they say, most people inwardly dislike putting themselves out to help 
others.  
2. People are always interested in their own welfare.  
3. There are many hypocrites in this society.  
4. In this society, one does not need to be constantly afraid of being cheated.   
5. One can avoid falling into trouble by assuming that all people have a vicious streak.  
6. People usually do not trust others as much as they say they do.  
In this society, one has to be alert or someone is likely to take advantage of you.   
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Appendix E 
Matchstick Puzzles 
You are about to encounter some mathematical puzzles. You will be presented with eight (8) incorrect 
equations written with matchsticks.  
    
Your task will be to move one matchstick from one symbol to another in order to make the equation 
correct.  
  
 So, if you are given the problem: 
  
  XI = X + VI 
 
 
 
You could move one of the matchsticks from the "V" on the right side of the equation over to the left 
side of the equation, so it would read: 
 
 
XII = X + II 
 
 
You will have a text box beneath each equation. Please enter the corrected equation using Roman 
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numerals.  
 
In case you need a refresher on your Roman numerals, you will be provided with this guide on the next 
page: 
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You will have a time limit of 3 minutes to complete all 8 puzzles on the next page. 
Move one matchstick from one symbol to another in order to make the equation correct. Enter your 
answer in Roman numerals in the text box below the matchstick equation.  
    
You have 3 minutes to complete as many items as possible.   
    
If you need help reading the Roman numerals, refer to the following figure: 
 
 
 
 
IX = X - III 
 
 
 
 
Move one matchstick to make the above equation correct. Please type-in your answer using Roman 
numerals in the text box below. 
________________________________________________________________ 
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VI = VIII - IV 
 
 
 
 
Move one matchstick to make the above equation correct. Please type-in your answer using Roman 
numerals in the text box below. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
II = III + I 
 
 
 
 
Move one matchstick to make the above equation correct. Please type-in your answer using Roman 
numerals in the text box below. 
________________________________________________________________ 
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VII = II + III 
 
 
 
 
Move one matchstick to make the above equation correct. Please type-in your answer using Roman 
numerals in the text box below. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
XI = VI - IV 
 
 
 
 
Move one matchstick to make the above equation correct. Please type-in your answer using Roman 
numerals in the text box below. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
VII = III - III 
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Move one matchstick to make the above equation correct. Please type-in your answer using Roman 
numerals in the text box below. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
II = VII + IV 
 
 
 
 
Move one matchstick to make the above equation correct. Please type-in your answer using Roman 
numerals in the text box below. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
IX = X - VI 
 
 
 
Move one matchstick to make the above equation correct. Please type-in your answer using Roman 
numerals in the text box below. 
________________________________________________________________ 
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That's it for the matchsticks! If you didn't finish all of them, that's fine. It is intended to be difficult. 
 
 
Please click through to continue. 
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Appendix F 
Similarity Judgments 
Scale: 1 (Very Dissimilar) to 6 (Very Similar) 
Please judge how similar or dissimilar the following pairs of objects are. 
1. Tree and Flower are... 
2. Lake and Ocean are... 
3. Soda and Water are... 
4. Lion and House Cat are... 
5. Banana and Cherry are... 
6. Laptop and PC are... 
7. Glasses and Contacts are... 
8. Hat and Turban are... 
9. House and Apartment are... 
10. Pants and Shorts are... 
11. Water and Water are... 
12. Mountain and Hill are... 
13. Email and Letter are... 
14. Eagle and Robin are... 
15. Earring and Necklace are... 
16. Bread and Chocolate are... 
Note: Items were presented one at a time. 
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Appendix G 
IPIP Variety-Seeking (Goldberg et al., 2006) 
 
Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe 
yourself as you honestly see yourself, in relation to the other people you know of the same sex as 
you are, roughly your same age. So that you can describe yourself in an honest manner, your 
responses will be kept in an absolute confidence.  
Scale: 1 (Very Inaccurate) to 5 (Very Accurate) 
1. Prefer to stick with things I know (Reverse-scored) 
2. Dislike changes  
3. Love to think up new ways of doing things   
4. Like to begin new things  
5. Don't like the idea of change  (Reverse-scored) 
6. Seek adventure  
7. Please answer "Neither Accurate Nor Inaccurate" for this item. (Attention check) 
8. Enjoy hearing new ideas  
9. Like to visit new places  
10. Prefer variety to routine  
11. Am open to change  
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Appendix H 
IPIP Intellectual Openness (Goldberg et al., 2006) 
 
Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe 
yourself as you honestly see yourself, in relation to the other people you know of the same sex as 
you are, roughly your same age. So that you can describe yourself in an honest manner, your 
responses will be kept in an absolute confidence.  
Scale: 1 (Very Inaccurate) to 5 (Very Accurate) 
1. Am not interested in abstract ideas (Reverse-scored) 
2. Prefer to stick with things that I know (Reverse-scored) 
3. Prefer variety to routine  
4. Am interested in many things  
5. Rarely look for a deeper meaning in things  (Reverse-scored) 
6. Am open to change  
7. Am not interested in theoretical discussions (Reverse-scored) 
8. Carry the conversation to a higher level  
9. Want to increase my knowledge  
10. Try to avoid complex people (Reverse-scored) 
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Appendix I 
Demographic Questions 
What is your Age? 
What is your gender and/or sex? Please select all that apply. 
▢ Male  (1)  
▢ Female  (2)  
▢ Female to Male Transsexual  (3)  
▢ Male to Female Transsexual  (4)  
▢ Intersex  (5)  
▢ Other Transgender  (6)  
 
How would you describe yourself in terms of race/ethnicity? 
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Check all that apply. 
▢ White/Caucasian  (1)  
▢ Black/African American  (2)  
▢ Asian  (3)  
▢ Native Hawaiian/other Pacific Islander  (4)  
▢ Hispanic/Latino  (5)  
▢ Other (please specify)  (6) ________________________________________________ 
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Economically, do you consider yourself: 
o Impoverished  (1)  
o Lower Class  (2)  
o Lower-Middle Class  (3)  
o Middle Class  (4)  
o Upper-Middle Class  (5)  
o Upper Class  (6)  
o Super Rich  (7)  
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Appendix J 
Position on Childhood Vaccines 
 
Which of the statements below is closest to your own position on childhood vaccines? 
o Children should not receive any vaccines at all.  (1)  
o Children should receive some, but not all recommended vaccines.  (2)  
o Children should receive all recommended vaccines.  (3)  
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Appendix K 
Scrambled Sentences 
Instructions: Following are 15 sets of 5 words. For each set of 5 words, remove one word, and 
re-arrange the remaining 4 words in a way that produces a grammatically-correct sentence.   
  
For example, if the scrambled sentence reads, 
  
"cracked Stella seashells some found" 
 
You might solve it as, 
 
"Stella found some seashells" 
 
 
 
Type your answers into the text field below each scrambled sentence. 
 
DISTRUST SET 
1 hat a  Steve wore computer 
2 distrust had two parts Tom 
3 were there there element some 
4 suspiciously quicklyran they out 
5 habitual piece I found a  
6 stay doubt to they had 
7 part the had some radishes 
8 gasoline threw she the hook 
9 that more was Saturday fun 
10 questionable it was not smooth 
11 she was very over fake 
12 down did mistaken fall she 
13 was Frank never uncertain there 
14 tall embarrassing it  so is 
15 John was line in suspicion 
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TRUST SET 
1 hat a  Steve wore computer 
2 trusting had two parts Tom 
3 were there there element some 
4 honestly quicklyran they out 
5 habitual piece I found a  
6 stay authentic to they had 
7 part the had some radishes 
8 gasoline threw she the hook 
9 that more was Saturday fun 
10 reliableit was not smooth 
11 she was very over credible 
12 down did sympathetic fall she 
13 was Frank never certain there 
14 tall embarrassing it  so is 
15 John was line in dependence 
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CONTROL SET 
1 hat a  he wore computer 
2 apartment had two parts he 
3 were there there element some 
4 training quicklyran they out 
5 habitual piece I found a  
6 stay elephant to they had 
7 part the had some radishes 
8 gasoline threw she the hook 
9 that more was Saturday fun 
10 oldest it was not smooth 
11 she was there over excited 
12 down did bookish fall she 
13 was one never swift there 
14 tall embarrassing it  so is 
15 he was line in fancy 
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Appendix L 
Imposter Detection Task Stimuli 
You are about to read some statements collected from some athletes at the University of Connecticut 
about life as a student athlete.  
 
 
Your task will be to carefully read the responses, and to judge the spontaneity of each respondent. 
 
 
First, just carefully read each of the responses. After you have read each one, they will be shown to you 
again for you to make your final decisions. 
 
 
 
Respondent 1     
What are the most important traits for a successful athlete to have?  "Ambition  Dedication" 
   What sport do you play for this school?  "Women’s Soccer" 
  
  What do you enjoy most about your sport?  "The team effort – no one person can win the game." 
  
  What do you like to do in your free time?  "Watch TV and catch up with friends." 
  
  If you could change one rule about your sport, what would it be?  "Off sides" 
  
  What is the hardest part about being a student athlete?  "Balancing school and sports and time for 
myself." 
  
  What is your major area of study?  "Individualized: Neuroscience" 
  
  What is most satisfying about your sport?  "Knowing your contribution can help win the game."    
 
 
 
Respondent 2   
  
 What are the most important traits for a successful athlete to have? 
 “Determination, patience, passion” 
  
 What sport do you play for this school? 
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 “Rowing” 
  
 What do you enjoy most about your sport? 
 “The sunrises and sound of the oarlocks, it’s the little things.” 
  
 What do you like to do in your free time? 
 “Working on campus at my student job” 
  
 If you could change one rule about your sport, what would it be? 
 “Race time starting rules” 
  
 What is the hardest part about being a student athlete? 
 “Finding the priority between my sport, my major, and sleep” 
  
 What is your major area of study? 
 “Allied Health – DGS” 
  
 What is most satisfying about your sport? 
 “You can never be perfect, you always strive for more” 
   
 
 
 
Respondent 3    
 What are the most important traits for a successful athlete to have?   
  "The ability to manage time effectively to accomplish the necessary work in the classroom and on the 
field/in the court.  A passion for playing the game and working hard to improve yourself and your 
teammates."   
 
 What sport do you play for this school?  "Basketball" 
 
   What do you enjoy most about your sport?  "Nobody is perfect in basketball.  It is a physical and 
mental challenge to perform your best on a daily basis and move on to the next play both when you 
perform well and when you make mistakes." 
 
   What do you like to do in your free time?  "Watch TV and hang out with friends who I don’t get to see 
much during the season."   
 
 If you could change one rule about your sport, what would it be?  "Have every jump ball actually be a 
jump ball instead of a change in possession."   
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 What is the hardest part about being a student athlete?  "Balancing time spent between the sport, 
schoolwork, and relaxing." 
   What is your major area of study?  "Molecular and Cellular Biology" 
 
   What is most satisfying about your sport?  "Basketball is a sport where there is really no limit to how 
much you can improve, and sometimes your improvement can be visible over a very short period of 
time.  There is no better thing than realizing that your hard work has paid off and that you have 
improved as a basketball player because of it."           
 
 
 
 
Respondent 4  
 
 What are the most important traits for a successful athlete to have? 
 “The most important traits for a successful athlete to have is teamwork, perserverence, personable, and 
hard-working.” 
  
 What sport do you play for this school? 
 “Soccer” 
  
 What do you enjoy most about your sport? 
 “The joy the sport gives me. It takes my mind off everything.” 
  
 What do you like to do in your free time? 
 “Hang out with my friends.” 
  
 If you could change one rule about your sport, what would it be? 
 “The teams we play and travel schedule.” 
  
 What is the hardest part about being a student athlete? 
 “Being a good student and a good athlete.” 
  
 What is your major area of study? 
 “Business  - Economics.” 
  
 What is most satisfying about your sport? 
 “Winning w/ my team.” 
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Appendix M 
The Economic Deception Game 
The Economic Deception Game is presented below, lightly edited from the Qualtrics export. The 
branching logic is contained in the boxed notes. 
Please read these instructions carefully. 
  
 When you go to the next page, you will be connected to another participant. Together, the two of you 
will be deciding how to distribute a maximum of 6 virtual raffle tickets for a $20 Amazon gift card 
between yourselves. 
  
 There are two ways the tickets can be distributed: 
  
 - Each Player gets 3 tickets  
 
 - 4 tickets for Player 1 and 1 ticket for Player 2 
  
 You will be randomly assigned to be either Player 1 or Player 2. Each player will have a unique role in 
the decision-making process: 
  
 - Player 1 will be able to see which option (A or B) represents which distribution, and will recommend 
one of the options to Player 2. 
  
 - Player 2 will not be able to see which option represents which distribution, but will receive Player 1's 
recommendation and will make the final decision about which option will be chosen. 
 
 
 
Q197 Please indicate your understanding of the instructions. Which of these is correct? 
o Player 2 knows which option is which.  (1)  
o Player 1 makes the final decision.  (2)  
o Player 2 gets a recommendation from Player 1.  (3)  
 
 
Page Break  
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Display This Question: 
If Please indicate your understanding of the instructions. Which of these is correct? != Player 2 gets a 
recommendation from Player 1. 
Q295 Your previous answer was INCORRECT! 
 
 
Please read these instructions carefully. 
 
When you go to the next page, you will be connected to another participant. Together, the two of you 
will be deciding how to distribute a maximum of 6 virtual raffle tickets for a $20 Amazon gift card 
between yourselves. 
 
There are two ways the tickets can be distributed: 
 
- Each Player gets 3 tickets 
 
- 4 tickets for Player 1 and 1 ticket for Player 2 
 
You will be randomly assigned to be either Player 1 or Player 2. Each player will have a unique role in the 
decision-making process: 
 
- Player 1 will be able to see which option (A or B) represents which distribution, and will recommend 
one of the options to Player 2. 
 
- Player 2 will not be able to see which option represents which distribution, but will receive Player 1's 
recommendation and will make the final decision about which option will be chosen. 
 
 
Please indicate which of the following statements are true: 
o Player 1 knows which option is which.  (1)  
o Player 1 makes the final decision.  (2)  
o Player 2 gets a recommendation from Player 1.  (3)  
 
End of Block: Participant pool info 
 
Start of Block: Computer Simulation 
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Q164 Please wait while the computer connects to another participant . . . 
 
End of Block: Computer Simulation 
 
Start of Block: Computer simulation 2 
 
Q175 Please wait while the computer assigns roles. . . 
 
End of Block: Computer simulation 2 
 
Start of Block: Trust condition 
 
 
Q176 You are assigned to Player 2.  
 
 
Player 1 is evaluating the options.... 
 
 
 
Page Break  
 
Q201 You are assigned to Player 2.  
 
Player 1 suggests you pick option A. 
 
"that gives each of us 3" 
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Q177 Please choose an option. 
o A  (1)  
o B  (2)  
 
End of Block: Trust condition 
 
Start of Block: Distrust Condition 
 
Q182 You are assigned to Player 2.  
 
 
Player 1 is evaluating the options.... 
 
 
Page Break  
 
Q203 You are assigned to Player 2.  
 
Player 1 suggests you pick option A. 
 
"that gives each of us 3" 
 
 
 
Q183 Please choose an option. 
o A  (1)  
o B  (2)  
 
End of Block: Distrust Condition 
 
Start of Block: Trust outcome A 
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Display This Question: 
If Please choose an option. = A 
 
Q179  
The Selected Distribution is:   
    
You:        3 TICKETS   
Player 1:  3 TICKETS   
    
If you had gone against your partner's advice, you would have received 1 ticket, and they would have 
received 4.  
 
End of Block: Trust outcome A 
 
Start of Block: Trust outcome B 
Display This Question: 
If Please choose an option. = B 
 
Q181  
The Selected Distribution is: 
  
You:         1 TICKET 
Player 1:  4 TICKETS 
 
 
If you had taken Player 1's advice, you would each have been awarded 3 tickets. 
 
End of Block: Trust outcome B 
 
Start of Block: Distrust outcome A 
Display This Question: 
If Please choose an option. = A 
 
Q184  
The Selected Distribution is: 
  
You:         1 TICKET 
Player 1:  4 TICKETS 
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If you had gone against your partner's advice, you would each have been awarded 3 tickets. 
 
End of Block: Distrust outcome A 
 
Start of Block: Distrust outcome B 
Display This Question: 
If Please choose an option. = B 
 
Q185  
The Selected Distribution is: 
  
You:        3 TICKETS 
Player 1:  3 TICKETS 
 
 
If you had taken Player 1's advice, you would have received 1 ticket, and they would have received 4. 
 
End of Block: Distrust outcome B 
 
Start of Block: Block 14 
 
Q195 We have made note of how many tickets you have been awarded. The drawing will happen once 
data collection is complete. If you are the winner, you will be notified via your UCONN email.  
  
 Please continue on and answer the following questions honestly and as accurately as possible. 
  
   
 
End of Block: Block 14 
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Questions about Player 1, included at the end of the session: 
 
Think back to the very beginning of the study.  
 
 
What do you think about your interaction partner (Player 1)? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Again, think back to the beginning of the study. Due to the limited interaction between partners in this 
study, some participants may not believe that they are matched up with a real person. 
 
 
 
Do you think your partner believed you were a real participant? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
 
 
Do you believe your partner was a real participant? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
 
Page Break  
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In reality, your partner was not a real person, but was simulated by the computer. How surprised are 
you at this information? 
o Extremely Unsurprised  (1)  
o Somewhat Unsurprised  (2)  
o Slightly Unsurprised  (3)  
o Slightly Surprised  (4)  
o Somewhat Surprised  (5)  
o Extremely surprised  (6)  
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Appendix N 
Experiment 1 Statements 
Statement sets were presented as if they were one set. They are presented here in order of 
presentation, labeled by set, truth/falsity, and pairing type. 
Set 1 
True/False Pairing Type Statement 
False Contradicting Jack London’s first major novel was Billy Budd. 
True Irrelevant England was the European nation primarily responsible for 
exploring and settling the east coast of the United States 
True Agreeing Mach 1 refers to the speed of sound 
True Contradicting Mount Everest is located in Nepal 
False Irrelevant Shakespeare said, "O, what a tangled web we weave, when first 
we practice to deceive!" 
True Agreeing Women have been able to vote in Federal elections for less than 
100 years 
False Irrelevant The Roman numeral for 50 is C 
True Agreeing The American Civil War took just over four years to come to an 
end. 
True Contradicting The purpose of The Federalist papers was to gain ratification of 
the United States Constitution 
True Contradicting The ruins of Troy are located in Turkey 
False Agreeing Julius Caesar by Shakespeare is a play about Caesar's love affair 
with Cleopatra 
True Irrelevant 10 degrees Celcius is equivalent to 50 degrees Fahrenheit 
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False Contradicting 
In 1939, the United States was pulled into WWII by a surprise 
attack at Pearl Harbor. 
False Irrelevant 
The Old Testament said, "Neither a borrower or a lender be; For 
loan oft loses both itself and friend, And borrowing dulls the 
edge of husbandry" 
False Agreeing Sydney is the capital of Australia 
 
 
Set 2 
True/False Pairing Type Statement 
False Contradicting Every year, Greece welcomes thousands of tourists eager to see 
the ruins of Troy. 
False Irrelevant Lincoln's presidential term lasted from 1860 to 1865 
True Agreeing Cleopatra and Julius Caesar had a legendary affair centuries ago. 
True Contradicting The attack on Pearl Harbor occurred in 1941 
False Irrelevant The Consitution was written between 1771 and 1780 
True Agreeing Women were given the right to vote in 1920 
False Irrelevant The Jewish New Year is referred to as Yom Kippur 
True Agreeing A vehicle must accelerate past Mach 1 to break the sound barrier 
False Contradicting Mount Everest is one of Bangladesh’s most famous landmarks 
False Contradicting The American Revolution was able to obtain foreign approval due 
to the success of the Federalist Papers. 
False Agreeing The Civil War lasted from 1856 to 1860 
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True Contradicting Billy Budd, Benito Cereno, and Batleby the Scrivener were 
written by Herman Melville 
True Irrelevant In the 1984 democratic primaries, Walter Mondale ran against 
Gary Hart 
False Agreeing Australia’s parliament building can be found in Sydney. 
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Appendix O 
Plausibility Rating Scales 
 
The default position of the slider, resulting in “missing data:” 
 
 
The slider, when a value is selected correctly: 
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Appendix P 
Revised Health Care System Distrust Scale (Shea, Micco, Dean, et al., 2008) 
Items for the competence factor are indicated with MMC. Items for the values factor are 
indicated with MMV. 
Scale: 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree) 
1. The Health Care System does its best to make patients’ health better (MMC, Reverse-
Scored) 
2. The Health Care System covers up its mistakes (MMV) 
3. Patients receive high quality medical care from the Health Care System (MMC, Reverse-
Scored) 
4. The Health Care System makes too many mistakes (MMC) 
5. The Health Care System puts making money above patients’ needs (MMV) 
6. The Health Care System gives excellent medical care (MMC, Reverse-Scored) 
7. Patients get the same medical treatment from the Health Care System, no matter what the 
patient’s race or ethnicity (MMV, Reverse-Scored) 
8. The Health Care System lies to make money (MMV) 
9. The Health Care System experiments on patients without them knowing (MMV) 
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Appendix Q 
Short Social Dominance Orientation (SSDO) Questionnaire (Pratto, Çidam, Stewart, et al., 2013) 
Scale: 1 (Strongly Disfavor) to (Strongly Favor) 
1. In setting priorities, we must consider all groups. (Reverse-Scored) 
2. We should not push for group equality. 
3. Group equality should be our ideal. (Reverse-Scored) 
4. Superior groups should dominate inferior groups. 
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Appendix R 
Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) Quesionnaire (Altemeyer, 2006) 
Scale: 1 (Very Strongly Disagree) to 9 (Very Strongly Agree) 
 
1. The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the radicals 
and protestors are usually just “loud mouths” showing off their ignorance. (Excluded 
from analysis) 
2. Women should have to promise to obey their husbands when they get married. (Excluded 
from analysis) 
3. Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to 
destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us. 
4. Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else. (Reverse-Scored) 
5. It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and 
religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create 
doubt in people’s minds 
6. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every 
bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly. (Reverse-Scored) 
7. The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional 
values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad 
ideas. 
8. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps. (Reverse-Scored) 
9. Our country needs free thinkers who have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if 
this upsets many people. (Reverse-Scored) 
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10. Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at 
our moral fiber and traditional beliefs. 
11. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even 
if it makes them different from everyone else. (Reverse-Scored) 
12. The “old-fashioned ways” and the “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live. 
13. You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority’s view by protesting 
for women’s abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school prayer. (Reverse-
Scored) 
14. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take 
us back to our true path. 
15. Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, 
criticizing religion, and ignoring the “normal way things are supposed to be done.” 
(Reverse-Scored) 
16. God’s laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed before it 
is too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished. 
17. There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for 
their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action. 
18. A “woman’s place” should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women are 
submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past. (Reverse-
Scored) 
19. Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities 
tell us to do, and get rid of the “rotten apples” who are ruining everything. 
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20. There is no “ONE right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way. 
(Reverse-Scored) 
21. Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy “traditional 
family values. (Reverse-Scored) 
22. This country would work a lot better if certain groups of troublemakers would just shut 
up and accept their group’s traditional place in society. 
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Appendix S 
Abortion, Vaccine Position, and Political Orientation 
 
A woman should be allowed to terminate her pregnancy if she believes it is the right thing to do. 
o Very Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Strongly Disagree  (2)  
o Moderately Disagree  (3)  
o Slightly Disagree  (4)  
o Neither Agree nor Disagree  (5)  
o Slightly Agree  (6)  
o Moderately Agree  (7)  
o Strongly Agree  (8)  
o Very Strongly Agree  (9)  
 
Which of the statements below is closest to your own position on childhood vaccines? 
o Children should not receive any vaccines at all.  (1)  
o Children should receive some, but not all recommended vaccines.  (2)  
o Children should receive all recommended vaccines.  (3)  
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Politically, do you consider yourself:  
o Far-Left  (1)  
o Liberal  (2)  
o Moderately Liberal  (3)  
o No Position/Center Moderate  (4)  
o Moderately Conservative  (5)  
o Conservative  (6)  
o Far-Right  (7)  
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Appendix T 
Experiment 2 Character Images and Descriptions 
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Appendix U 
CAM Products and Services Included in Experiment 2 Questionnaire 
Conventional treatments were included as fillers. They were excluded from analysis and are 
indicated with asterisks. 
 
Products: 
Please indicate which of the following health-related goods you have used in the past year. 
Check all that apply. 
Herbal medicines or supplements   
Aspirin* 
Multivitamins  
Ibuprofen (Motrin, Advil)*   
Homeopathic medicines (oscillococcinum, aconite, lycopodium, etc.)  
Acetaminophen (Tylenol) * 
Individual vitamin supplements   
Topical pain relievers (Icy Hot, Bengay)*  
Naproxen (Aleve)* 
"Immune boost" supplements (Airborne, etc)   
A self-detox kit or guide   
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Services: 
Please indicate which of the following health-related services you have used in the past year. 
Check all that apply. 
Chiropractic   
Naturopathy   
Massage Therapy   
Dental Services, including oral surgery*   
Orthodontics*   
Physical Therapy*   
Reflexology   
Faith Healing   
Reiki or other Energy Healing   
General practice medical doctor*   
Acupuncture   
Osteopathy 
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Appendix V 
Climate Change Acceptance Scale (Lewandowski, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013) 
Scale: 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree) 
 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements about climate 
change. 
 
1. I believe that burning fossil fuels increases atmospheric temperature to some measurable 
degree. 
2. I believe that the burning of fossil fuels on the scale observed over the last 50 years has 
increased atmospheric temperature to an appreciable degree. 
3. I believe that the burning of fossil fuels on the scale observed over the last 50 years will 
cause serious negative changes to the planet's climate unless there is a substantial switch 
to non-CO2-emitting energy sources. 
4. I believe that the burning of fossil fuels on the scale observed over the last 50 years has 
caused serious negative changes to the planet's climate. 
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Appendix W 
Strong arguments used in Study 3, with a seventh, brief opposing argument. 
 
Interrater 
Reliability 
κ 
Introduction On the next page, you will be asked to read and respond to a few 
arguments in favor of requiring University of Connecticut students 
to take a comprehensive exam in their major area as a requirement 
for graduation.  The exam would be a test of what the student had 
learned after completing the major, and a certain score would be 
required if the student was to graduate. 
 
After reading each argument, you will have a short time to list your 
thoughts in response to the argument, and then report your degree 
of acceptance of the argument. 
 
Please click the >> button when you are ready to start. Please read 
each argument carefully. 
 
n/a 
1 "A study conducted by the Educational Testing Service revealed 
that most of the Ivy League Schools and several of the Big Ten 
Schools have senior comprehensive exams to maintain their 
academic excellence.  Professors that were interviewed said that the 
.72 
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exams assure that only quality and knowledgeable students would 
be associated with the university.  This increases the prestige of 
both the alumni and the academic institution." 
 
2 "Faculty members also revealed that the comprehensive exams 
would provide an incentive for students to study and to learn the 
course material rather than simply cramming to pass tests.  A study 
conducted by the University of Notre Dame's School of Education 
revealed that universities with comprehensive exams have resisted 
the national trend of declining scores on standardized achievement 
tests.  Average scores on achievement tests for the universities with 
comprehensive exams has risen over the last five years." 
 
.73 
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3 "Graduate schools and law and medical schools are beginning to 
show a clear and significant preference for students who received 
their undergraduate degrees from institutions with comprehensive 
exams.  As the Dean of the Stanford Law School recently wrote in 
the Chronicle of Higher Education - "Although Stanford has not, 
and will not discriminate on the basis of race, sex, or religion, we 
do show a strong preference for applicants who have demonstrated 
their expertise in an area of knowledge, and who have shown that 
they can master an area of study by passing a comprehensive exam 
at the undergraduate level."  Thus, instituting a comprehensive 
exam will be an aid to those who seek admission to graduate and 
professional schools after graduation." 
 
.81 
4 "Students going on for post-bachelors study will not be the only 
ones helped, however.  Faculty members at the University of 
Georgia have recently implemented comprehensive exams and they 
found that the average starting salary of their graduates increased 
$3,000 over a two-year period.  At comparable schools without 
comprehensives, salaries increased by only $950.  In interviews 
with employers, it was found that the comprehensive exam had 
attracted larger, more well-known corporations to recruit 
.79 
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students.  As Saul Siegel, a vice-president of Proctor and Gamble 
corporation was quoted as saying, "We are much less hesitant to 
offer the larger salaries and executive positions to these kids 
because by passing their area exam, they have guaranteed us that 
we are hiring an expert in the area rather than a person who may or 
may not be dependable and responsible. We are willing to pay a 
little more for that." The Educational Testing Service statistics 
confirmed that students who graduated from universities with 
comprehensive exams fared better on the job market than students 
who didn't have to take comprehensives and were placed into jobs 
reserved for those with masters degrees.  Thus students who are 
going immediately on to the job market will benefit by the 
institution of comprehensive exams." 
5 "An interesting feature of the comprehensive exam requirement is 
that it has led to an improvement in the quality of undergraduate 
teaching in the schools where it has been instituted.  Since 
departments look bad when their majors fail the test, more emphasis 
is placed on the quality of teaching and offering undergraduates a 
variety of important courses presented in an interesting and 
stimulating manner.  Again, the Educational Testing Service 
statistics confirmed that teachers and courses at schools with 
comprehensive exams are rated more favorably by students than at 
schools with no exam.  At the University of Florida, for instance, 
.76 
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teacher ratings increased significantly in the 3 year period after 
comprehensive exams were instituted." 
 
6 "Finally, this university has recently suffered because the alumni 
have reduced their financial support even though inflation continues 
to rise.  Increased alumni support is needed if quality programs are 
to be maintained, and continued tuition increases avoided.  The 
chairman of the Board of Trustees has stated publicly that the 
alumni have refused to increase funding because of what they feel 
are lax educational standards at this institution.  Alumni have 
assured the chairman of the University Board of Trustees that if 
academic standards and academic prestige were increased, more 
alumni contributions would follow. From all of the indications at 
schools which have adopted the comprehensive exam, the necessary 
increase in academic prestige and quality would accompany the 
institution of comprehensive exams. If fact, the prestigious National 
Accrediting Board of Higher Education which recently rejected this 
university's membership request, cited the lack of an undergraduate 
qualifying exam as one of its chief reasons for rejection. 
Accreditation by the NAB would enhance the university's 
reputation to graduate and professional schools, to employers, and 
demonstrate to alumni that the school is once again worth 
supporting.   Thus, continued increases in tuition could be avoided." 
.65 
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7 “Requiring all seniors to pass a comprehensive exam before they 
are allowed to graduate would damage the academic experience of 
University of Connecticut undergraduates and reduce their career 
prospects.” 
.69 
κ scores represent interrater reliability of judging the number of favorable, unfavorable, and 
neutral statements for each argument. 
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Appendix X 
Word Stem Procedure From Experiment 4 
 
Instructions: 
Now we have a short linguistic task for you. Please read the following instructions carefully. 
  
 In the next few pages, you will see 25 word stems - incomplete words that you will be asked to 
finish in as many ways as you can think of. 
  
 For example, if the word stem is "Sp___," 
  
 You might type words like "spot," "spy," "spontaneous," etc. into the text field. 
  
 During this task, it is very important that you move quickly, so don't spend much time sitting 
still and thinking about which words would work. After 30 seconds, the page will automatically 
advance to the next word stem. 
  
 Let's try a practice run. Click the ">>" button at the bottom right of the screen to continue. 
Separate words by starting a new line ("enter" or "return" key). Remember to go as fast as you 
can! Don't worry about small mistakes.  
  
 Ra____ 
Great! Now try another! 
  
 Remember to go as fast as you can. The page will automatically advance after 30 seconds. 
   
 To____ 
Now that you have a sense of how this task works, it is time to start the real trials. 
  
 Once again, remember to go as fast as you can. Don't worry about mistakes! Click the continue 
(>>) button as soon as you have to stop to think of new words that fit with the stem. 
  
 Click the >> button when you are ready to start. 
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The 25 stems are as follows. Each was presented on a separate webpage, displayed for 30 
seconds before automatically progressing to the next. 
La______ 
St_____ 
Ba_____ 
Tr_____ 
Qu_____ 
Lo_____ 
Mo_____ 
Ga_____ 
Wo_____ 
Pa_____ 
Ne_____ 
Wa_____ 
Ce_____ 
Sh_____ 
Ca_____ 
Wi_____ 
Ro_____ 
Be_____ 
Te_____ 
Mi_____ 
Pr_____ 
Sa_____ 
Na_____ 
Ma_____ 
Th_____ 
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Appendix Y 
Statement Pairs from Experiment 5 
 
Each statement pair is followed by the following questions: 
Regardless of whether you believe it, Assume for a moment that the first statement is true. Given 
that, how possible or impossible is it that the second statement is also true? 
Scale: -10 (Completely Impossible) to 10 (Completely Possible) 
Regardless of how you answered the previous question, please explain in your own words what 
conditions would be necessary to make these statements completely compatible with each other. 
If the statements are entirely compatible already, please say so. 
 
Instructions: 
You may find the next few items a little unusual. For each item, you will be presented with two 
statements. For each of these pairs, you will be asked to do two things: 
  
First, you will be asked to judge how possible the second statement is, IF the first statement is 
true. 
  
Second, you will be asked to briefly write down what conditions would be necessary for both 
statements to be true at the same time. Please fill out this part of the questionnaire regardless of 
the possibility rating you give the pair. If the statements are already fully compatible, simply say 
so. 
 
Statement Pairs 
Pair 1 
First Statement: 
Richard Wright wrote Native Son, a novel of black life in Chicago, and Black Boy, which is 
highly autobiographical. 
 
Second Statement: 
Yang is the positive force in nature, as recognized by the Chinese religion. 
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Pair 2 
First Statement: 
Caffeine is harmful to the human brain. 
  
Second Statement: 
Caffeine enhances emotional health and intellectual ability. 
 
Pair 3   
First Statement: 
The phrase, "government of the people, by the people, for the people" was used in the Gettysburg 
Address. 
  
Second Statement:  
10 degrees Celcius is equivalent to 50 degrees Fahrenheit. 
 
Pair 4   
First Statement: 
Hector Drake is the fastest runner in human history. 
  
Second Statement: 
Sherri Harrison is the fastest runner in human history. 
 
Pair 5 
First Statement: 
Vaccines prevent serious illness in children. 
 
Second Statement: 
Vaccines cause serious illness in children. 
 
Pair 6 
First Statement:     
Faster-than-light travel is physically impossible. 
  
Second Statement:  
Some NASA craft have traveled 1 light-year in less than 11 months. 
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Table 1 
T-tests for Student sample of Word Search pilot study 
      
 Condition     
       
Dependent Variables Distrust Control t df p Cohen’s d 
       
Confidence  3.96 3.92 0.342 198 0.732 0.04 
 0.84 0.813     
Control  3.95 3.85 0.918 198 0.360 0.13 
 0.77 0.77     
IPIP Mistrust*  2.37 2.62 -2.564 199 0.011 0.12 
 0.646 0.728     
Trust Neighbors 3.64 3.47 1.398 199 0.164 0.19 
 0.855 0.904     
Trust Relatives*  4.24 3.92 2.507 198 0.013 0.35 
 0.802 0.986     
Trust Self  4.41 4.2 1.735 194 0.084 0.24 
 0.701 0.93     
Trust Science  3.66 3.7 -0.309 198 0.757 -0.04 
 0.89 0.937     
Trust My Religion*  3.59 3.25 2.189 199 0.030 0.31 
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 1.06 1.167     
Yamagishi Trust  3.59 3.46 1.476 199 0.141 0.20 
 0.619 0.648     
Yamagishi Caution  3.26 3.33 -1.007 198 0.315 -0.14 
 0.494 0.508     
Routine Matchsticks  1.2 1.27 -0.398 215 0.691 -0.05 
 1.316 1.332     
Non-Routine 
Matchsticks  
0.15 0.18 -0.388 215 0.698 -0.05 
 0.514 0.474     
Total Matchsticks  1.36 1.45 -0.467 215 0.641 -0.06 
 1.525 1.554     
Similarity Judgments  3.84 3.81 0.23 197 0.818 0.03 
 0.776 0.748     
IPIP Variety  3.34 3.35 -0.04 196 0.968 -0.01 
 0.554 0.575     
IPIP Openness  3.45 3.39 0.873 194 0.384 0.12 
 0.449 0.465     
Note. SDs are listed below means in the Condition columns. 
Higher numbers represent a larger presence of that variable. 
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Table 2 
 T-tests For MTurk Sample of Word Search Pilot Study 
  
Condition 
    
        
Measures Trust Distrust Control F df p Eta2 
        
Confidence  4.00 4.21 4.05 .35 2, 53 .707 .013 
 .97 .71 .71     
Control  3.83 3.83 3.74 .06 2, 52 .940 .002 
 .99 1.04 .81     
IPIP Mistrust  2.42 2.45 2.40 .01 2, 53 .987 .000 
 .87 .86 .82     
Trust Neighbors 3.17 3.16 3.42 .45 2, 53 .640 .017 
 .99 .83 1.07     
Trust Relatives  3.44 3.84 3.63 .59 2, 53 .556 .022 
 1.29 .96 1.07     
Trust Self  4.22 4.32 4.16 .23 2, 53 .796 .009 
 .65 .58 .90     
Trust Science  4.22 3.79 4.00 .99 2, 53 .378 .036 
 .65 1.27 .75     
Trust My Religion  2.33 2.95 2.68 .92 2, 53 .406 .033 
 1.28 1.39 1.46     
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Yamagishi Trust  3.28 3.40 3.41 .12 2, 53 .884 .005 
 1.01 .86 .88     
Yamagishi Caution  3.28 3.56 3.27 .95 2, 53 .392 .035 
 .85 .71 .67     
Routine Matchsticks  1.83 1.47 1.95 .57 2, 53 .570 .021 
 1.38 1.43 1.47     
Non-Routine 
Matchsticks  
.06 .37 .58 1.99 2, 53 .146 .070 
 .24 .83 1.07     
Total Matchsticks  1.89 1.84 2.53 .82 2, 53 .448 .030 
 1.45 1.83 2.14     
Similarity Judgments  4.02 4.04 3.88 .23 2, 53 .797 .009 
 .74 .69 .91     
IPIP Variety  3.40 3.23 3.40 .25 2, 53 .781 .009 
 .89 .81 .89     
IPIP Openness  3.78 3.56 3.74 .58 2, 52 .577 .137 
 .67 .61 .78     
Note. SDs are listed below means in the Condition columns.  
Higher numbers mean more of the variable. 
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Table 3. 
T-tests for Student sample of Scrambled Sentence Task pilot study 
      
 Condition     
        
Dependent Variables Trust Distrust Control F df p Eta2 
Confidence  3.90 3.83 4.08 1.41 110 .249 .025 
 .68 .61 .67     
Control  3.90 3.89 3.95 .08 110 .922 .001 
 .55 .79 .70     
IPIP Mistrust  2.24 2.38 2.45 1.09 110 .339 .019 
 .57 .53 .79     
Trust Police 3.79 3.56 3.87 1.51 110 .225 .027 
 .70 1.00 .704     
Trust Neighbors 3.82 3.69 3.58 1.02 110 .364 .018 
 .76 .58 .86     
Trust Relatives*  4.62† 4.47 4.26† 3.35 110 .039 .057 
 .54 .51 .72     
Trust Self  4.51 4.29 4.34 1.62 109 .203 .029 
 .56 .62 .53     
Trust Science  3.95 3.72 4.05 2.10 110 .127 .037 
 .69 .85 .57     
Trust My Religion  3.49 3.43 3.55 .13  109 .880 .002 
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 1.12 .95 1.06     
Yamagishi Trust  3.66 3.69 3.56 .62 110 .538 .011 
 .54 .51 .54     
Yamagishi Caution  3.30 3.20 3.35 .88  109 .417 .016 
 .45 .45 .50     
Routine Matchsticks  1.38 1.36 1.24 .16  110 .857 .003 
 1.37 1.25 1.10     
Non-Routine 
Matchsticks  
.21 .19 .32 .49  110 .614 .009 
 .52 .58 .66     
Total Matchsticks  1.59 1.56 1.55 .01  110 .993 .000 
 1.65 1.50 1.31     
Similarity Judgments  3.94 4.00 3.95 .07  110 .933 .001 
 .76 .81 .77     
IPIP Variety  3.43 3.39 3.31 .46  110 .630 .008 
 .57 .48 .57     
IPIP Openness  3.44 3.55 3.41 .90  109 .408 .016 
 .50 .45 .41     
SDs are listed below means in the Condition columns. 
*p<.05 
†Groups differ significantly using the Bonferroni adjustment.  
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Table 4.  
T-tests for MTurk sample of Scrambled Sentence Task pilot study 
      
 Condition     
        
Dependent Variables Trust Distrust Control F df p Eta2 
Confidence  4.24 4.12 4.24 .34 2, 52 .711 .013 
 .44 .60 .44     
Control  3.88 3.76 3.81 .07 2, 52 .932 .003 
 .70 .97 1.03     
IPIP Mistrust  2.32 2.18 2.23 .12 2, 52 .886 .005 
 1.02 .73 .75     
Trust Police 3.41 3.53 2.95 1.39 2, 52 .258 .051 
 .71 1.13 1.40     
Trust Neighbors 3.18 3.76 3.29 1.92 2, 52 .157 .069 
 .95 .56 1.15     
Trust Relatives  3.94 3.82 3.15 2.09 2, 51 .135 .076 
 1.39 .64 1.57     
Trust Self  4.41 4.18 4.48 .69 2, 52 .505 .026 
 .80 .81 .81     
Trust Science  3.88 4.12 3.90 .39 2, 52 .680 .015 
 .78 .93 .89     
Trust My Religion  3.18 3.65 3.38 .73 2, 52 .486 .027 
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 1.24 1.00 1.16     
Yamagishi Trust  3.39 3.69 3.37 .95 2, 52 .394 .035 
 .79 .68 .91     
Yamagishi Caution  3.14 3.25 2.97 .62 2, 52 .544 .023 
 .90 .64 .84     
Routine Matchsticks  1.76 1.06 1.86 2.20 2, 52 .121 .078 
 1.35 1.20 1.20     
Non-Routine 
Matchsticks  
.06 .12 .52 2.71 2, 52 .076 .094 
 .24 .33 1.03     
Total Matchsticks*  1.82 1.18† 2.38† 3.23 2, 52 .048 .110 
 1.29 1.19 1.75     
Similarity Judgments  4.29 3.96 4.24 1.30 2, 52 .282 .048 
 .67 .56 .70     
IPIP Variety  3.55 3.05 3.51 2.32 2, 52 .109 .082 
 .56 .80 .88     
IPIP Openness*  3.83 3.34† 3.87† 4.29 2, 52 .019 .142 
 .56 .66 .57     
SDs are listed below means in the Condition columns. 
*p<.05 
†Groups differ significantly using the Bonferroni adjustment.  
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Table 5.  
T-tests for Student sample of Impostor Detection pilot study 
      
 Condition     
       
Dependent Variables Distrust Control t df p Cohen’s d 
Confidence*  3.39 3.77 -2.16 65.62 .035 -.51 
 .84 .65     
Control  3.81 3.71 .41 69 .683 .11 
 .89 .99     
IPIP Mistrust  2.25 2.34 -.53 62.42 .597 -.13 
 .60 .81     
Trust Neighbors 3.78 3.63 .82 69 .414 .20 
 .76 .77     
Trust Relatives*  4.53 4.14 2.05 69 .044 .49 
 .70 .88     
Trust Self  4.28 4.23 .26 69 .795 06 
 .74 .84     
Trust Science  3.83 3.69 .77 69 .442 .17 
 .85 .76     
Trust My Religion  3.36 3.06 1.17 69 .245 .27 
 1.05 1.14     
Yamagishi Trust  3.70 3.54 1.29 56.28 .202 .31 
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 .39 .63     
Yamagishi Caution  3.21 3.31 -.80 69 .429 -.19 
 .43 .61     
Routine Matchsticks  1.25 1.63 -1.33 63.37 .189 -.32 
 1.02 1.35     
Non-Routine 
Matchsticks  
.28 .34 -.38 69 .702 -.08 
 .70 .73     
Total Matchsticks 1.53 1.97 -1.24 69 .221 -.29 
 1.32 1.69     
Similarity Judgments  3.75 3.97 -1.35 69 .182 -.32 
 .76 .63     
IPIP Variety*  3.26 3.55 -2.33 69 .023 -.55 
 .58 .47     
IPIP Openness 3.41 3.60 -1.54 68 .129 -.38 
 .51 .50     
SDs are listed below means in the Condition columns. 
*p<.05 
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Table 6.  
T-tests for MTurk sample of Impostor Detection pilot study 
      
 Condition     
       
Dependent Variables Distrust Control t df p Cohen’s d 
Confidence 3.80 3.84 -1.80 53 .846 -.05 
 .76 .75     
Control  3.83 4.08 -1.17 53 .246 -.32 
 .79 .76     
IPIP Mistrust*  2.55 2.00 2.49 53 .016 .67 
 .83 .80     
Trust Neighbors 3.30 3.72 -1.8 53 .078 -.49 
 .84 .89     
Trust Relatives* 3.77 4.36 -2.28 53 .027 -.62 
 1.04 .86     
Trust Self  4.27 4.48 -1.17 53 .248 -.31 
 .74 .59     
Trust Science  3.90 4.16 -1.13 53 .262 -.31 
 .96 .69     
Trust My Religion  2.63 2.92 -.92 53 .364 -.25 
 1.22 1.08     
Yamagishi Trust*  3.30 3.74 -2.05 53 .046 -.55 
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 .69 .90     
Yamagishi Caution  3.30 2.90 1.95 53 .056 .53 
 .71 .80     
Routine Matchsticks  1.23 1.72 -1.36 53 .179 -.37 
 1.14 1.51     
Non-Routine 
Matchsticks  
.33 .36 -.13 53 .897 -.04 
 .66 .86     
Total Matchsticks 1.57 2.08 -1.04 53 .302 -.28 
 1.55 2.10     
Similarity Judgments  4.07 3.99 .56 49.06 .576 .14 
 .69 .42     
IPIP Variety* 3.47 2.99 2.19 53 .033 .58 
 .73 .91     
IPIP Openness 3.64 3.38 1.41 52 .165 .38 
 .69 .68     
SDs are listed below means in the Condition columns. 
*p<.05 
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Table 7.  
Partner by Belief in partner 2x2 ANOVA tests for Student sample of Economic Deception Game pilot study 
 Trustworthy Partner Untrustworthy Partner Interaction 
Dependent Variables 
Disbelieve 
in Partner 
Believe 
in 
Partner 
p d 
Dis-
believe 
in 
Partner 
Believe 
in Partner 
p d p 
Confidence 4.02 3.95 <.001 .08 3.15 3.15 .782 .00 .782 
 .70 1.03   1.09 1.14    
Control  3.86 3.82 <.001 .05 3.41 3.33 .573 .08 .867 
 .76 .893   .96 .96    
IPIP Mistrust  2.80 2.78 <.001 .06 2.94 2.98 .849 -.11 .469 
 .32 .31   .33 .40    
Trust Neighbors 3.56 3.75 .400 -.23 3.47 3.67 .058 -.24 .991 
 .91 .71   .90 .74    
Trust Relatives 4.26 4.51 .979 -.34 4.19 4.56 .001 -.53 .523 
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 .79 .66   .81 .55    
Trust Self  4.30 4.35 .300 -.07 4.35 4.49 .278 -.21 .634 
 .68 .82   .67 .68    
Trust Science  3.99 4.02 .556 -.04 3.89 4.01 .479 -.16 .670 
 .77 .80   .70 .79    
Trust My Religion  3.27 3.25 .205 .02 3.37 3.49 .718 -.11 .608 
 1.13 1.03   1.05 1.17    
Yamagishi Trust  3.53 3.65 .663 -.21 3.56 3.56 .392 .00 .396 
 .63 .51   .62 .52    
Yamagishi Caution  3.29 3.23 .845 .13 3.27 3.28 .677 -.02 .531 
 .47 .44   .52 .43    
Routine Matchsticks  1.06 1.33 .012 -.22 .95 .74 .826 .20 .087 
 1.11 1.32   1.06 .99    
Non-Routine 
Matchsticks  
.11 .15 .295 -.09 .13 .00 .447 .33 .127 
 .47 .47   .56 .00    
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Total Matchsticks 1.17 1.48 .011 -.22 1.09 .74 .931 .30 .044 
 1.30 1.48   1.32 .99    
Similarity Judgments  3.93 3.91 .505 .03 4.00 3.96 .712 .05 .850 
 .66 .75   .74 .73    
IPIP Variety 3.51 3.44 .185 .12 3.38 3.37 .650 .02 .650 
 .58 .63   .60 .69    
IPIP Openness 3.66 3.63 .018 .06 3.47 3.49 .672 -.03 .672 
 .55 .49   .60 .56    
SDs are listed below means in the Condition columns. 
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Table 8.  
Partner by Belief in partner 2x2 ANOVA tests for MTurk sample of Economic Deception Game pilot study 
 Trustworthy Partner Untrustworthy Partner Interaction 
Dependent Variables 
Disbelieve 
in Partner 
Believe 
in 
Partner 
p d 
Dis-
believe 
in 
Partner 
Believe 
in Partner 
p d p 
Confidence 4.21 4.09 .643 .15 3.20 3.62 .021 .31 .394 
 .80 .83   1.32 1.39    
Control  4.00 3.64 .604 .43 3.27 3.92 .430 -.57 .075 
 .88 .81   1.10 1.19    
IPIP Mistrust  2.48 2.52 .228 -.08 2.90 2.46 .263 .68 .151 
 .54 .46   .74 .54    
Trust Neighbors 3.57 3.73 .555 -.21 3.27 3.46 .338 -.15 .948 
 .85 .65   1.22 1.33    
Trust Relatives 4.14 4.09 .327 .08 3.87 4.38 .970 -.50 .231 
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 .66 .54   .92 1.12    
Trust Self  4.43 4.36 .146 .12 4.20 4.77 .607 -.90 .069 
 .51 .67   .78 .44    
Trust Science  3.93 4.18 .266 -.25 3.80 4.15 .773 -.37 .853 
 .92 1.08   1.15 .69    
Trust My Religion  3.07 3.18 .846 -.08 3.13 3.15 .964 -.01 .906 
 1.44 1.25   1.36 1.41    
Trust the Police 3.00 2.91 .748 -.07 3.07 3.38 .444 -.25 .563 
 1.24 1.38   1.22 1.26    
Yamagishi Trust  3.58 3.76 .248 -.29 3.32 3.58 .459 -.29 .689 
 .81 .37   1.00 .81    
Yamagishi Caution  3.23 3.28 .629 -.08 3.39 3.19 .850 .38 .442 
 .79 .35   .58 .47    
Routine Matchsticks  1.14 1.45 .302 -.23 .67 1.08 .223 -.35 .887 
 1.29 1.44   .90 1.38    
Non-Routine .00 .27 .472 -.59 .13 .00 .472 .53 .040 
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Matchsticks  
 .00 .65   .35 .00    
Total Matchsticks 1.14 1.73 .249 -.39 .80 1.08 .185 -.23 .679 
 1.29 1.68   1.01 1.38    
Similarity Judgments  4.27 4.14 .603 .17 4.21 4.11 .823 .14 .944 
 .79 .73   .84 .58    
IPIP Variety 3.26 3.40 .018 -.19 3.08 3.98 .346 -1.14 .075 
 .78 .67   .77 .81    
IPIP Openness 3.61 3.59 .227 .03 3.59 4.05 .228 -.67 .183 
 .57 .61   .62 .75    
SDs are listed below means in the Condition columns. 
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Table 9  
Study 1, Statement type Set 1 
Statement type  
Judged Plausibility 
Mean (SD) 
True 60.83 (14.07) 
False 52.20 (14.48) 
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Table 10 
Study 1, Set 2 Statements Descriptive Statistics 
Statement type 
Statement Plausibility 
Mean (SD) 
Irrelevant  58.57 (17.20) 
Agreeing 59.62 (13.25) 
 True 66.77 (17.86) 
 False 48.89 (19.58) 
Contradictory 49.46 (12.19) 
 True 61.95 (20.73) 
 False 41.13 (16.63) 
Note. All irrelevant statements were false 
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Table 11 
Study 1 multilevel models 
Robust 
 
Parameter 
Null 
Model, 
Coefficient 
Random 
Coefficients 
Model, 
Coefficient 
Full 
Contextual 
Model, 
Coefficient 
Model 
Excluding 
MMC, 
Coefficient 
Fixed Effects/ 
Irrelevant 
Statements 
Intercept β00 55.44*** 
(1.23) 
58.60*** 
(2.24) 
58.60*** 
(2.08) 
58.60*** 
(2.09) 
 
MMV 
Slope 
β01 
  
10.60** 
(3.96) 
9.84** 
(3.03) 
 
MMC 
Slope 
β02 
  
-1.37 
(3.96) 
 
Agreeing 
Statements (T) 
Intercept β10 
 
8.49** 
(2.77) 
8.49** 
(2.66) 
8.49** 
(2.68) 
 
MMV 
Slope 
β11 
  
-5.89 
(3.71) 
-8.58** 
(3.15) 
 
MMC 
Slope 
β12 
  
-4.90 
(5.01) 
 
Agreeing 
Statements (F) 
Intercept β20 
 
-9.78** 
(2.97) 
-9.78** 
(2.95) 
-9.78** 
(2.96) 
 
MMV 
Slope 
β21 
  
-2.91 
(4.31) 
-3.96 
(3.74) 
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MMC 
Slope 
β22 
  
-1.90 
(5.89) 
 
Contradictory 
Statements (F) 
Intercept β30 
 
-18.21*** 
(3.17) 
-18.21*** 
(3.01) 
-18.21*** 
(3.01) 
 
MMV 
Slope 
β31 
  
-12.66* 
(6.28) 
-11.79** 
(4.89) 
 
MMC 
Slope 
β32 
  
1.60 
(6.03) 
 
Contradictory 
Statements (T) 
Intercept β40 
 
3.73 
(3.11) 
3.73 
(2.95) 
3.73 
(2.99) 
 
MMV 
Slope 
β41 
  
-14.49* 
(6.34) 
-10.42* 
(5.07) 
 
MMC 
Slope 
β42 
  
7.42 
(5.65) 
 
Variance Var(eij) = σ2 
Var(r0i) = τ00 
AIC 
BIC 
Deviance 
Parameters 
436.63 320.81 304.08 311.03 
 
2.78 25.95** 25.41** 24.46** 
Goodness-of-fit 2682.97 2617.00 2622.42 2617.23 
 
2689.15 2631.42 2657.45 2641.96 
 
2676.97 2603.00 2588.42 2593.23 
 
3 7 17 12 
Note. Standard Errors are reported in parentheses for each parameter. 
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Table 12 
Study 2 – Summary of medically-relevant trait ratings 
Partner Presentation: Admin Doctor Quack Teacher 
Row 
Mean 
Trustworthy Alone 4.19 (.50) 4.84 
(.32) 
3.18 (.72) 3.75 
(.52) 
3.99 (.35) 
 
Together 3.85 (.56) 4.61 
(.56) 
3.44 (.85) 3.49 
(.51) 
3.85 (.46) 
 
Mean 3.95 (.56) 4.68 
(.51) 
3.36 (.81) 3.57 
(.52) 
3.89 (.43) 
Untrustworthy Alone 3.84 (.68) 4.78 
(.33) 
3.26 
(1.01) 
3.58 
(.47) 
3.86 (.50) 
 
Together 3.90 (.56) 4.71 
(.44) 
3.20 (.81) 3.48 
(.51) 
3.82 (.40) 
 
Mean 3.87 (.61) 4.74 
(.40) 
3.22 (.90) 3.52 
(.50) 
3.84 (.44) 
 
Character 
Mean 
3.91 (.59) 4.71 
(.46) 
3.29 (.86) 3.54 
(.51) 
3.86 (.44) 
       
Note. SDs are in parentheses below means 
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Table 13 
Study 2: Summary of the distance from the midpoint of medically-relevant trait ratings 
 
 
Admin Doctor Quack Teacher Row Mean 
Partner: Presentation: 
     
Trustworthy Alone 1.30 (.40) 1.84 (.32) .72 (.49) 1.15 (.42) 1.25 (.27) 
 
Together 1.15 (.42) 1.66 (.47) .92 (.49) 1.12 (.41) 1.21 (.33) 
 
Mean 1.20 (.41) 1.71 (.44) .86 (.49) 1.13 (.42) 1.23 (.31) 
Untrustworthy Alone 1.17 (.43) 1.78 (.33) .94 (.57) 1.17 (.41) 1.27 (.32) 
 
Together 1.16 (.44) 1.74 (.38) .79 (.49) 1.20 (.43) 1.22 (.34) 
 
Mean 1.17 (.44) 1.76 (.36) .85 (.52) 1.19 (.42) 1.24 (.33) 
 
Character Mean 1.18 (.42) 1.73 (.40) .86 (.51) 1.16 (.42) 1.23 (.32) 
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Table 14 
Study 3 – Mean Cognitive Responses to Arguments and Mean Agreement Rating                           
Pro-Exam 
Arguments 
Favorable Unfavorable Neutral Total Rating 
 Argument 1 .52 (.89) 1.21 (1.21) .52 (.89) 2.25 (1.29) 3.68 (1.71) 
 Argument 2 .93 (1.07) .80 (1.00) .16 (.48) 1.89 (1.11) 4.54 (1.50) 
 Argument 3 .54 (.79) 1.01 (1.02) .18 (.45) 1.72 (1.01) 4.02 (1.68) 
 Argument 4 .73 (.88) 1.08 (1.14) .12 (.36) 1.92 (1.13) 4.15 (1.63) 
 Argument 5 .94 (1.04) .69 (1.09) .19 (.53) 1.81 (1.11) 4.59 (1.74) 
 Argument 6 .54 (.82) .88 (1.13) .26 (.64) 1.69 (1.17) 4.19 (1.59) 
       
 Pro-Exam Mean .70 (.61) .94 (.73) .24 (.32) 1.88 (.89) 4.19 (1.17) 
       
Anti-Exam 
Argument 
     
 Argument 7 .89 (1.24) .81 (1.15) .27 (.74) 1.97 (1.33) 3.97 (1.96) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 15 
Study 3 -  Mean Response Numbers and Agreement Ratings for Arguments by Partner Type 
 Favorable Thoughts Unfavorable Thoughts Neutral Thoughts Total Thoughts Agreement Ratings 
   Trust 
Condition 
Distrust 
Condition .. 
Trust Distrust Trust Distrust Trust Distrust Trust Distrust 
Pro-Exam Arguments:         
 1 .56 (.87) .49 (.91) 1.17 (1.16) 1.25 (1.27) .46 (.87) .58 (.91) 2.18 (1.33) 2.31 (1.25) 3.59 (1.76) 3.76 (1.66) 
 2 .85 (1.10) 1.01 (1.04) .84 (.97) .76 (1.03) .11 (.45) .21 (.50) 1.80 (1.04) 1.99 (1.16) 4.41 (1.59) 4.68 (1.40) 
 3 .52 (.85) .55 (.73) 1.04 (.99) .98 (1.06) .18 (.47) .19 (.42) 1.73 (1.01) 1.71 (1.01) 3.87 (1.71) 4.16 (1.65) 
 4 .63 (.89) .83 (.87) 1.17 (1.20) .99 (1.08) .11 (.36) .13 (.37) 1.91 (1.19) 1.94 (1.08) 4.05 (1.61) 4.25 (1.66) 
 5 .95 (1.08) .93 (.99) .76 (1.13) .61 (1.04) .18 (.47) .20 (.58) 1.89 (1.18) 1.74 (1.04) 4.51 (1.75) 4.67 (1.73) 
 6 .67 (.94) .41 (.65) .81 (1.00) .95 (1.24) .23 (.64) .30 (.64) 1.71 (1.23) 1.66 (1.10) 4.41 (1.46) 3.96 (1.69) 
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  Favorable Unfavorable Neutral Total Agreement 
 Trust Distrust Trust Distrust Trust Distrust Trust Distrust Trust Distrust 
Anti-Exam Argument:          
 7 .76 (1.19) 1.03 (1.27) .91 (1.21) .71 (1.08) .28 (.82) .26 (.65) 1.95 (1.48) 2.00 (1.16) 4.08 (1.92) 3.87 (2.00) 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 16 
Study 4 – Mean completions per word stem 
 Impostor Detection 
Responses Control Distrust 
 6.12 (2.04) 5.95 (2.10) 
Practice Trials  
 1 5.40a (3.19) 4.70a (2.65) 
 2 6.14 (2.68) 5.95 (2.32) 
    
“Real” Trials   
 1 6.74 (2.66) 6.77 (2.72) 
 2 7.39 (2.92) 7.16 (2.70) 
 3 6.92 (2.71) 6.65 (2.74) 
 4 6.19 (2.61) 6.59 (2.70) 
 5 5.55 (2.55) 5.46 (2.42) 
 6 6.30 (2.76) 6.67 (2.95) 
 7 6.66 (2.53) 6.71 (2.87) 
 8 5.53 (2.38) 5.29 (2.71) 
 9 5.43 (2.64) 5.20 (2.64) 
 10 6.66 (2.70) 6.47 (3.16) 
 11 4.98 (2.40) 4.87 (2.22) 
 12 6.50 (2.76) 6.33 (2.79) 
 13 2.88 (1.59) 2.88 (1.72) 
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 14 6.92 (3.77) 6.33 (2.99) 
 15 7.28 (3.06) 6.66 (3.19) 
 16 5.95 (2.69) 5.46 (2.52) 
 17 6.21 (2.85) 6.24 (3.15) 
 18 7.30 (2.76) 7.05 (2.91) 
 19 5.76 (2.51) 5.46 (2.56) 
 20 5.92 (2.69) 5.82 (2.87) 
 21 5.90 (2.60) 5.87 (2.30) 
 22 6.53 (2.82) 6.50 (2.99) 
 23 4.30 (2.23) 4.08 (2.25) 
 24 6.76 (2.76) 6.51 (2.58) 
 25 7.09 (3.01) 6.98 (3.14) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
a Means differ at p < .05 
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Table 17 
Study 5 – Statement Responses by Pairing Type 
Pairing Type 
Words Per 
Response 
Sentences 
Per 
Response 
Judged 
Possibility 
Unrelated 
15.79a 
(10.94) 
1.23 
(.49) 
3.83a  
(5.47) 
Conflicting 
19.15b 
(13.48) 
1.29 
(.60) 
-2.73b  
(5.44) 
Contradicting 
16.70a  
(11.76) 
1.22 
(.51) 
-3.59b 
(5.81) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Different superscripts within the same response type 
indicates a significant difference. 
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Table 18 
Study 5 – Statement Responses by Pairing and Trust 
Condition 
Pairing Type 
and Condition 
Number 
Words   
Number 
Sentences  
Judged 
Possibility 
 
Unrelated 
 Trust. Part. 
15.78 
(11.40) 
1.22  
(.47) 
4.32  
(5.38) 
 Untrust. Part. 
15.91 
(10.52) 
1.24  
(.51) 
3.43  
(5.53) 
Conflicting    
 Trust. Part. 
19.62 
(11.95) 
1.28  
(.58) 
-2.57 
(5.59) 
 Untrust. Part. 
18.81 
(14.92) 
1.29  
(.61) 
-2.95  
(5.34) 
Contradicting    
 Trust. Part. 
17.21 
(11.42) 
1.27  
(.53) 
-3.55  
(5.77) 
 Untrust. Part. 
16.31 
(12.14) 
1.18  
(.50) 
-3.66  
(5.90) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Averages are 
assessed per response, not per participant.. 
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--Coefficients (SE)-- 
Table 19 
Study 6: Models of agreement with different arguments, including both manipulated distrust and 
medical mistrust. 
 
 
  
  
   Anti-Rotation Message 
 
 
 
Parameter 
Pro-
Rotation 
Message 
General 
Agreement 
Profit 
Motive 
Not Worth 
Money 
Not Worth 
Personal 
Risk 
Responsible 
Behavior 
 
Constant 
 
B0 
 
6.33 
(.72) 
 
3.01** 
(.97) 
 
3.39** 
(1.09) 
 
3.24* 
(1.02) 
 
5.71*** 
(1.13) 
 
4.26*** 
(1.08) 
Untrustworthy 
Partner 
B1 .03 
(1.33) 
-4.91** 
(1.79) 
-2.50 
(2.02) 
-.14 
(1.88) 
-.75 
(2.07) 
-.68 
(2.00) 
MMV B2 -.106 
(.226) 
.364 
(.30) 
.46 
(.34) 
.11 
(.32) 
-.26 
(.35) 
.27 
(.34) 
MMVxUP B3 -.097 
(.44) 
1.41* 
(.60) 
.67 
(.67) 
.08 
(.63) 
.163 
(.69) 
-.07 
(.67) 
        
 Model F .47 7.02  2.93 .09 .31 2.49 
 Adjusted 
R2 
.02 .22 .08 -.05 -.03 .065 
 p .70 <.001 .04 .97 .82 .068 
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Figure 1. Estimated plausibility ratings based on MMV, statement pairing, and truth value of the statement, according to the 
multilevel model in Experiment 1.  
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Figure 2. Interaction between belief in partner, trustworthiness of partner, and argument position 
on total cognitive responses. 
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Figure 3. Estimated Overall Agreement With the Anti-Tire Rotation Essay in Experiment 6. 
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